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“Everyone is affected daily by administrative intervention, not merely in 
an abstract or philosophical sense but as a matter of practical (and often 
painful) fact...” 
Cora Hoexter, 




Section 33 of the Constitution envisions a lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
manner of obtaining administrative justice. Coupled with the project of Transformative 
Constitutionalism, which seeks to create a culture of justification, the hope was that 
South Africa’s public administration would become more open, accountable and 
efficient.  
The primary mechanism through which the above occurs, is judicial review. 
However, its time-consuming and costly nature means that a large portion of South 
African society cannot gain access to the court system. Furthermore, courts have often 
held that the public administration is better suited to deal with certain matters, as courts 
may lack the necessary expertise to address a particular administrative matter 
adequately. Thus, there is a need to find alternative methods for holding the public 
administration accountable. 
One such method, is by way of the exhaustion of internal remedies. Section 7(2)(a) 
of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 holds that an applicant for 
judicial review must first exhaust any and all available internal remedies before 
approaching a review court. Should the applicant fail to do so, the court is obliged to 
direct said applicant to first exhaust the available internal remedies (section 7(2)(b)), 
unless the court grants an exemption (section 7(2)(c)). 
However, members of the public have no general right to an internal remedy, nor is 
there a duty on the state to provide an aggrieved party with one.  
South African administrative law currently lacks a uniform system of internal 
controls (remedies), and whether or not an aggrieved party will have an internal 
remedy to exhaust, will depend on the context of each case.  
Accordingly, this thesis argues in favour of the creation and implementation of a 
uniform system of internal controls by the state, by relying on four main points: (a) 
section 33 of the Constitution; (b) the project of Transformative Constitutionalism; (c) 
the impact of poverty on the attainment of administrative justice; and (d) the duty to 
exhaust domestic remedies under international law. 
Should the above argument be accepted, then focus must shift to the content and 
scope of an effective internal remedy. By way of analysis of various statutory 
frameworks containing existing internal remedies, nine criteria are identified, which 
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should inform the decision-making of the state when formulating the content and scope 





Artikel 33 van die Grondwet poog om te verseker dat administratiewe geregtigheid 
geskied op ‘n wyse wat regmatig, redelik en prosedureel bilik is. Tesame met die 
projek van Transformatiewe Grondwetlikheid wat ‘n kultuur van regverdiging tot stand 
wil bring, was die hoop dat die publieke administrasie meer toeganklik, aanspreeklik 
en doeltreffend sou funksioneer. 
Die primêre meganisme om die bogenoemde te bereik, is geregtelike hersiening. 
Tog, die tyd- en duursame wyse daarvan beteken dat ‘n groot deel van die Suid-
Afrikaanse publiek sukkel om toegang tot die regsisteem te kry. Verder het howe ook 
reeds bevind dat die publieke administrasie meer geskik is om sekere probleme op te 
los, aangesien howe soms nie die nodige kennis het om sekere administratiewe 
kwessies suksesvol op te los nie. Alternatiewe metodes moet dus gevind word om die 
publieke administrasie verantwoordelik te hou. 
Een so metode is by wyse van die uitputting van interne remedies. Artikel 7(2)(a) 
van die Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 van 2000 vereis dat ‘n applikant vir 
geregtelike hersiening eers beskikbare interne remedies moet uitput voor die hof 
genader word. Sou die applikant dit nie doen nie, moet die hof weier om die saak aan 
te hoor todat relevante interne remedies uitgeput is (artikel 7(2)(b)), tensy die hof ‘n 
uitsondering toestaan (artikel 7(2)(c)). 
Ten spyte van die bogenoemde, het die publiek steeds geen algemene reg tot ‘n 
interne remedie nie, en daar is ook geen plig op die staat om ‘n gegriefde party met 
een te verskaf nie.  
Die Suid-Afrikaanse administratiefreg het tans geen uniforme sisteem van interne 
kontrole (remedies) nie. Dit beteken dat die beskikbaarheid van interne remedies 
streng sal afhang van die konteks van elke saak. 
Gevolglik is hierdie tesis ten gunste van die skepping en implementering van ‘n 
uniforme sisteem van interne kontrole deur die staat, en steun op vier hoof argumente 
daarvoor: (a) artikel 33 van die Grondwet; (b) die projek van Transformatiewe 
Grondwetlikheid; (c) die impak van armoede op administratiewe geregtelikheid; en (d) 
die plig onder internasionale reg om binnelandse remedies uit te put. 
Sou die bogenoemde argument aanvaar word, moet fokus skuif na die inhoud en 
omvang van ‘n effektiewe interne remedie. By wyse van ‘n analise van ‘n aantal 




geïdentifiseer waarop die staat kan steun wanneer die inhoud en omvang van ‘n 
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1 1 Administrative justice 
1 1 1 General 
The enactment of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 
of 1993 (“Interim Constitution”), ushered in the commencement of a new constitutional 
dispensation in South Africa.1 The Apartheid system of government, premised on 
parliamentary sovereignty,2 was replaced with a system based on constitutional 
supremacy and the rule of law.3 This shift was described by the Constitutional Court 
as “a legal watershed”,4 and had a significant impact on South African law, including 
the public law of which administrative law forms part. 
Section 33(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“Constitution”) provides that “everyone has the right to [just] administrative action that 
is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair”. Administrative law (and specifically 
administrative justice) can no longer simply be regarded as a common law tradition.5 
It has been elevated to a constitutional guarantee.6 The Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) was enacted, in line with section 33(3) of the 
Constitution, to give effect to the right to administrative justice.  
However, in order for PAJA to give effect to the constitutional right to administrative 
justice, an applicant must show that they were affected by an “administrative action”7 
as defined in section 1(i) of PAJA.8 This concept serves a “gateway” function, in order 
to ensure that a reviewing body, such as a court or tribunal, does not become 
overburdened with countless review matters.9 It serves to “balance accountability with 
efficiency”.10 
                                            
1 S4(1) of the Interim Constitution: “This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any 
law or act inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary 
implication in this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency”. 
2 Y Burns & R Henrico Administrative law 5 ed (2020) 136; Chapter 2 will provide an in depth discussion 
on the common law tradition of administrative law. 
3 S4 of the Interim Constitution. 
4 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 45. 
5 K Jordaan Monetary Relief for Breaches of Administrative Justice: Common Law, The Constitution 
and PAJA LLM thesis proposal, Stellenbosch University (2017) 4. 
6 4.  
7 H Corder “The development of administrative law in South Africa” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative 
justice in South Africa: an introduction (2016) 1 19. 
8 19. 





1 1 2 Branches capable of performing administrative action 
The principle of separation of powers, although not expressly mentioned in the 
Constitution, forms an integral part of the new constitutional dispensation.11 Each 
branch, namely: the “policy branch”,12 the public administration,13 the legislature14 and 
the judiciary,15 are capable of performing administrative actions.16  
1 1 3 Public administration 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the public administration. The public 
administration, although there is no set definition, consists of all organs of state,17 
excluding the cabinet.18 It is “that part of the executive concerned with the 
implementation of legislation and policy”.19 The Constitutional Court in President of the 
Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union,20 considered the type 
of public administration envisioned for a new democratic South Africa, and the reason 
for infusing the administration with a number of constitutional values, principles and 
duties.21 In this regard, the Constitution devotes a chapter to the public administration, 
emphasising its important role.22  
Specifically, the Constitution determines that the above-mentioned values and 
principles include:  
“[t]he promotion and maintenance of a high standard of professional ethics (s 195(1)(a)), 
the promotion of the efficient, economic and effective use of resources (s 195(1)(b)), the 
                                            
11 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 113; South African Association of Personal 
Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) paras 21 & 22. 
12 Permanent Secretary, Department of Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-College 
(PE)(Section 21) Inc 2008 2 SA 1 (CC) paras 18, 21 & 24. 
13 Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2005 3 SA 156 (C) para 21. 
14 De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 3 SA 430 (C) 452I-453B. 
15 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) 
para 141. 
16 G Quinot & P Maree “Administrative action” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative justice in South Africa: 
an introduction (2016) 65 67-69. 
17 Defined in s239 of the Constitution. 
18 MP Ferreira-Snyman “Demokrasie en die openbare administrasie” (2005) 45 Tydskrif vir 
Geesteswetenskappe 79 80. 
19 P Maree “Administrative authorities in legal context” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative justice in South 
Africa: an introduction (2016) 28 30. 
20 2000 1 SA 1 (CC). 
21 Para 133: “Public administration, which is part of the executive arm of government, is subject to a 
variety of constitutional controls. The Constitution is committed to establishing and maintaining an 
efficient, equitable and ethical public administration which respects fundamental rights and is 
accountable to the broader public…”.  




provision of services in an impartial, fair, equitable and unbiased manner (s 195(1)(d)), the 
accountable conduct of public administration (s 195(1)(f)) and the fostering of transparency 
through the provision to the public of timely, accessible and accurate information (s 
195(1)(g))”.23 
 
Section 195(3) further requires that national legislation be enacted to give effect to the 
values and principles in section 195(1). 
To ensure the realisation of the above, the White Paper on the Transformation of 
the Public Service (“WPTPS”),24 called for the establishment of a policy framework to 
guide the implementation of statute and policy.25 The purpose of the WPTPS was to 
initiate the transformation of the public service, to create “a public service that is 
representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and responsive 
to the needs of all”.26 The adoption of the WPTPS in 1997 therefore resulted in the 
policy of Batho Pele, meaning “putting people first”.27 Batho Pele must ensure, 
amongst others, the accountability of the public administration to the public as a whole. 
The eventual focus of this thesis, being internal remedies, will result in continual 
emphasis of the principle of accountability. 
1 2 Regulation of administrative power 
Administrative law regulates administrative action.28 It determines the validity of an 
action, indicating whether an affected party should seek redress or not, as well as the 
scope and the manner of the administrator’s powers.29  
As mentioned above, the rules of administrative justice are based on lawfulness, 
reasonableness and procedural fairness. PAJA gives effect to these rights guaranteed 
under section 33 of the Constitution, and provides a number of grounds of review on 
which an applicant must rely when challenging administrative action.30  These review 
                                            
23 S195(1) of the Constitution; C Plasket “The Exhaustion of Internal Remedies and s7(2) of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000” (2002) 119 SALJ 50 53. 
24 GN R 1459 of GG 18340 of 01-10-1997. 
25 TI Nzimakwe & Z Mpehle “Key factors in the successful implementation of Batho Pele principles” 
(2012) 7 J. Public Adm. 279 280. 
26 280. 
27 281; See also: Anonymous “Public Service Integrity Management Framework” (2013) Department of 
Public Service and Administration <http://www.dpsa.gov.za/dpsa2g/documents/misc/Integrity%20 
Management%20Framework.pdf> (accessed 12-02-2019). 
28 G Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative justice in South Africa: 
an introduction (2016) 95 96. 
29 96. 
30 See s6 of PAJA for a comprehensive list of these grounds of review. See also: Burns & Henrico 




grounds are specifically important in relation to judicial review, the first regulatory 
mechanism through which administrative action can be challenged.31 
Further regulatory mechanisms through which administrative action may be 
challenged include: (a) legislative oversight, a mechanism which precedes all other 
forms of regulation, as administrative action primarily originates from legislative 
provisions;32 (b) mechanisms internal to the administration, allowing the administration 
to “correct their own mistakes”;33 and lastly; (c) specialised oversight bodies that 
include, amongst others, the Public Protector34 and the Public Service Commission.35 
1 3 Judicial review 
1 3 1 General 
In spite of the diverse regulatory mechanisms, only judicial review shall be 
examined in this thesis. Judicial review, as developed under the common law, remains 
the most important form of control over the powers, organisation and actions of the 
public administration.36 Under the common law, the High Court was said to have an 
inherent power to review administrative action judicially.37 This was based on the 
doctrine of ultra vires, which encompasses:  
“the responsibility of the courts to interpret and apply legislation so as to ensure that those 
to whom parliament has delegated powers do not exceed or abuse them.”38 
  
With the advent of democracy in 1994, judicial review was subjected to dramatic 
change.39 Section 24 of the Interim Constitution and section 33 of the Constitution, 
meant that South Africa’s written Constitution became, for the first time, the source “of 
                                            
31 Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in Administrative justice in South Africa 96. 
32 97.  
33 100. 
34 See chapter 9 of the Constitution. 
35 See chapter 10 of the Constitution. 
36 M Wiechers Administratiefreg 2 ed (1984) 292; Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in 
Administrative justice in South Africa 109. 
37 This was authoritatively established in: Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg 
Town Council 1903 TS 111 115: “Whenever a public has a duty imposed upon it by statute, and 
disregards important provisions of the statute, or is guilty of gross irregularity or clear illegality in the 
performance of the duty, this Court may be asked to review the proceedings complained of and set 
aside or correct them. This is no special machinery created by the Legislature; it is a right inherent in 
the Court”; See also Shidiack v Union Government (Minister of the Interior) 1912 AD 642. 
38 A Breitenbach “The place of the common law in ‘constitutional’ administrative law” in H Corder & L 
Van Der Vijver (eds) Administrative Justice (2002) 37 37. 




both the courts’ power of judicial review and of the rules of administrative law.”40 
Nonetheless, with PAJA, the High Court remained the court of first instance for judicial 
review,41 until 2019. On 19 September 2019, the Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services identified a number of Magistrate’s Courts who will, in addition to the High 
Court, have jurisdiction over the review of administrative action.42 This will be 
discussed in chapter 3. 
The most important characteristic of judicial review is that it should not be confused 
with appeals. In line with the principle of separation of powers, the judiciary “‘reviews’ 
the procedural regularity of the exercise of public power and does not hear ‘appeals’”.43 
“Substantive decision-making on the facts or the merits”44 falls to the executive branch 
of government, and not to the judiciary.45 It is the duty of judges to review whether the 
executive, and more specifically, the public administration had remained within the 
limits of the authority granted to them when reaching a decision or exercising a 
discretion. 
In order for an aggrieved party to approach a court for judicial review, they must 
comply with a number of procedural requirements,46 of which two require emphasis, 
namely: (a) the duty to exhaust internal remedies, and (b) launching the application 
for judicial review “without unreasonable delay and within 180 days”. The duty to 
exhaust internal remedies shall be the primary focus of this thesis.  
1 3 2 Exhaustion of internal remedies under PAJA 
Internal remedies (or control) are distinct from the control exercised by civil courts.47 
It concerns an appeal, or other forms of control, internal to the administration 
                                            
40 Breitenbach “The place of the common law in ‘constitutional’ administrative law” in Administrative 
Justice 39; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 33. 
41 S7(4) of PAJA provides that: “[u]ntil the rules of procedure referred to in subsection (3) come into 
operation, all proceedings for judicial review under this Act must be instituted in a High Court or another 
court having jurisdiction”. 
42 GN R1216 in GG 42717 of 19-09-2019. 
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(b) statutory time limits; (c) exhaustion of internal control measures; (d) showing legal standing to bring 
the action; (e) application proceedings; (f) burden of proof; and (g) oral evidence. For further information 
see: Burns & Henrico Administrative law chapter 24. 




concerned.48 There is a distinct relationship between judicial review and internal 
remedies.49 An aggrieved party is not permitted to approach a court for judicial review, 
before all internal remedies have been exhausted.50 This duty is encapsulated in 
section 7(2) of PAJA.51 The purpose of this provision is to “advance an integrated 
system of regulation of administrative action”.52 The administration should as far as 
possible be equipped with the tools to rectify its own mistakes.53 
Under the common law, there was no absolute duty to first exhaust an internal 
remedy before approaching a court for review.54 However, with the enactment of 
section 7(2)(a) of PAJA, courts have been at pains to stress that internal remedies 
must first be exhausted, unless exceptional circumstances can be shown.55 Thus, 
section 7(2) made far-reaching changes to the common law. Firstly, there is now a 
“positive and unequivocal obligation”56 to exhaust internal remedies, irrespective of 
the circumstances. Secondly, it bars a court from reviewing administrative action until 
internal remedies have been exhausted (unless an exemption is granted).57 Lastly, for 
an exemption to be granted, the applicant bears the onus of showing exceptional 
circumstances why he or she should not be required to first exhaust an available 
internal remedy.58 
In light of this, it is clear that this duty is strictly enforced. It places renewed pressure 
on an aggrieved party to first approach the public administration, utilising its 
                                            
48 602.  
49 Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in Administrative justice in South Africa 115. 
50 Burns & Henrico Administrative law 603. 
51 “7. Procedure for judicial review –  
(2)(a) Subject to paragraph (c), no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action in terms of this 
Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has first been exhausted.  
(b) Subject to paragraph (c), a court or tribunal must, if it is not satisfied that any internal remedy referred 
to in paragraph (a) has been exhausted, direct that the person concerned must first exhaust such 
remedy before instituting proceedings in a court or tribunal for judicial review in terms of this Act.  
(c) A court or tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the person concerned, 
exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any internal remedy if the court or tribunal deems it 
in the interest of justice”. 
52 Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in Administrative justice in South Africa 115. 
53 Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for HR as Amicus Curiae) 2010 4 SA 327 (CC) para 36. 
54 Para 34; J R de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) 466; Burns & 
Henrico Administrative law 602-603. 
55 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd (Formerly Tropical Paradise 427 
(Pty) Ltd 2010 3 All SA 577 (SCA) para 19; Dengetenge Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sphere Mining 
& Development Co Ltd 2014 5 SA 138 (CC) paras 127-133; Nichol v Registrar of Pension Funds 2008 
1 SA 383 (SCA) para 15. 
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procedures, before approaching the court. This thesis adopts the view that this is a 
positive development, seeing that internal remedies are usually more informal than 
judicial proceedings.59 It is also more affordable, which is important in a country where 
more than 50% of the population lives below the poverty line,60 and “can address a 
wider range of issues regarding administrative action.”61 
Nonetheless, there is no uniform system of internal controls in South Africa.62 A 
party affected by an administrative action has no right to an internal remedy, and there 
is no obligation on a particular part of the public administration to have internal 
remedies in place.63 The creation of a “more coherent and uniform system of internal 
remedies”64 was considered during the drafting process of PAJA.65 However, this was 
left to the discretion of the Minister of Justice, who was afforded the discretion in terms 
of PAJA, to appoint an advisory council who could advise on “any improvements that 
might be made in respect of internal complaints procedures”.66 To date, no steps to 
this effect have been taken.67 Therefore, whether an aggrieved party will have an 
internal remedy to exhaust depends on the “particular legislative framework in terms 
of which the administrative action”68 was taken. 
Arguably this creates a lacuna in South African law, which is the first element to be 
investigated by this thesis. 
1 3 3 The content of internal remedies under PAJA 
It must further be noted that, even if one accepts that an internal remedy must first 
be exhausted, whether an internal remedy actually exists is a far more complicated 
question. Section 7(2) only applies to particular types of internal remedies. Firstly, it 
must be a remedy found in statute or in regulations,69 and it must be internal to the 
specific administration concerned.70 Secondly, the internal remedy must be available 
                                            
59 102. 
60 L Chutel “Post-apartheid South Africa is failing the very people it liberated” (25-08-2017) Quartz Africa 
<https://qz.com/africa/1061461/post-apartheid-south-africa-is-failing-the-very-people-it-liberated/> 
(accessed 09-02-2019); Anonymous “Poverty on the rise in South Africa” (22-08-2017) StatsSA 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334> (accessed 09-02-2019). 
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68 100. 
69 Road Accident Fund v Duma and Three Similar Cases 2013 6 SA 9 (SCA) para 25. 




and effective,71 which implies that it should be capable of providing appropriate relief, 
akin to that of judicial review.72 Section 7(2) only comes into play if these conditions 
are met. 
In trying to determine whether a particular remedy satisfies the above criteria, courts 
have often arrived at different conclusions.73 Therefore, the second element of this 
thesis will be to determine the content, requirements and scope of an effective internal 
remedy. 
There is a variety of internal remedies to be found in South African legislation. It 
would be beyond the scope of this thesis to review each of these mechanisms. 
However, in order to identify the criteria of an effective internal remedy, focus shall be 
on local government legislation,74 as well as internal remedies in the immigration, 
social welfare and school fee context.  
2 Research question  
The overarching research question of this thesis is the extent to which, in light of 
Transformative Constitutionalism75 and the Batho Pele principles, there should be a 
general and enforceable duty on the state, to create mechanisms that qualify as 
internal remedies, under section 7(2) of PAJA. This question entails two elements: 
firstly, one must establish the fundamental basis for the existence of such a duty, and 
secondly, the content and scope of an internal remedy complying with such a duty, 
must be determined. 
3 Rationale  
3 1 Transformative Constitutionalism 
It was mentioned above76 that the Interim Constitution, and its successor, the 
Constitution, signalled a decisive break with South Africa’s Apartheid past. The post-
1994 dispensation is a constitutional one, premised on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.77 As part of the new constitutional vision, much has been written on the issue 
                                            
71 Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for HR as Amicus Curiae) 2010 4 SA 327 (CC) para 44. 
72 Reed v Master of the High Court of SA 2005 2 All SA 429 (E) paras 20-25; Koyabe v Minister for 
Home Affairs (Lawyers for HR as Amicus Curiae) 2010 4 SA 327 (CC) para 44. 
73 See the discussion immediately succeeding this point. 
74 Local government is the arm of government with which the public come into contact with most often. 
See: heading 3 in chapter 5.  
75 Defined in: K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150; 
see discussion in the rationale below. 
76 See footnote 1.  




of Transformative Constitutionalism. Karl Klare defines Transformative 
Constitutionalism as a: 
“long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed 
to transforming a country's political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism 
connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political 
processes grounded in law.”78 
 
In conjunction with Klare, former Chief Justice Pius Langa wrote that Transformative 
Constitutionalism includes “the pursuit of some form of economic transformation and 
a change in legal culture.”79 Transformation, he argues, is an ongoing process which 
recognises that there is value in that ever-present process itself.80 It envisions a 
“meaningful improvement of the material conditions of people’s lives together with real 
change in legal culture.”81 
The Constitution envisages four features of transformation, namely: (a) the 
realisation of substantive equality; (b) the achievement of social justice; (c) the 
introduction and implementation of human rights standards; and (d) the “promotion of 
a culture of justification in public-law interactions.”82 The last-mentioned feature is 
especially relevant to this thesis, due to the public administration involving 
administrative actions, which amount to public-law interactions.83 
As mentioned above, the public administration is governed by section 195(1) of the 
Constitution, as well as the Batho Pele principles.84 These principles, in conjunction 
with the project of Transformative Constitutionalism, seeks to build a public 
administration that is efficient, accountable and transparent. 
3 2 Lack of access to justice due to poverty 
It has been 26 years since the end of Apartheid, yet South Africa continues to 
experience severe levels of poverty. More than 55.5% of the population live below the 
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80 142.  
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82 C Hoexter “Judicial Policy Revisited: Transformative Adjudication in Administrative law” (2008) 24 
SAJHR 281 286-287. 
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poverty line, and must make ends meet on less than a R1 227 per month.85 
Exacerbating this problem is South Africa’s high unemployment rate of 30.1%.86 In the 
words of former Deputy Judge President Mojapelo of the South Gauteng High Court, 
South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies in the world, with a highly 
skewed income distribution.87 He emphasised that there is an ever increasing gap 
between the rich and the poor, and argued that there cannot be access to justice as 
long as poverty and unemployment prevails.88  
It is unsurprising that most South Africans cannot afford to approach the court 
system, something that is problematic, seeing that the right of access to courts is 
guaranteed under section 34 of the Constitution. As mentioned above, the court of first 
instance for the review of administrative action is predominantly the High Court (and 
designated Magistrate’s Courts).89 However, there are only fourteen provincial High 
Court divisions,90 and each are located in urban areas (cities or large towns).91 This 
constitutes a barrier to access to justice, seeing that some people have to travel great 
distances to get to the court. Further, the high costs and time-consuming nature of the 
judicial process prevents access.92 It is estimated that, if all procedures are followed 
and all parties timely perform their respective responsibilities, a review application 
could take nine months to be finalised before a court.93 However, it is a well-known 
fact that securing access to records held by government often poses the greatest 
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86 Anonymous “Quarterly Labour Force Survey” (23-06-2020) StatsSA 
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87 K Ramotsho “High litigation costs deprive the poor access to justice” (01-11-2018) De Rebus 
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91 Anonymous (04-09-2012) South African Government Information <https://web.archive.rg/web 
/20120904234855/http://www.info.gov.za:80/aboutgovt/justice/courts.ht> (accessed 16-02-2019). 
92 J Dugard “Courts and the Poor in South Africa: A Critique of Systematic Judicial Failures to Advance 
Transformative Justice” (2008) 24 SAJHR 214 216. 
93 This is merely an estimation. There are a number of decisions where the time-line has stretched far 
beyond this period. See in this regard: President of the Republic of South Africa v Democratic Alliance 
(664/17) 2018 ZASCA 79; Zuma v Democratic Alliance; Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 
v Democratic Alliance 2018 1 SA 200 (SCA); South Durban Community Environmental Alliance v MEC 
for Economic Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs: KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government 




challenge in review applications.94 Thus, a more accurate time-line could be anything 
between twelve to eighteen months, if not longer, from launch of an application to date 
of judgment by the court.95 
Also, legal representation in the High Court entails the use of advocates in the 
majority of cases. A junior advocate may charge approximately R550 per hour (or 
R5500 per day), whilst counsel of ten years’ standing could charge between R1500 
and R2400 per hour (or between R15 000 and R24 000 per day).96 Furthermore, 
should one consult an attorney “to institute or to defend an action”, costs of such a 
consultation may be set at R292.50 (per quarter of an hour), while the “drawing-up, 
checking, typing, printing, delivery, copies…” of letters, telegrams and facsimiles may 
be charged at R117.50 per page.97 This means that costs and fees severely restrict 
access to justice for the poor, especially civil justice.98  
Yet, “access to justice is an essential imperative”99 in South Africa’s post-Apartheid 
era.100 Dugard has gone as far as to argue that the judiciary has remained 
“institutionally unresponsive to the problems of the poor”101 and that it “fails to advance 
transformative justice.”102 One of her main arguments is that the “judiciary has 
collectively failed to act as an institutional voice for the poor.”103 
The poor and vulnerable in South Africa thus find themselves in a double bind, they 
are increasingly reliant on the state administration for their social welfare, but unable 
to access the primary mechanism to enforce justice in such administrative decision-
making. 
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3 3 The obligation in international law to exhaust domestic remedies 
In Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for HR as Amicus Curiae) 
(“Koyabe”),104 the Court, when discussing section 7(2)(a) of PAJA, held:  
“[a] useful analogous requirement in international law is the customary international law 
duty to exhaust available domestic remedies before approaching an international 
tribunal.”105 
  
It is a recognised principle of customary international law that, should a respondent 
state provide domestic remedies, the applicant should first exhaust those remedies 
before approaching an international forum. The purpose of those remedies are to 
provide states with the opportunity to “find their own solutions”,106 and “to make 
beneficial use of their access to relevant facts [and] information […].”107 
The international position is analogous to the South African approach to internal 
remedies under section 7(2) of PAJA. However, there is one issue not yet seen 
domestically, but which has been raised by international scholars. Referencing 
Udombana,108 the Court in Koyabe emphasised that:  
“[a] condition for the application of the local remedies rule is that it must first be determined 
whether those remedies exist, which implies the corresponding duty of the state to provide 
them. . .” (emphasis added).109 
 
This argument in international law, that there should be a recognisable and 
enforceable duty on states to provide domestic remedies, has been consistently made 
since the 1960’s.110 It is peculiar that a similar argument in relation to the exhaustion 
of internal remedies under PAJA has not been made at national (domestic) level.  
3 4 Improving access to justice 
In light of the project of Transformative Constitutionalism and the almost 
insurmountable problems posed by poverty, unemployment and lack of access to 
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justice, the question then becomes whether there is a solution? This is important, 
because it does not appear from the above that judicial review will always be the most 
effective remedy in all cases of review of administrative action. Ultimately, the question 
is whether there is a mechanism that can assist in advancing Transformative 
Constitutionalism, and assist in providing access to justice? 
This thesis will argue in the affirmative, arguing that a system of internal remedies 
may provide such a solution. The majority of South Africans cannot afford to take the 
public administration to court, should they feel that they have been adversely impacted 
by an administrative action. However, if the public administration is required to 
establish and implement a uniform system of internal controls, then in light of the 
obligation under section 7(2)(a) of PAJA, there may be appropriate remedial action in 
place for an aggrieved party. It could create the possibility of affordable and time-
friendly mechanisms that must first be exhausted before any party involved will be able 
to approach a court.111 
The only issue that poses difficulty is that the research problem highlights the fact 
that there is no clarity on what constitutes an internal remedy. Also, at this moment, 
internal remedies only function in the judicial review context, but not in a facilitative 
manner that is required to provide equal access to justice for all. Thus, there is a need 
for the current study.  
4 Hypotheses  
a) In line with the current understanding of administrative justice, it is desirable 
to have a specific mechanism, other than judicial review, with which 
administrative action can be challenged. 
b) The project of Transformative Constitutionalism, together with a proper 
reading of the Constitution, requires administrative law to have an effective, 
accessible and affordable mechanism with which administrative action can 
be challenged.  
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5 Methodology  
The thesis shall the take the form of a classical doctrinal study. By utilising the 
primary112 and secondary113 sources of law, this thesis will analyse the current legal 
position regarding the use and applicability of internal remedies in South African 
administrative law. This, together with the below-mentioned theoretical framework, will 
test the above-mentioned hypotheses, and try to answer the research question. 
6 Division of chapters 
6 1 Chapter 2 
This chapter will investigate the development of the concept of administrative law, 
as understood under the common law Apartheid era, into the concept of administrative 
justice in the new constitutional dispensation. As mentioned above, there was a clear 
shift from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy, which greatly 
impacted administrative justice. The shift away from the classifications of functions 
approach towards the functional approach,114 as well as the realisation of a culture of 
justification115 must be clearly set out. Furthermore, the chapter will provide a clear 
exposition on the reform of South African administrative law that occurred between the 
years 1990 and 2000,116 and will emphasise the need for an accountable public 
administration. 
6 2 Chapter 3 
The third chapter will seek to analyse judicial review, in view of section 7(2) of PAJA. 
A discussion of the procedure of judicial review under both the former and current 
dispensation will be provided so as to enable one to grasp the importance thereof. 
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Utilising case law, the two procedural requirements of judicial review117 shall then be 
discussed,118 with specific focus placed on the functionality and applicability of the duty 
to exhaust available internal remedies.119 The chapter will ultimately conclude with a 
discussion on the absence of a uniform system of internal controls. 
6 3 Chapter 4 
This chapter shall emphasise the dual nature of administrative law. The nature of 
administrative law is twofold:  
“on the one hand, administrative law aims to restrict public power (control); on the other 
hand, administrative law aims to enable and facilitate the exercise of public power 
(empowerment)”.120  
 
Chapter 4 will argue that the duty under section 7(2)(a) of PAJA to exhaust internal 
remedies satisfies the first leg, namely, control. However, the absence of a uniform 
system of internal controls in South Africa means that the second leg of administrative 
law, empowerment, is absent. There is control, but no empowerment. 
It was argued above121 that the new constitutional dispensation envisions the 
realisation of the project of Transformative Constitutionalism. The Batho Pele 
principles requires a public administration that is efficient, accountable and 
transparent.122 Yet, how can this vision be realised without there being a general duty 
on the public administration to have internal mechanisms in place through which they 
can be held directly accountable? The only choice for an aggrieved party in the 
absence of internal remedies is to approach a court for judicial review, which may be 
unaffordable and time-consuming.  
Chapter 4 will thus seek to establish a basis for the argument that there should be 
a general duty on the public administration to have internal remedies in place that 
require exhaustion under section 7(2)(a) of PAJA. 
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6 4 Chapter 5 
If the premise that there should be a duty on the public administration to have 
internal remedies in place is accepted, then the second element of the research 
question must be addressed, namely the content and scope of internal remedies. The 
basic criteria to be satisfied is highlighted above.123 Thus, chapter 5 will seek to 
determine what an effective internal remedy for the purposes of a uniform system of 
internal controls must entail. In this regard, mechanisms which are considered to 
amount to internal remedies (or not) will be reviewed. The focus shall be on local 
government law, specifically section 62 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems 
Act 32 of 2000 (“Systems Act”) and regulations 49 and 50 of the Supply Chain 
Management Regulations.  
Chapter 5 will scrutinise South African case law to determine why the content of 
section 62 has been uniformly accepted as an internal remedy requiring exhaustion, 
but not that of regulations 49 and 50.124 Chapter 5 will show that in order to determine 
the content and scope of effective internal remedies that can ensure an efficient, 
accountable and transparent public administration, alternatives to local government 
law need to be explored. 
6 5 Chapter 6 
In light of the absence of agreement on what constitutes an effective internal 
remedy, chapter 6 will flow from chapter 5 and review further examples of internal 
remedies in the immigration, social welfare and school fee context. These remedies 
are highlighted due to focus being on enabling marginalised sections of society (such 
as the poor) to gain access to the justice system. 
This chapter will involve an in depth study of these internal remedies, as a means 
to support the argument that South African administrative law is in need of a uniform 
system of internal controls, to advance the Batho Pele principles, as well as the project 
of Transformative Constitutionalism, to realise an accountable public administration. 
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6 6 Conclusion 
Lastly, this chapter will unify the first 6 chapters and indicate whether the research 
was successful in answering the research question and proving the hypothesis. 
Chapter 7 shall be concise, so as to merely emphasise the main points of conclusion 
already stipulated in the preceding chapters, and provide my recommendations for the 
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As the winds of change brought democracy and considerable social, political and 
economic change to the shores of South Africa in the last decade of the twentieth 
century, so too did it transform administrative law between the years 1990 and 2000. 
Under the common law, South African administrative law was based on the doctrines, 
traditions and conventions of the English law.1 Further, the principles of legislative 
supremacy and parliamentary sovereignty applied.2 The Constitution was not 
supreme. With the advent of democracy, however, both the Interim Constitution3 and 
the Constitution confirmed the Constitution’s supremacy, and that of the rule of law.4  
Due to a number of reforms,5 South African administrative law experienced a shift 
towards an all-encompassing concept, known as “administrative justice”.6 
Administrative law is no longer simply concerned with judicial review before the 
courts.7 Rather, it also considers “alternative methods of scrutinising the fairness and 
justice of administrative conduct.”8  
This shift towards administrative justice shall be discussed in depth throughout the 
remainder of this chapter. A critical understanding of this concept contributes to, and 
supports, the need for a duty on the state to provide a system of internal remedies.9 
Accordingly, the chapter will first attempt to define administrative law in general (this 
will be done by considering a multiplicity of working definitions under both the common 
law and the post-1994 dispensation), where after the position of administrative law 
under the common law shall be set out, together with the reforms that enabled the shift 
towards the broader concept of administrative justice. Lastly, an in-depth exposition 
on the concept of administrative justice shall be provided, so as to convey its impact 
on the question of exhaustion of internal remedies under section 7(2)(a) of PAJA.10 
                                            
1 L Baxter Administrative law (1994) 30. 
2 30. 
3 S4(1) of the Constitution: “This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or 
act inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary 
implication in this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency”. 
4 Ss 1(c) and 2 of the Constitution. 
5 See heading 4 below. 
6 See heading 5 below. 
7 H Corder “The development of administrative law in South Africa” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative 
justice in South Africa: an introduction (2016) 1 4. 
8 4. 
9 See heading 6 3 in chapter 1. Further discussion shall ensue in chapter 4. 




2 Defining administrative law 
2 1 Common law 
Under the common law, it was recognised that there were numerous approaches 
to defining administrative law. Baxter highlighted that there was “little agreement as to 
its precise outer boundaries, and the perceptions of the subject and its central 
concerns [were] continuously changing and broadening.”11 Nevertheless, Baxter 
defined administrative law as:  
“that branch of public law which regulates the legal relations of public authorities, whether 
with private individuals and organisations, or with other public authorities…”12  
Wiechers provided a similar definition, albeit in Afrikaans, emphasising that:  
“[a]dministratiefreg is daardie deel van die publiekreg wat die organisasie, bevoegdhede 
en optredes van die staatsadministrasie reël.”13  
Thus, Wiechers’s definition further emphasised that administrative law forms part of 
the public law, and is concerned with the organisation, capacity and actions of the 
state administration. 
In short, Baxter summarised general administrative law as follows: 
“It stipulates a set of common principles which are designed to promote the effective use 
of administrative power, to protect individuals and organisations from its misuse, to 
preserve a balance of fairness between public authorities and those with whom they 
interact, and to ensure the maintenance of public interest.”14 
It is however important to note a number of parallels between the common law and 
post-1994 definitions of administrative law, seeing that the common law continues to 
exist and influence administrative law in the post-1994 dispensation.15 
2 2 Post-1994 constitutional dispensation 
Under the current dispensation, recognition was once again given to the fact that 
there can be no set definition for administrative law in general. Corder emphasises 
                                            
11 Baxter Administrative law 55. 
12 2. 
13 In English: “administrative law is that part of the public law that governs the organisation, capacities 
and actions of the public (state) administration” (own translation). See: M Wiechers Administratiefreg 2 
ed (1984) 2.  
14 Baxter Administrative law 3. 
15 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 45; A Breitenbach “The place of the common law in ‘constitutional 




that one should not seek to find “absolute clarity or certainty [with regards to the] many 
rules of administrative law.”16 Thus, Corder defines administrative law as follows:  
“[a]dministrative law is that part of constitutional law which both empowers those exercising 
public authority or performing public functions through the law, and which holds 
accountable to rules of law all those who exercise public power or perform public 
functions.”17 
Devenish, Govender and Hulme also attempt to define administrative law, by stating 
that:  
“administrative law, which is a part of the domain of public law, regulates the organisation, 
capacities and actions of the state in its interactions with individuals and juristic persons.”18 
It therefore becomes apparent, that administrative law forms part of public law, is 
concerned with those exercising public power or performing public functions, and 
simultaneously attempts to hold those same actors accountable for their decisions 
and/or actions. Accountability becomes the focal point of administrative law (and more 
so of administrative justice) under the new dispensation.19 
3 Administrative law under the common law 
Under the common law, the majority of South African administrative law could be 
found in South African statute and case law.20 However, unwritten rules of 
administrative law were drawn primarily from English law.21 
Firstly, the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and legislative supremacy formed 
an integral part of South Africa’s Apartheid Constitutions.22 As a result, the courts had 
no power to question the validity of enacted Acts of parliament, and had to both 
observe, as well as enforce, the will of parliament, whether the bench agreed with the 
content of the enacted legislation or not.23 Emphasising the impact of these doctrines, 
Stratford ACJ wrote in Sachs v Minister of Justice,24 that:  
                                            
16 Corder “The development of administrative law in South Africa” in Administrative justice in South 
Africa 3. 
17 3. 
18 GE Devenish, K Govender & D Hulme Administrative law and Justice in South Africa (2001) 7.  
19 See the discussion under heading 5 below. 
20 Wiechers Administratiefreg 37-38. 
21 For an in depth exposition on these rules, see: Wiechers Administratiefreg 38-39. 
22 This was the position ever since the enactment of the Statute of Westminster by the British Parliament 
in 1931. See: Baxter Administrative law 30.  
23 30. 




“[p]arliament may make any encroachment it chooses upon the life, liberty, or property of 
any individual subject to its sway, and … it is the function of the courts of law to enforce its 
will.”25 
Further, in 2004 Justice O’Regan summarised the common law position as follows: 
“[f]rom the early part of the last century, the courts generally […] capitulated the force of 
the legislature and executive bent on the abuse of power for racial ends.”26  
The above indicates that there was little room for the judiciary to be critical, or 
exercise any form of independent authority. It was subservient to the legislature.27 This 
formed the basis on which judicial review had to occur, as parliament had the power 
to authorise any administrative action it deemed fit.28 
Secondly, administrative law was primarily premised on the ultra vires doctrine.29 
The doctrine is linked to both the separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty 
principles, and holds:  
“in applying the law, the courts must ensure that Parliament’s intention is carried out. It 
allows judges to strike down governmental action falling outside the parliamentary 
mandate.”30 
It provided an “inherent” rationale for judicial review, implying that the court required 
no statutory authorisation to perform judicial review.31 In short, Baxter highlights that: 
“[t]he self-justification of the ultra vires doctrine is that its application consists of nothing 
other than an application of the law itself, and the law of parliament [included].”32 
Thirdly, the review capacity of courts could be completely nullified through the use 
of so-called “ouster clauses”.33 An ouster clause “is a provision in a statute that 
attempts to shield the exercise of particular administrative power from legal scrutiny, 
                                            
25 37. 
26 K O’Regan “Breaking Ground: Some Thoughts on the Seismic Shift in Our Administrative Law” (2004) 
121 SALJ 424 424. 
27 State Information Technology Agency SOC Limited v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Limited 2018 2 SA 23 
(CC) para 25. 
28 Baxter Administrative law 30. 
29 Corder “The development of administrative law in South Africa” in Administrative justice in South 
Africa 16. 
30 C Hoexter “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 SALJ 
484 486, footnote 7. 
31 Baxter Administrative law 303. 
32 303. 





particularly by the courts.”34 These provisions were often utilised due to the application 
of the ultra vires doctrine, as explained above. Therefore, through the assignment of 
wide-reaching discretionary powers to, for example, the State President under the 
former Public Safety Act 3 of 1953,could promulgate regulations to oust the capacity 
of courts to review the lawfulness of laws and regulations.35 This further enforced the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament had the power to determine the 
issues to be decided by the courts.36 
Fourthly, the separation of powers principle was fundamental to the functioning of 
administrative law.37 There are three branches of government,38 with the main issue 
being the delineation of how far the capacity of courts, to review the actions of the 
other two branches of government, extends.39 Under the common law, the courts and 
legal practitioners made extensive use of the “classification of functions” doctrine (also 
known as the institutional approach).40 This was done in an attempt to provide 
coherence to administrative law, and determine whether the principles of natural 
justice, audi alteram partem (listen to the other side)41 and nemo iudex in sua causa 
potest (no one should be a judge in their own cause/interest)42 applied to a set of facts. 
A reviewing judge would attempt to classify the administrative conduct in question into 
one of five categories.43 In light of the severe restrictions placed on the rights and civil 
liberties of the majority of South Africa’s citizens, people often turned to administrative 
law, and more specifically judicial review, to “curtail or ameliorate the effects of 
                                            
34 G Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative justice in South Africa: 
an introduction (2016) 95 98. 
35 S2 and 3(1)(a) of the Public Safety Act; for a further analyses regarding the impact of wide 
discretionary powers being conferred on officials, see: WHB Dean “Our Administrative Law: A Dismal 
Science” (1986) 2 SAJHR 164 167. 
36 It could be argued that ouster clauses began to provide a basis for the use of internal remedies. The 
idea that solutions should be sought from an institution, other than the courts. In chapter 4, the rationale 
behind the implementation of a uniform system of internal remedies will be discussed, together with the 
idea that the administration should be empowered to correct its own mistakes. 
37 Baxter Administrative law 30; Wiechers Administratiefreg 17. 
38 The executive, the legislature and the judiciary. 
39 Corder “The development of administrative law in South Africa” in Administrative justice in South 
Africa 12. 
40 12; see the discussion under heading 5 2 2. 
41 M Murcott “Procedural Fairness” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative justice in South Africa: an 
introduction (2016) 145 145. 
42 145. 
43 The action’s nature would be classified as being of a (a) law-making; (b) judicial; (c) quasi-judicial; 
(d) purely administrative; or (e) ministerial nature. See Corder “The development of administrative law 




executive and administrative tyranny.”44 Administrative law became a mechanism 
used by people to fight the injustices of Apartheid. Thus, in an attempt to limit the 
scope of judicial review, courts relied on the classification of functions doctrine.45  
In conclusion, in 1986 W H B Dean provided an in-depth analysis on the state of 
South African administrative law. His conclusions led him to refer to this subject as a 
“dismal science.”46 Writing on the need for the legislature to provide enabling 
legislation that courts could employ in their review of administrative decisions, he held 
that:  
“[i]t is a process which involves not only legal skills of a high order, but also imagination to 
adapt old arguments to new uses. If South African administrative law is to cease to be a 
'dismal science', we must try harder.”47 
In light of this conclusion, the following section aims to set out the four stages of reform 
deemed critical for the shift to administrative justice.  
4 The reform of South African administrative law: 1990-2000 
4 1 The first stage 
In February 1993, approximately 100 South African delegates, as well as 
international scholars, attended a three-day conference at the Breakwater campus of 
the University of Cape Town.48 The conference, “Administrative Law for a future South 
Africa”, resulted in a two-page document which listed both terms of agreement, and 
areas requiring urgent attention, and became known as the “Breakwater Declaration.” 
One of the most important proposals to flow from the conference, was to include a 
right to administrative justice in the future Constitution,49 although its parameters was 
not yet delineated.  
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to other rights in the Bill of Rights.” 
46 Dean (1986) SAJHR 176. 
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48 Corder “The development of administrative law in South Africa” in Administrative justice in South 
Africa 17; H Corder “Reviewing review: much achieved, much more to do” in H Corder & L Van der 
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4 2 The second stage 
The second stage was earmarked by the eventual inclusion of a right to 
administrative justice in section 24 of the Interim Constitution. Although delegations to 
the Multi-Party Negotiation Process could see the value of such a right, its formulation 
was steeped in controversy.50 Those who would form part of the future government 
remembered the damage “which could be inflicted as the result of the unbridled 
exercise of power and appreciated the role played by judicial review during 
apartheid.”51 Yet, they simultaneously did not wish to be too constrained in their 
freedom to ensure good governance and “socio-economic reconstruction and 
redistribution.”52 
As a result, section 24 of the Interim Constitution was redrafted and renegotiated 
and finally set out as follows: 
“Every person shall have the right to- 
(a) lawful administrative action where any of his or her rights or interests is affected or 
threatened;  
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of his or her rights or legitimate 
expectations is affected or threatened;  
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which affects any of 
his or her rights or interests unless the reasons for such action have been made public; 
and  
(d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it where 
any of his or her rights is affected or threatened.” 
4 3 The third stage 
Despite its “generous and innovative provisions”,53 the post-Apartheid ANC-led 
government increasingly saw section 24 as hindering their discretionary exercise of 
power,54 and proposed removing the right to administrative justice from the final 
Constitution.55 The government felt that replacing section 24 with a “comprehensive 
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statutory regime”56 would be more appropriate. However, the proposal was met with 
considerable opposition, and a compromise was struck.57 There would be a right to 
administrative justice in the Constitution, as well as a provision calling for the statutory 
regulation thereof.58  
Ultimately, section 33 of the Final Constitution reads as follows: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.  
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons.  
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must—  
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal;  
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); 
and  
(c) promote an efficient administration.”  
4 4 The fourth stage 
In January 1999, the working committee of the South African Law Commission 
began its work on the draft bill on administrative justice.59 The draft bill proposed an 
“intricate and detailed” definition for “administrative action”, a certain minimum content 
for compliance with procedural fairness, as well as a notice or comment procedure (or 
a public enquiry) for acts which affects the public.60 Ultimately, the proposal was seen 
as progressive and providing for a flexible and accessible process of administrative 
review.61 Nevertheless, upon the draft bill being submitted to the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Justice, extensive changes were made to the bill, removing 
much of that flexibility and progressiveness.62 
Both houses of Parliament ultimately approved the bill, and the President signed 
PAJA into law on 3 February 2000. PAJA sets out to regulate the entire administrative 
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law regime, and, in terms of the principle of subsidiarity,63 is the first port of call for any 
person wishing to challenge an administrative action. Accordingly, PAJA and the 
Constitution constitute the primary sources of administrative justice. However, to 
enable one to understand their impact, one needs to comprehend what is meant by a 
right to administrative justice. 
5 Administrative justice under the post-1994 constitutional dispensation 
5 1 Democracy and constitutional supremacy 
On 27 April 1994, when all South African citizens went to the polls to vote in the first 
democratic elections in South African history, the Interim Constitution entered into 
force and signalled a decisive break with the past. Three years later, on 4 February 
1997, the Constitution came into force.  
Section 1 of the Constitution, the foundation clause, emphasises the core values of 
a democratic South Africa, stating that:  
“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following 
values:  
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms.  
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.  
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.  
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a 
multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.” 
The Constitution therefore makes it clear that the state shall be based on a 
democratic system of government, with a supreme Constitution. The principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty no longer applies, and all, including parliament, is subject 
to the Constitution.  
                                            
63 In Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC), the court held at para 
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Further, in stark contrast with Apartheid, the independence of the South African 
judiciary is enshrined in the Constitution, with section 165 affirming the following:  
“(1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.  
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they 
must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.  
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts; […].” 
This highlights the fact that the Constitution now “empowers courts to be the guardians 
of the Constitution and to ensure that the state respects, protects, promotes and fulfils 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.”64 Therefore, contrary to the position under the common 
law, it is no longer possible to oust the jurisdiction of the courts through so-called 
ouster clauses. However a court’s jurisdiction over a matter may still be delayed.65 
5 2 A right to administrative justice 
5 2 1 Section 33 of the Constitution 
As stated above, section 33(1) provides that “everyone has the right to [just] 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.”66 The right to 
administrative justice can no longer be regarded as a common law tradition, rather it 
has been elevated to a constitutional guarantee.67 It now qualifies as a human right in 
the Bill of Rights, and is subject to sections 7,68 869 and 3670 of the Constitution.71 
O’Regan emphasised that “it was, and remains, rare for a Bill of Rights to contain a 
clause of this type. But perhaps it was not surprising in the South African context.”72 
Recognising the injustices of the past, it quickly became apparent that a right to 
administrative justice was necessary under the new constitutional dispensation.   
With the enactment of PAJA, in line with section 33(3), the right to administrative 
justice became fully operational and enforceable. As mentioned above,73 PAJA is the 
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67 See heading 1 1 1 in chapter 1. 
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70 S36 is the limitation analyses.  
71 P Maree “Administrative authorities in legal context” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative justice in South 
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primary mechanism to be employed when challenging an administrative action. 
However, in order for PAJA to find application, an applicant must be able to show that 
the administrative issue in question, falls within the parameters of an “administrative 
action”, as defined in section 1(i) of PAJA.74 As a result, the concept of “administrative 
action” fulfils a “gateway” function, and aims to prevent a reviewing body from 
becoming overburdened with countless review matters.75  
5 2 2 The shift from an institutional to the functional approach 
The classification of functions doctrine (institutional approach) was ultimately 
rejected by the courts,76 and a new approach, known as the functional approach, was 
adopted. Key to this development, was the Constitutional Court judgment in President 
of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 
(“SARFU”).77 This judgment is fundamental to both the interpretation of section 33, as 
well as the operation of administrative law in general.78 
SARFU characterised administrative action as the “legal regulation of all public 
power.”79 This implies that administrative action is “an incidence of the exercise of 
public power.”80 It is for this reason, that the court in SARFU emphasised the role 
performed by the public administration,81 as a part of the executive, noting that section 
33 specifically uses the word administrative, not executive action.82  
The above led the court to conclude that: 
“[w]hat matters is not so much the functionary as the function. The question is whether the 
task itself is administrative or not. […] The focus of the enquiry as to whether conduct is 
“administrative action” is not on the arm of government to which the relevant actor belongs, 
but on the nature of the power he or she is exercising.”83 
This means that regardless of the branch of state concerned, where it performs a 
public function, it shall be the nature of that function that determines whether public 
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77 2000 1 SA 1 (CC). 
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law principles find application, and not its identity or nature.84 It must be noted that the 
Constitutional Court judgment of AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council 85 also found that the scope of the functional approach may include 
the activities of private entities.86 This was based on, amongst other things, the 
consideration of foreign law, as well as the definition of organ of state in section 239 
of the Constitution.87 
Lastly, complementing the functional approach, is the accompanying shift to a so-
called “culture of justification.”88 In 1994, Mureinik wrote that what the new Constitution 
required, was a move from a “culture of authority to a culture of justification.”89 This 
was supported by an article he wrote the previous year, in which he held that “[t]he 
best that democracy can be, is a system in which the government responds to the 
governed.”90 This meant that government should foster participation and 
accountability, implying that government should “justify its decisions to those whom it 
governs.”91 Similarly, Hoexter wrote that one of the central features of “transformation 
envisaged by the Constitution” is the “promotion of a ‘culture of justification’ in public 
law interactions.”92 This, applied more generally, would mean that it is insufficient for 
an actor, regardless of who or what it may be, to simply take a decision - it must also 
be able to explain why the decision or action was taken. This can be deemed to speak 
to the broader theme of accountability, and its importance in the post-Apartheid era. 
5 2 3 The public administration 
As mentioned above,93 under the separation of powers principle, there are three 
main branches of state, namely: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Each 
branch is capable of performing an administrative action.94 This thesis focusses 
specifically on the executive branch of state, and more so on the public administration 
itself. 
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The executive in general can be defined as that “branch of state within the 
separation of powers primarily concerned with the formulation of policy and the 
implementation of legislation and policy.”95 As a subdivision of the executive, the public 
administration, which has no set definition,96 is concerned only with the 
implementation of legislation and policy.97 In this regard, the Constitutional Court in 
SARFU held:  
“Public administration, which is part of the executive arm of government, is subject to a 
variety of constitutional controls. The Constitution is committed to establishing and 
maintaining an efficient, equitable and ethical public administration which respects 
fundamental rights and is accountable to the broader public. The importance of ensuring 
that the administration observes fundamental rights and acts both ethically and accountably 
should not be understated. In the past, the lives of the majority of South Africans were 
almost entirely governed by labyrinthine administrative regulations which, amongst other 
things, prohibited freedom of movement, controlled access to housing, education and jobs 
and which were implemented by a bureaucracy hostile to fundamental rights or 
accountability. The new Constitution envisages the role and obligations of government 
quite differently.”98 
Although the “variety of constitutional controls” that the Court referred to, can be 
found throughout the Constitution, it is chapter 10 of the Constitution that is of 
particular importance. This chapter focuses specifically on the public administration, 
and sets out the basic principles and values that should govern a democratic public 
administration. Section 195(1) holds:  
“(1) Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles 
enshrined in the Constitution, including the following principles:  
(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.  
(b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted.  
(c) Public administration must be development-oriented.  
(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.  
(e) People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to 
participate in policy-making.  
(f) Public administration must be accountable.  
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(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and 
accurate information.  
(h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to 
maximise human potential, must be cultivated.  
(i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, 
with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, 
fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad 
representation.” 
Section 195(3) then further places a duty on the state to enact national legislation to 
ensure the implementation and realisation of these values and principles.   
As a result, the state embarked on an all-encompassing overhaul of the public 
administration. This overhaul began with the commencement of the Public Service 
Act, 1994 (“PSA”), on the 3rd of June 1994.99 The PSA provides in its long title that it 
is promulgated:  
“[t]o provide for the organisation and administration of the public service of the Republic, 
the regulation of the conditions of employment, terms of office, discipline, retirement and 
discharge of members of the public service, and matters connected therewith.”   
Subsequently, the PSA was followed by the promulgation of the WPTPS.100 The 
purpose of the WPTPS was to establish a policy framework to guide “the introduction 
and implementation of new policies and legislation aimed at transforming” the public 
service.101 It demanded a “representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, effective, 
accountable and responsive”102 public service, capable of responding to the needs of 
those whom it serves. In 1997, the WPTPS was officially adopted, and became known 
as the policy of Batho Pele.103  
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Batho Pele, translated literally, means “putting people first.”104 In line with the 
Constitution, it aims to promote equal, effective and sustainable service delivery 
throughout all levels of government.105 It demands a “citizen-orientated approach to 
service delivery.”106 Batho Pele should not be seen as a plan, but rather as an “attitude 
or set of values”107 that should transform the public service, and thus the public 
administration as a whole. This set of values can be summarised in eight points, 
namely: (a) regular consultation with customers; (b) specific service standards; (c) high 
levels of courtesy; (d) provision of more and better information regarding services 
being provided; (e) openness and transparency regarding services; (f) remedies for 
failures and mistakes; (g) increasing access to services; and (h) providing the best 
possible value for money.108 
Overseeing the realisation of this ambitious project, is the Public Service 
Commission, established under section 196 of the Constitution.109 The Commission is 
empowered to promote the values and principles of section 195, set out above, and to 
ensure a high standard of ethics in the public administration.110  
In conclusion, in 2004, Corder wrote:  
“I have always believed that the developmental and service-emphasizing objectives set by 
the Constitution for the public administration constitute a justifiable framework for review, 
and I look forward to the day when they are used as such in court.”111    
Although this chapter does not yet focus on judicial review, this statement already 
highlights the important role that these values and principles fulfil with regards to 
judicial review and perhaps more so, for the duty to exhaust internal remedies.  
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5 3 The significance of the public administration’s accountability post-1994 
5 3 1 Accountability 
Section 1(d) of the Constitution holds that South Africa shall be a “multi-party 
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.” Further, as highlighted above, there is a recurring theme in both 
jurisprudence and in literature, that the public administration should be accountable, 
responsive and transparent.112 The continual emphasis of these principles, and 
specifically of accountability, is fundamentally important to this thesis. It is captured in 
the preamble of PAJA which states that it has been enacted in order to:  
“promote an efficient administration and good governance; and create a culture of 
accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration or in the exercise of 
a public power or the performance of a public function, by giving effect to the right to just 
administrative action.” 
The question may of course be asked: why this emphasis on accountability? 
Masango and Mfene argue that accountability is important, because, there is a 
presumption that the absence of accountability would mean “that those in power have 
the capacity to act without regard for those who authorise their actions and for those 
whose lives are affected by those actions.”113 Taking note of the atrocities of the past, 
one can see why an accountable public administration is preferred. 
Of course, overemphasis of this principle may pose a danger. In 2002, Hoexter 
wrote: 
“administrative law ought to facilitate creative decision-making in the public interest, but at 
the same time permit the effective assertion of citizens’ rights and limit any abuses of public 
power.”114 
Further, in trying to delineate what would constitute procedural fairness, the 
Constitutional Court in Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of 
the Association of Governing Bodies of State Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal,115 
held that: 
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“[a]s a young democracy facing immense challenges of transformation, we cannot deny 
the importance of the need to ensure the ability of the executive to act efficiently and 
promptly.”116  
The Court called for a balance to be struck between the need to eradicate unfair 
discrimination on the one hand, and the obligation to act fairly on the other.117 Applying 
the same argument to accountability, there must be a balance between demanding 
accountability from the public administration, and at the same time, allowing it to 
perform its functions efficiently and promptly, while not overburdening it with the 
constant need to justify each and every decision or action it takes.  
This balance is in fact also called for in section 33(3)(c) of the Constitution, which 
emphasises the need for legislation to promote an “efficient administration”. Corder 
notes that section 33 specifically differentiates between the rights “accorded to ‘every 
one’” and the “rights which is granted only to those who have been ‘adversely affected’ 
by [an] action.”118 This links back to the earlier discussion regarding the term 
“administrative action” fulfilling a gateway function to PAJA.119 Corder emphasises that 
PAJA effectively “erects a series of barriers that have to be surmounted before a 
claimant can obtain the promised rights.”120 Nevertheless, Corder is of the opinion that 
the drafters of PAJA would argue that these “barriers” are reasonable and justifiable, 
not only in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, the limitation clause, but also to 
ensure an efficient administration.121  
Thus, achieving this balance is an endeavour to be aspired to by all in the public 
administration, as well as those wishing to rely on their rights under section 33 of the 
Constitution. Yet, it remains crucial that those whom the public administration serves, 
are able to call it to account when it fails in the performance of its mandate. 
5 3 2 PAJA, a lost opportunity   
Immediately following the enactment of PAJA, Hoexter wrote a highly influential 
article on the future of judicial review in South African administrative law.122 She began 
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by writing that South African administrative law “cried out for two things” in the 
twentieth century:  
“First, it called for completion. There was a need to develop an integrated system of 
administrative law in which judicial review could play a more suitable and more limited role. 
Secondly, it called for the construction of an appropriate theory of deference. There was a 
need to identify principles to guide the courts' intervention and non-intervention in 
administrative matters.”123 
The history of South Africa, she argued, explained both of these requirements, 
because administrative law had, at the time, always been dominated by judicial review, 
while “other controls and safeguards […] [had] been relegated to unimportant positions 
or neglected altogether.”124 With the advent of democracy, the hope of administrative 
lawyers was that both the Constitution and legislation would provide for this integrated 
system of administrative law, enabling a more “balanced approach to judicial 
intervention.”125 However, PAJA, Hoexter wrote, disappointed any such hope and 
could be seen as an “opportunity lost”.126  
The reason for this argument is that South African administrative law “has never 
had much to offer except judicial review.”127 South Africa has never had an integrated 
system where judicial review functioned “supplementary to the business of making 
good decisions, and in which other forms of control and reconsideration – such as 
administrative adjudication – [could be] taken seriously.”128 PAJA does not provide an 
adequate basis for an integrated system of administrative law, and continues to 
emphasise the importance of judicial review.129 It ends up increasing the “primacy of 
judicial review.”130 
Therefore, in spite of emphasising the importance of accountability, together with 
the maintenance of an appropriate balance between accountability and efficiency, this 
thesis shall argue that South African administrative law, under the broader umbrella of 
administrative justice, continues to place too much emphasis on judicial review. 







129 For a further discussion on the limits and limitations of review, see Hoexter’s article 488-494. See 
also: Hoexter “The current state of South African administrative law” in Administrative justice 28. 




According to Hoexter, PAJA does not directly address what some might regard “as the 
perfect rival to judicial review,” namely “the opportunity to have a decision 
reconsidered by the administration itself.”131 This thesis, in conjunction with Hoexter’s 
argument,132 shall argue that one mechanism through which the administration could 
review its own mistakes, is by way of internal remedies. Internal remedies can be 
utilised to counter the continued emphasis of judicial review, and ensure the realisation 
of a more integrated system of administrative law in South Africa, one in which there 
is an appropriate balance between accountability and efficiency. 
6 Conclusion 
Since 1990, administrative law has experienced various stages of development, to 
such an extent that South African lawyers and academics now focus predominantly 
on the broader framework of administrative justice. The developments set out above, 
has at the same time enabled the transformation of the public administration, enabling 
it to cater for a democratic society, in which all are equal under a supreme Constitution. 
Therefore, considerable emphasis is placed on the need to ensure an accountable, 
responsive and open public administration.  
Numerous mechanisms exist to ensure that the vision of a public administration that 
complies with the principles of both Batho Pele and accountability is realised. Yet, as 
highlighted above, PAJA continues to endorse judicial review as the dominant 
mechanism through which administrative errors should be corrected. This continues 
to be the prevailing position, in spite of the preferred option of a more integrated 
system of administrative law in South Africa. In advancing the need to realise this 
integrated system, this thesis focuses on how a system of internal remedies could help 
to realise a system in which the public administration can be held accountable to those 
whom it serves, while at the same time being empowered to perform its mandate 
promptly and efficiently. It is for this reason that internal remedies, as part of the 
broader mechanism of judicial review, shall be discussed in the following chapter. 
 






Chapter 3: Analysing judicial review in light of section 7(2) of PAJA 
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In 2000, Max du Plessis published a paper on the legitimacy of judicial review in 
South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation, and held:  
“[t]he general conclusion seems to be that judicial review is an essential part of the 
democratic process, and that the disadvantages attached to the court’s powers of judicial 
review, are outweighed by the advantages of having judges perform an independent check 
on government.”1 
The primacy of judicial review in South African administrative law is well-established 
as a mechanism through which accountability of the public administration can be 
maintained.2 Nevertheless, it is no longer the sole mechanism for doing so. As 
mentioned in chapter 2,3 Hoexter believes that PAJA does not adequately address 
what could be “the perfect rival to judicial review”,4 namely “the opportunity to have a 
decision reconsidered by the administration itself”,5 which can occur by means of the 
utilisation of internal remedies. It is for precisely this reason that the third chapter of 
this thesis shall provide an in depth exposition on judicial review, with the aim of 
providing a greater understanding of the duty to exhaust internal remedies.  
A discussion on judicial review must start with what is considered its core, namely 
that it does not amount to the hearing of an appeal. Taking a matter on review, does 
not mean one appeals against the decision of the administrator in question. This 
distinction shall serve as the point of departure for this chapter. Thereafter, the key 
aspects of judicial review under both the common law and current constitutional 
dispensation shall be set out. This will be followed by a discussion on the procedural 
requirements that must be complied with, before proceedings for judicial review may 
be instituted. Lastly, the functionality of the duty to exhaust internal remedies shall be 
explained with reference to both the common law and PAJA, which shall enable one 
to ask the fundamental question, namely: what qualifies as an internal remedy in need 
of exhaustion?   
                                            
1 M du Plessis “The legitimacy of judicial review in South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation: 
insights from the Canadian experience” (2000) 33 Comp. Int. Law J. South. Afr. 227 230. Du Plessis 
was writing in the context of the counter-majoritarian dilemma. 
2 See heading 5 3 2 in chapter 2. 
3 See heading 5 3 2 in chapter 2. 
4 See heading 5 3 2 in chapter 2. 




2 The distinction between review and appeal 
In order for an aggrieved party to lodge an application for judicial review in terms of 
PAJA, such party must be able to prove that the administrative issue in question falls 
within the definition of “administrative action”.6 Should there be non-compliance with 
the definition, judicial review under PAJA is not an option, and there is no consideration 
of the need to exhaust internal remedies under section 7(2) of PAJA.7 Nevertheless, 
should there be compliance with PAJA, an aggrieved party may lodge an application 
for review.8 
However, a mistake often made, is that the person affected by the administrative 
action, believes that the application for review, amounts to an appeal against the 
decision of the administrator. This is a critical misunderstanding of what review entails. 
Consequently, the difference between these two terms are briefly discussed below.   
2 1 Appeal of a decision 
Burns writes that the High Court has never enjoyed an “inherent appeal 
jurisdiction”.9 Such a right will only come into existence upon express statutory 
authorisation.10 An appeal means that a matter is re-heard. This implies that the 
appeals court will examine the merits, as heard in the court a quo, and determine 
whether the decision taken by that court, was right or wrong based on the facts of the 
case.11 This further implies that an appeals court is restricted to the court a quo’s 
record of proceedings, unless statute provides otherwise.12  
2 2 Review of a decision 
South African courts13 have a “constitutional mandate to review administrative 
action based on section 33 and 34”14 of the Constitution. The court must establish 
                                            
6 S1(i) of PAJA. See heading 5 2 1 in chapter 2. 
7 Please note that legality review under the common law will still be a possibility, with the duty to exhaust 
internal remedies under the common law finding application. See both headings 3 & 5 3 2 below. 
8 S6(1) of PAJA. 
9 Y Burns & R Henrico Administrative law 5 ed (2020) 369.  
10 369. 
11 369; G Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative justice in South 
Africa: an introduction (2016) 95 107. 
12 Burns & Henrico Administrative law 369. 
13 The High Court has always been deemed to serve as the court of first instance for judicial review. 
However, the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, on 19 September 2019, identified a number 
of Magistrate’s Courts who possesses the jurisdiction to undertake judicial review of administrative 
action. The relevant courts were able to hear review matters from 1 October 2019, but the relevant court 
rules commenced only on 4 November 2019. See GN R 1216 in GG 42717 of 19-09-2019. 




whether there was compliance with the “constitutional requirements of lawfulness, 
procedural fairness and reasonableness.”15 In short, review considers how a decision 
was taken and whether it was just or not.16 The sole purpose of review proceedings is 
to determine whether the administrator complied with its authorised mandate, and 
exercised its function in accordance with the law.17 The review court may generally 
not consider the merits of the case,18 nor decide whether the decision was right or 
wrong. It merely determines whether it was a just decision. This is to ensure that there 
is compliance with the separation of powers principle.19 For a court to go beyond the 
determination of whether a decision is just, would mean that it steps into the sphere of 
the executive arm of government. 
It must, however, be stressed that the distinction between appeal and review has 
become somewhat blurred, particularly in the context of reasonableness review.20 
However, South African courts continue to stress that the distinction remains in place.  
In Carephone (Pty) Limited v Marcus NO,21 the Labour Appeal Court held that the 
requirement of justifiability, which gives effect to “administrative accountability, 
responsiveness and openness”:22  
“does not purport to give courts the power to perform the administrative function 
themselves, which would be the effect if justifiability in the review process is equated to 
justness or correctness.”23 
Further, the court held that:  
“[…] value judgments will have to be made which will, almost inevitably, involve the 
consideration of the ‘merits’ of the matter in some way or another. As long as the judge 
determining this issue is aware that he or she enters the merits not in order to substitute 
his or her own opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is 
rationally justifiable, the process will be in order.”24  
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In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs,25 the 
Constitutional Court also recognised that the distinction remains in place, when it held 
that: 
“Although the review functions of the court now have a substantive as well as a procedural 
ingredient, the distinction between appeals and reviews continues to be significant. The 
court should take care not to usurp the functions of administrative agencies. Its task is to 
ensure that the decisions taken by administrative agencies fall within the bounds of 
reasonableness as required by the Constitution.”26 
Accordingly, reasonableness review will inevitably entail a substantive and 
procedural component, in which the court ventures into a consideration of the merits 
of the case, but this continues to fall within the ambit of judicial review, and only occurs 
during reasonableness review. It does not amount to the hearing of an appeal. It is 
merely done to assist the court in determining whether the decision was rationally 
justifiable, not whether it was right or wrong.  
3 Judicial review in the pre-constitutional dispensation 
Prior to the commencement of the Interim Constitution, the common law was 
regarded as the “source of the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review of 
administrative action.”27 This was confirmed in Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council (“Consolidated Investment”)28 and 
Shidiack v Union Government (Minister of the Interior).29 The court in Consolidated 
Investment held:  
“[…] this court may be asked to review the proceedings complained of and set aside or 
correct them. This is no special machinery created by the legislature; it is a right inherent 
in the court.”30 
The basis for this “inherent right” of judicial review was founded on the doctrine of ultra 
vires.31 As explained in chapter 2,32 the doctrine required no statutory authority to be 
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given to courts; rather it encompassed nothing more than the application of the law 
itself.33 The doctrine ensured that the main concern of courts were to enforce the will 
of the legislature. 
Secondly, judicial review was based on the rules of natural justice.34 Developed as 
a component of the grounds of review, the rules of natural justice concerned itself with 
procedural fairness.35 It consisted of two “inalienable rights under the common law”,36 
namely: (a) the right to a hearing before an implicated right could be removed,37 and 
(b) the idea that no person could be a judge in their own interest.38 These rules or 
principles provided the “minimum standards of fair decision-making”,39 but were not 
“precise rules of unchanging content.”40 Their content could vary depending on the 
facts of the issue in question.41 
Thirdly, the common law placed considerable emphasis on the fact that an applicant 
for judicial review had to have locus standi in judicio (standing) before applying for 
judicial review.42 The applicant had to prove to the court that he/she had:  
“(a) some legal right or recognised interest [that] is at stake; (b) [that] the right or interest is 
direct; and (c) [that] the right or interest is a personal (and possibly special) one.”43 
The common law did not recognise an “actio popularis”44 or so-called citizen’s action, 
in terms of which an applicant could ask for review based on the aim of protecting the 
public interest. Accordingly, Baxter held that the basis of this requirement is to 
“[ensure] a personal nexus between the complainant and the act complained of.”45 
Courts strictly enforced this requirement, noting that it ensures the prevention of an 
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over-burdened court roll, effective use of resources, and enables the party “best-
placed to litigate the issue”,46 to be the one who approaches the court.47 
Lastly, extensive use was made of ouster clauses.48 Ouster clauses nullified the 
review capacity of courts, thus shielding certain administrative conduct from legal 
scrutiny.49 Parties had no right to approach a court to ask for review, should such a 
clause find application in the circumstances of their particular matter. This allowed the 
legislature, and by implication, the Apartheid government of the day, to counter the 
High Courts’ inherent right to judicial review under the doctrine of ultra vires. 
As a result of the above, judicial review took place in a manner mostly uncritical of 
the government, with the judiciary seldom exercising any real form of independent 
checks and balances with regards to the government.50 Although three different 
branches of government existed under the separation of powers principle, courts were 
subservient to the legislature, and it was on this basis that it had to investigate whether 
there was compliance with the rules of administrative law. 
4 Judicial review in the constitutional dispensation 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa (“Pharmaceutical Manufacturers”),51 the Constitutional Court 
confirmed that the Constitution, not the common law, now constitutes the foundation 
on which judicial review occurs.52 Judicial review is specifically authorised in terms of 
section 33 of the Constitution, the right to just administrative action which is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair, in conjunction with sections 1(c) and 2 of the 
Constitution which confirms the supremacy of the Constitution.53 This ensures that 
effect is given to section 195 of the Constitution, which seeks a public administration 
governed by democratic values and principles.54  
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This does not imply that the common law is not applicable in the constitutional era. 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, Chaskalson CJ confirmed that the common law is 
not a system of law separate from the Constitution, by holding that:  
“I cannot accept this contention which treats the common law as a body of law separate 
and distinct from the Constitution. […] There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the 
Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its 
force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.”55  
However, its continued existence was confirmed when the Court argued:  
“[this] is not to say that the principles of [the] common law have ceased to be material to 
the development of public law. These well-established principles will continue to inform the 
content of administrative law and other aspects of public law, and will contribute to their 
future development.”56 
The common law therefore continues to exist and inform judicial review under the 
constitutional dispensation, but does so to the extent permitted by the Constitution.57 
Nevertheless, section 33 of the Constitution was never considered to be the sole 
basis on which courts exercise the function of judicial review.58 Rather, section 33(3) 
required that legislation be enacted to give effect to the rights in section 33(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism (“Bato Star”),59 the Constitutional Court confirmed that “[t]he cause of 
action for the judicial review of administrative action now ordinarily arises from PAJA, 
not from the common law as in the past.”60 Judicial review therefore occurs in terms 
of PAJA, on the authority assigned to it under the Constitution.61 Specifically, section 
6(2)(a)-(i) of PAJA sets out the grounds on which a party may ask for review of an 
administrative action. In Bato Star, O’Regan J confirmed that these grounds of review 
“divulge a clear purpose to codify the grounds of judicial review of administrative 
action.”62 
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Lastly, as emphasised above,63 the common law required a party to prove standing 
(which meant a direct and personal impact on their rights or interests), before applying 
for judicial review. However, post-1994, standing is seldom an issue due to section 38 
of the Constitution. This provision takes a considerably broader approach to standing 
than the common law, and holds that:  
“[a]nyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened. […] The persons who may 
approach a court are – (a) anyone acting in their own interest; (b) anyone acting on behalf 
of another person who cannot act in their own name; (c) anyone acting as a member of, or 
in the interest of, a group or class of persons; (d) anyone acting in the public interest; (e) 
and an association acting in the interest of its members.” 
While PAJA itself contains no explicit standing provision, the Constitutional Court, in 
Giant Concerts CC v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd,64 confirmed that section 38 
applies to litigation instituted in terms of PAJA.65 Thus, PAJA requires standing to be 
showed, but this requirement is analogous to standing under section 38 of the 
Constitution, and is therefore broader than under the common law.66  
In conclusion, post-1994 judicial review occurs by direct authorisation of the 
Constitution, but entails the utilisation of the process as laid out in PAJA (in terms of 
the principle of subsidiarity). Furthermore, well-established common law principles 
continue to inform the review process, but these principles are themselves subject to 
the Constitution. By necessary implication, this implies an overhaul of the duty to 
exhaust internal remedies, seeing that PAJA in section 7(2) provides for such a duty 
prior to judicial review. This overhaul is what shall be discussed in the remainder of 
the chapter.  
5 The procedural requirements to be satisfied prior to judicial review 
5 1 General 
The enactment of the Interim and Final Constitution, together with PAJA, enabled 
an overhaul of judicial review. This process was briefly outlined above. Nevertheless, 
before a party may approach a court to ask for judicial review, they must satisfy a 
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series of procedural requirements. These requirements have been amended in the 
constitutional dispensation. Therefore, the two procedural requirements regarding the 
time-period within which to launch an application for review and the exhaustion of 
internal remedies prior to review, as they exist under both the common law and the 
constitutional era, shall be outlined below. This is to illustrate the shift that has taken 
place in the application procedure of judicial review. 
Included in this discussion is the recent development that organs of state seeking 
to review their own decisions may not do so under PAJA, but must rather rely on review 
in terms of the principle of legality.67 However, the focus of this thesis is not on the 
utilisation of PAJA by organs of state; rather its concern lies primarily with private 
parties seeking review, and the role that internal remedies can fulfil in this regard. 
Further, the requirement that an applicant must have standing in order to approach a 
review court will not be dealt with here. This requirement has already been discussed 
at length under headings 3 and 4 above (and is unproblematic for present purposes).  
5 2 The time-period within which to launch an application for review 
5 2 1 The common law position 
Under the common law, there existed no statutory time-limit within which a review 
application had to be launched.68 Rather, the party seeking review had to approach 
the review court within a “reasonable period of time”.69 In Setsokosana Busdiens 
(Edms) Bpk v Voorsitter Nasionale Vervoerkommissie (“Setsokosana Busdiens”),70 
the Appellate Division held that “what is reasonable depends, of course, on the (facts 
and) circumstances.”71  
Where there was a delay in bringing the review application, the courts had to assess 
the delay, and relied on a two-step approach to assess whether the delay was 
reasonable. The two-step approach was set out in the case of Wolgroeiers Afslaers 
(Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Kaapstad (“Wolgroeiers Afslaers”)72 and Setsokosana 
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69 Burns & Henrico Administrative law 593. 
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Busdiens.73 These judgments would later be confirmed, in the constitutional era, by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gqwetha v Transkei Development Corporation Ltd 
(“Gqwetha”),74 which, in turn, was subsequently referred to by the Constitutional Court 
in Khumalo v Member of the Executive Council for Education, KwaZulu Natal 
(“Khumalo”).75 Thus, all four cases will be utilised to set out the common law approach 
to time.76 
Under the two-step approach, the first step requires an investigation into whether 
the delay was “unreasonable.”77 This involves “a factual enquiry upon which a value 
judgment is called for in the light of all the relevant circumstances including any 
explanation that is offered for the delay”78 In Khumalo, the Court was at pains to stress 
that in the absence of any explanation for the delay, such delay will be unreasonable.79 
Further, in Gqwetha, the court specifically noted the nature of the decision as an 
important material fact to be considered by a court in this enquiry, seeing that “[n]ot all 
decisions have the same potential for prejudice to result from their being set aside.”80 
However, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the delay (step one) depends 
wholeheartedly on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, with a court’s 
discretion (step two) being completely irrelevant.81 It concerns a determination of 
whether, in light of all possible circumstances, the delay was unreasonable.82 While 
this implies a value judgment, it should not be confused with the discretion that the 
court may exercise under step two83 of the enquiry. 
Secondly, should the delay be found to have been unreasonable (step one), then 
the court must move on to the second step of the enquiry, and determine whether it 
should exercise its discretion to overlook the delay and nevertheless allow the 
application for review (condonation).84 In this regard, the court in Gqwetha held that 
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the “delay cannot be evaluated in a vacuum but only relative to the challenged 
decision, and particularly with the potential for prejudice in mind.”85 Thus, the second 
step requires the court to determine what the potential prejudice could be to the 
affected parties, as well as the possible consequences of setting aside the decision in 
question.  
In short, if the delay is found to be reasonable under step one, the court does not 
proceed to step two, but simply hears the application. If the delay is found to be 
unreasonable, then the court will have to proceed to the second step, and use its 
discretion to determine whether to condone the delay or not. 
However, it is important to note that contrary to PAJA, there was no need for an 
express (or separate) application for condonation of a delay under the common law. 
In Wolgroeiers Afslaers, counsel for the appellant argued that:  
“[w]hen an applicant institutes review proceedings after what appears prima facie to be an 
unreasonably long delay, this is a point which the Court should not take mero motu; the 
point is one which can only properly be taken by the respondent. The delay as such, and 
even the possible prejudice to the respondent, does not concern the Court unless the 
respondent chooses to raise it as an objection in limine.”86 
However, the court in Wolgroeiers Afslaers reasoned that: “although it is the customary 
and preferred option to raise said objection as a point in limine, it is not compulsory to 
do so” (own translation).87 Further, in Mamabolo v Rustenburg Regional Local 
Council,88 the court found that it may raise the issue of undue delay mero motu, but 
an applicant must be given the opportunity to explain said delay to the court.89 
In conclusion, the above demonstrates that the common law approach to the time-
period within which to launch a review application, involved the “exercise of [a] broader 
discretion than that traditionally applied to section 7 of PAJA.”90 A court generally 
enjoyed a discretion, more flexible than the one enjoyed by courts under PAJA.  
                                            
85 Para 33. 
86 1978 1 SA 13 (A) 17D-F. 
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verpligtend nie.” It is not compulsory, as Corbett J reasoned in Harnaker v Minister of the Interior 1965 
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contestatio it is obviously desirable that it should be raised in initio litis so that it can be dealt with as a 
separate peremptory defence before entering into the merits of the matter. This is a matter, however, 
that can generally be adjusted by a suitable order as to costs”. 
88 2001 1 SA 135 (SCA). 
89 Para 10; see also Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa 352. 





5 2 2 PAJA   
Section 7(1) of PAJA provides the time-period within which a review application 
must be launched. Section 7(1) provides that:  
“Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must be instituted without 
unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days after the date –  
(a) subject to subsection (2)(c), on which any proceedings instituted in terms of internal 
remedies as contemplated in subsection (2)(a) have been concluded; or  
(b) where no such remedies exist, on which the person concerned was informed of the 
administrative action, became aware of the action and the reasons for it or might 
reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action and the reasons.” 
In short, section 7(1) requires an applicant to launch the application (a) within a 180 
days from the date on which they exhausted (should there be any) available internal 
remedies, or where there are no internal remedies, (b) within a 180 days from the date 
on which they either became aware of the administrative action and the reasons for it, 
or might reasonably have been expected to be aware of the administrative action and 
the reasons for it.91 Thus, the linkage within PAJA between the timeframe for bringing 
an application for review, and the exhaustion of internal remedies, is clear.  
While it is accepted that section 7(1) of PAJA is the statutory embodiment of the 
common law requirement that review proceedings be launched within a reasonable 
period of time, PAJA’s provisions are, nevertheless, “more onerous and more 
restrictive.”92 This is particularly so, as the 180 day period refers to calendar days, as 
opposed to business days, implying that it includes Sundays and public holidays.93  
The Constitutional Court in Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality v Asla 
Construction (Pty) Limited  (“Buffalo City”),94 referring to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
decision in Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads 
Agency Ltd,95 confirmed that the two-step common law approach to assessing delay96 
applies “up to a point”97 to section 7(1) of PAJA. It applies “up to a point” because the 
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method of assessing the delay differs.98 Should the application for review be launched 
within 180 days, then the review court will, in line with the first step, enquire as to 
whether the delay, if any, was unreasonable, and then move on to the second step of 
the enquiry, should the delay be found unreasonable.99  
However, a delay exceeding 180 days is “per se unreasonable.”100 This implies the 
absence of the discretion that courts had under the second step of the common law 
enquiry. In fact, that discretion has been statutorily removed under section 9 of PAJA. 
A review court is only empowered to hear the review application where the applicant 
has brought a separate application for condonation of the delay, asking the review 
court to extend the 180 day period under section 9 of PAJA.101 This the court may only 
do if it is in the interest of justice to do so.102 Only if the court grants the application for 
condonation, will it take the matter on review.  
The rules regarding the time-period within which to launch an application for review 
has, accordingly, experienced reform under the constitutional era. PAJA imposes a 
more narrow and onerous procedure, contrary to the more flexible approach that 
existed under the common law. 
                                            
98 Para 49. 
99 Para 49; see also Joubert Galpin Searle v Road Accident Fund 2014 4 SA 148 (ECP), where Plasket 
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100 2019 4 SA 331 (CC) para 49. 
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for example, in both Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd 2000 2 SA 837 (CC) para 1 & 3 
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applications for condonation as required by PAJA. 
102 S9(2) of PAJA; in Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison  
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“whether the interests of justice require the grant of such extension depends on the facts and 
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sought, the extent and cause of the delay, its effect on the administration of justice and other litigants, 
the importance of the issue to be raised in the intended proceedings and the prospects of success.” 
In this regard, see also: Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd 2000 2 SA 837 (CC) para 3 




5 2 3 Organs of state seeking review of its own decisions 
In Buffalo City, the Constitutional Court confirmed its decision in State Information 
Technology Agency SOC Limited v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Limited (“Gijima”),103 that an 
organ of state seeking review of its own decision may not do so under the auspices of 
PAJA, but must rather launch the application in terms of the principle of legality.104 The 
Court in Gijima reached this conclusion based on its interpretation of both section 33 
of the Constitution and PAJA.105  
It was the Court’s interpretation in Gijima, that the Bill of Rights is primarily there “to 
protect warm-bodied human beings”,106 with its entitlements “primarily”107 meant to 
guard against state power.108 Utilising this as its point of departure, the Court adopted 
a “very narrow approach”109 to interpreting section 33 of the Constitution, finding that 
organs of state are not entitled to the right to just administrative action under section 
33(1).110 Further, due to the obligation on the state under section 33(3) of the 
Constitution to enact legislation to give effect to the rights under section 33(1) and (2), 
it was the Court’s belief that the state cannot be “both beneficiary of the rights and the 
bearer of the corresponding obligation that is intended to give effect to the rights.”111 
This implies that only private persons enjoy the rights under section 33, with the state 
bearing the corresponding obligations under this section.  
Accordingly, when an organ of state seeks to review its own decision, it may not 
rely on PAJA, but must apply for review under the principle of legality. Of course, this 
raises the fundamental question of what constitutes legality review. Legality review is 
nothing other than the use of the common law principles applicable to judicial 
review.112 Prior to Gijima, the principle of legality would be used as a ground of review 
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only in circumstances where PAJA did not find application, meaning that the decision 
or action in question did not qualify as administrative action.113 In Bato Star, the 
Constitutional Court confirmed that the common law principles may not be relied on 
instead of PAJA, as that would undermine the “single-system-of-law principle”114 as 
enunciated in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.115 Nevertheless, with its judgment in 
Gijima, the Constitutional Court accepted that there can be:  
“two subsystems of administrative law: one regulatory review framework for persons 
seeking to review administrative action, and one for organs of state seeking to review their 
own decisions, even when these two sets of impugned decisions are the very same 
decisions.”116 
The above implies that the common law rules relating to the time-period within which 
to launch an application for review, would apply to organs of state seeking to review 
its own decisions, while private parties seeking review of the exact same decision must 
rely on PAJA and its rules.  
5 2 4  Final Remarks 
With the enactment of PAJA, section 7(1) adopted the common law principle that a 
party seeking review, must launch an application for review within a reasonable period 
of time. However, contrary to the common law, PAJA provides a strict statutory time-
limit of 180 days for doing so (with the possibility of an extension). PAJA thus adopts 
a more onerous approach to the time-requirement. However, should the party seeking 
review, be an organ of state wanting to review its own decision, it may not rely on 
PAJA (Gijima), but must rather rely on the principle of legality (common law). This is 
not applicable to a private party seeking review of a decision, nor to an organ of state 
seeking review of a decision, other than its own.  
5 3 Is there a duty to exhaust internal remedies? 
5 3 1 General 
Internal remedies (or control) are not to be confused with the form of control 
exercised by civil courts (external to the administration).117 An internal remedy 
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concerns an appeal, or other forms of control, internal to the particular administration 
concerned.118 Generally, a party should first exhaust any available internal remedies 
before approaching a court to ask for review of administrative action.  
Importantly, the discussion that follows below will neither attempt to determine what 
constitutes an internal remedy, nor what the content of such an internal remedy should 
be.119 Rather, this discussion will merely focus on the fact that the common law does 
not provide for a strict duty to exhaust internal remedies, while PAJA does provide for 
a strict duty. 
5 3 2 Exhaustion under the common law 
Under the common law there is no consensus on whether a duty to exhaust internal 
remedies exist, despite the compendium of jurisprudence on the subject.120  
The most important judgment is that of Shames v South African Railways and 
Harbour (“Shames”).121 Pretorius asserts that Shames can be regarded as the:  
“locus classicus regarding the principle that all extrajudicial remedies should be pursued 
prior to approaching the courts for relief in respect of administrative action.”122 
In this case, the appellant approached the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme 
Court, and instituted an action in which he alleged that his dismissal was wrongful.123 
However, the respondent “raised a plea in bar to the effect that the appellant had failed 
to appeal against his dismissal in the manner provided by the relevant legislation”,124 
and as such, was prevented from approaching the court until such time that he had 
exhausted these available internal statutory remedies.125 The court upheld the appeal 
and found that internal remedies must be exhausted prior to approaching a court for 
judicial review.126 The Shames principle was applied by the Appellate division in Crisp 
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v South African Council of the Amalgamated Engineering Union,127 as well as by the 
majority (Tindall JA) in Jockey Club of South Africa v Feldman.128 
However, in other cases the courts held that an applicant may, at any stage “of the 
dispute or where there is uncertainty” (own translation),129 rely on, and approach the 
court for, review.130 In Welkom Village Management Board v Leteno,131 the court 
quoted with approval a passage from Golube v Oosthuizen (“Golube”),132 where De 
Wet J held that:  
“[t]he mere fact that the Legislature has provided an extra-judicial right of review or appeal 
is not sufficient to imply an intention that recourse to a Court of law should be barred until 
the aggrieved person has exhausted his statutory remedies.”133 
Thus, the court in both decisions above, was of the opinion that internal remedies need 
not necessarily be exhausted prior to judicial review. The court in Durban City Council 
v Local Road Transportation Board,134 adopted a similar approach.   
Further, Plasket argues that whether a particular piece of statute should be 
interpreted to say that the review of a decision should be deferred until such time that 
the internal remedies under said Act had been exhausted, will primarily depend on two 
considerations: (a) “whether the internal remedy is effective”; and (b) “whether the 
alleged unlawfulness has undermined or tainted the internal remedy”.135 He concludes 
that the courts “are decidedly reluctant to imply an intention to oust or defer their 
jurisdiction until internal remedies have been exhausted.”136  
Accordingly, dissensus remained, and it was generally accepted that there was not 
a strict duty under the common law to first exhaust an internal remedy before 
approaching a review court,137 despite case law from the appellate division favouring 
its existence. 
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5 3 3 Exhaustion under PAJA 
Section 7(2) of PAJA regulates the exhaustion of internal remedies in the 
constitutional era, and holds:  
“(a) Subject to paragraph (c), no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action in 
terms of this Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has first been 
exhausted.  
(b) Subject to paragraph (c), a court or tribunal must, if it is not satisfied that any internal 
remedy referred to in paragraph (a) has been exhausted, direct that the person concerned 
must first exhaust such remedy before instituting proceedings in a court or tribunal for 
judicial review in terms of this Act.  
(c) A court or tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the person 
concerned, exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any internal remedy if the 
court or tribunal deems it in the interest of justice.” 
Burns asserts that the provisions of section 7(2) are “couched in peremptory 
language”,138 despite the fact that section 7(2)(c) uses the word “may.” Accordingly, in 
general or where exceptional circumstances are not present, PAJA adopts a strict 
approach to exhaustion, seeing that a court may not entertain an application for review 
for as long as the applicant has not first exhausted “all internal remedies.”139 This was 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Dengetenge Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern 
Sphere Mining & Development Co Ltd,140 when it held that all parties, including the 
court and administrator in question, are obliged by section 7(2) to exhaust the internal 
remedy before moving on to review.141 
However, section 7(2) applies only to “a particular type of internal remedies.”142 
Firstly, it must be a remedy provided for in “any other law.”143 This implies that it must 
be a remedy provided for in statute.144 Burns argues that should statute expressly 
provide for an internal remedy, then no court would doubt the existence of such a 
remedy, and would direct the applicant to first exhaust such remedy.145 Further, Burns 
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asserts that a problem may arise in the context of where documents provide for 
“internal dispute resolution mechanisms”,146 yet those documents are not readily 
available to the public.147 This argument is of no consequence, as PAJA clearly 
stipulates that it must be a remedy found in law, rather than in an “empowering 
provision”, which is the broader term used in PAJA to refer to instruments other than 
those found in law, for example policy documents or agreements. Thus, if it is not a 
remedy found in statute, it cannot be an internal remedy. Parties cannot, for example, 
create an internal remedy by inserting a clause into a contract. 
Secondly, “the remedy must be internal to the administration”148 concerned. 
Accordingly, should a remedy be provided for in statute, but that statute and/or remedy 
does not concern the administration in question, it is not an internal remedy that the 
applicant need to exhaust before approaching the court.149  
Lastly, the internal remedy must be “available to the complainant and be 
effective.”150 In Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for HR as Amicus Curiae) 
(“Koyabe”),151 the Constitutional Court held that:  
“[a] remedy will be effective if it is objectively implemented, taking into account the relevant 
principles and values of administrative justice present in the Constitution and our law. An 
internal remedy must also be readily available and it must be possible to pursue without 
any obstruction, whether systemic or arising from unwarranted administrative conduct.”152 
Therefore, in this context, the remedy would only be effective if it can provide the 
complainant with relief akin to the relief provided by a court.153  
Once an internal remedy meets the above-mentioned criteria, it must be exhausted 
in accordance with section 7(2)(a) of PAJA. Alternatively, where the applicant has not 
yet done so, the court must insist on the exhaustion thereof in accordance with section 
7(2)(b) of PAJA. 
Despite the fact that PAJA adopts a strict approach to the exhaustion of internal 
remedies, it is still possible to approach a review court directly, should exceptional 
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circumstances exist. This is provided for in section 7(2)(c) of PAJA. While PAJA does 
not define “exceptional circumstances”,154 Van Heerden JA agreed with the 
respondents in Nichol v Registrar of Pension Funds (“Nichol”)155 that exceptional 
circumstances means: 
“[…] circumstances that are out of the ordinary and that render it inappropriate for the court 
to require the s7(2)(c) applicant first to pursue the available internal remedies. The 
circumstances must in other words be such as to require the immediate intervention of the 
courts rather than resort to the applicable internal remedy.”156 
For a review court to recognise such circumstances and allow an exemption, it would 
have to exercise a “statutory discretion”,157 determining whether exceptional 
circumstances exist, as well as whether it is in the interest of justice to allow an 
exemption from section 7(2)(a) of PAJA.158 In Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital (“Unitas 
Hospital”),159 the Constitutional Court provided the factors to be considered by a court 
in the exercise of this discretion.160 They are the same factors the court considers 
when an applicant applies for condonation161 of a delay162 in launching their review 
application,163 and are nothing other than the general factors considered in 
determining whether a decision of the court is in the interest of justice. It is therefore 
crucial that the applicant shows the existence of these exceptional circumstances, or 
their application will fail. 
Furthermore, one last issue remains before the functionality of section 7(2) can be 
fully understood, namely: its constitutionality. Some academics view section 7(2) of 
PAJA as unconstitutional, specifically in light of section 34 of the Constitution, which 
guarantees a right of access to courts, a right which section 7(2) curtails for as long 
as internal remedies has not be exhausted.  
Plaskett believes that section 7(2) could have the effect of frustrating or curtailing 
the powers of a court to review administrative action. He argues that the initial bar that 
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section 7(2) places on a party to approach the court, amounts to an infringement on 
their section 34 rights.164 He concludes that section 7(2) is “rigid and overbroad and is 
therefore incapable of justification”165 under section 36 of the Constitution, the 
limitation clause.166 He argues that its “one-size-fits-all approach to internal remedies 
is arbitrary”,167 and involves the exercise of powers contrary to the rule of law 
principle.168  
However, Burns asserts that section 7(2) “does not automatically negate the 
requirement [that internal remedies be exhausted], since the administration should be 
afforded [the] opportunity of rectifying its mistakes”,169 and the complainant retains 
their right to approach the court should the administration not resolve the matter 
satisfactorily.170 
Nevertheless, no court has yet invalidated section 7(2) of PAJA, and declared it 
unconstitutional on the basis that it infringes on section 34 of the Constitution, and thus 
section 7(2) of PAJA remains in force.  
Accordingly, the post-1994 approach to the exhaustion of internal remedies differs 
from the common law, and, as a general rule, there is now a strict duty under PAJA to 
exhaust internal remedies prior to approaching a court for review. 
5 3 4 What does it mean to “exhaust” an internal remedy? 
In spite of the new-found clarity on the subject of exhaustion of internal remedies in 
the post-1994 era,171 there is still no clarity on the specific meaning of the term 
“exhaustion” itself. When a single internal remedy is provided for, then the matter is 
uncomplicated, seeing that all the applicant for review has to do, is to pursue that 
specific avenue, and if no relief is obtained, they may approach the court. However, 
things become problematic where more than one internal remedy exists. Thus, will 
there, for example, be exhaustion the moment the applicant can show that he/she has 
pursued one of the available two avenues to him/her, or only once both has been 
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pursued? There are a number of possible interpretations, and determining the 
correctness thereof often seems futile.  
However, South African courts have made it abundantly clear what exhaustion does 
not mean. In Reed v Master of the High Court of SA (“Reed and Others”),172 Plasket J 
stressed that section 7(2) of PAJA places no obligation on a party to: 
“exhaust all possible avenues of redress provided for in the political or administrative 
system – such as approaching a parliamentary committee or a Member of Parliament, or 
writing to complain to the superiors of the decision-maker. Similarly, it is not required of an 
aggrieved person that he or she approach one or more of the Chapter 9 institutions – such 
as the Public Protector or the Human Rights Commission – prior to resorting to judicial 
review.”173 
The courts’ reasoning was that firstly, “[p]arliament, or one of its committees, or a 
senior person in the bureaucracy, or a Chapter 9 institution”,174 does not qualify as a 
so-called public law remedy.175 Secondly, unlike the courts, “these bodies do not have 
jurisdiction, as a matter of law, to remedy the complaint”176 through the issuing of 
binding orders.177 In short, such remedies are not deemed internal to an 
administration.178  
Further, in Koyabe, the Constitutional Court held that “the mere lapsing of the time-
period for exercising an internal remedy on its own would not satisfy the duty to 
exhaust nor would it constitute exceptional circumstances.”179 The Court reasoned that 
the endorsement of a different interpretation would allow someone to “simply wait out 
the specified time-period and proceed to initiate judicial review”,180 and serve to 
“undermine the rationale and purpose of”181 the duty to exhaust internal remedies. 
Accordingly, an aggrieved party must take reasonable steps to exhaust available 
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internal remedies, with the aim of securing appropriate redress from the administration 
in question.182  
Nevertheless, the continued emphasis by courts and academics on the need to 
exhaust all internal remedies creates the impression that an aggrieved party would 
only be successful with their application for review, once all possible avenues of 
internal redress have been pursued. As mentioned above,183 Pretorius saw the 1922 
Shames decision, as the local classicus that “all extrajudicial remedies should be 
pursued”184 (emphasis added). In Koyabe, the Constitutional Court noted that section 
7(2) requires the exhaustion of all internal remedies.185 At the same time, Quinot wrote 
that PAJA “adopts a strict stance in section 7(2) that a court may not entertain an 
application for judicial review as long as all internal remedies have not been 
exhausted”186 (emphasis added). Similar to Quinot, Burns also wrote that a court or 
tribunal must direct an applicant to first exhaust internal remedies “[where] a court or 
tribunal is not completely satisfied that any or all of the internal remedies have been 
exhausted […].”187 (emphasis added).  
In light of the above, clarity is required. To achieve this, reliance must be placed on 
both examples in case law and my own interpretation.188 I will argue that different 
scenarios require different interpretations. 
In Koyabe, for example, the Constitutional Court had to consider an appeal against 
a High Court judgment, which had denied the applicants’ request for judicial review of 
a decision by the Department of Home Affairs withdrawing their permanent residence 
permits and status.189 The three applicants were all Kenyan nationals. The Court noted 
that section 8 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (“Immigration Act”) provides “two 
channels for review.”190 The first, section 8(1), provides a person, either refused entry 
into the country or found to be an illegal foreigner,191 with “a direct route to the 
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Minister”192 who reviews the decision taken by an immigration officer. The second, 
section 8(4), applies in all other circumstances and allows a person whose rights were 
materially and adversely affected by a decision, “to request a review or appeal to the 
Director-General”193 within 10 working days. It is then possible to, “[w]ithin a further 10 
days of the receipt of the Director-General’s decision”,194 seek a ministerial review or 
appeal.195  
It was the opinion of the Court that the section 8(1) procedure applied to the 
particular facts of the case, not section 8(4), and the remainder of the judgment dealt 
with the interplay between this provision and those of PAJA.196 What was not, 
however, clarified by the Court was whether, had it been section 8(4) that was 
applicable, the applicants would have been required to utilise both avenues in that 
procedure (review or appeal to the Director-General and subsequently seeking 
ministerial review or appeal), before it could be said that there was exhaustion of 
internal remedies.  
Similar to section 8(4) above, section 49 of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 
of 1999 (“National Heritage Resources Act”), also provides two internal mechanisms. 
Together, sections 49(1) and (2) provide for a so-called double appeal procedure. An 
aggrieved party may (a) appeal against a decision of a committee or delegated South 
African Heritage Resources Agency (“SAHRA”) representative to either the SAHRA 
council or a provincial heritage resources council.197 Should the aggrieved party’s 
appeal fail, they (b) obtain the right of a second appeal to the Minister or provincial 
MEC, against the decision of the SAHRA council/provincial heritage resources 
council.198 
Again, no court has yet pronounced on whether an aggrieved party would have to 
pursue both avenues to meet the criteria for exhaustion. Nevertheless, it is my opinion 
that in the context of section 49 of the National Heritage Resources Act and section 
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8(4) of the Immigration Act, the proper interpretation of the word “all”, for the purposes 
of PAJA, would mean the pursuit of both avenues before there can be said to be 
exhaustion. 
However, the same interpretation cannot be applied, in the procurement context, to 
section 62 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (“Systems 
Act”), which runs parallel with the mechanism provided for in regulation 49 of the Local 
Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 Municipal Supply Chain 
Management Regulations (“Supply Chain Management Regulations”).199 200  
Section 62 of the Systems Act holds:  
“A person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by a political structure, political 
office bearer, councillor or staff member of a municipality in terms of a power or duty 
delegated or sub-delegated by a delegating authority to the political structure, political office 
bearer, councillor or staff member, may appeal against that decision by giving written notice 
of the appeal and reasons to the municipal manager within 21 days of the date of the 
notification of the decision” (emphasis added). 
Concurrently, regulation 49 of the Supply Chain Management Regulations provides:  
“The supply chain management policy of a municipality or municipal entity must allow 
persons aggrieved by decisions or actions taken by the municipality or municipal entity in 
the implementation of its supply chain management system, to lodge within 14 days of the 
decision or action a written objection or complaint to the municipality or municipal entity 
against the decision or action” (emphasis added).  
In both these provisions, mechanisms exist with which the administration concerned 
can deal with a matter internally. Nevertheless, they have different time-periods within 
which they must be utilised. It is my opinion that this cannot be a case where the word 
“all”, for the purposes of PAJA, can mean that an aggrieved party must pursue both 
avenues before there could be exhaustion. Such an interpretation would allow for 
conflict between the two provisions, seeing that an applicant might pursue the 
regulation 49 avenue, and after 14 days launch an application for review, just for the 
municipality to argue that the 21 day period under section 62 has not yet lapsed and 
that internal remedies has not yet been exhausted. Thus, it must rather be the 
utilisation of the one or the other. 
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In conclusion, there appears to be clarity on what is generally meant by the term 
“exhaustion.” However, uncertainty remains with regards to the link between the words 
“all” and “exhaustion.” While the courts must yet provide clarity in this regard, it is my 
interpretation that what is meant by the exhaustion of “any and all” internal remedies, 
where more than one exist, will heavily depend on the context of the particular matter 
in question.  
5 3 5 The impact of Gijima on the exhaustion of internal remedies 
The Constitutional Court confirmed in Gijima that an organ of state seeking review 
of its own decision may not do so under the auspices of PAJA, but must rather launch 
the application for review in terms of the principle of legality.201 However, this is not 
applicable to a private party seeking review of a decision, nor to an organ of state 
seeking review of a decision, other than its own.202  
The Courts’ judgment raises a number of questions, at this time still unanswered, 
for the exhaustion of internal remedies. This is particularly true where an aggrieved 
party raises a complaint with regards to a decision of an organ of state and wants to 
utilise an internal remedy, yet the organ of state simultaneously reconsiders its own 
decision, agrees with the aggrieved party’s objection, and wants to seek review of its 
own decision. Does the aggrieved party retain the right to first exhaust an available 
internal remedy, or does one immediately go over to legality review? As of yet, there 
is no answer. 
Another point of concern is the functus officio doctrine, or so-called principle of 
finality. The doctrine provides that:  
“a person who is vested with adjudicative or decision-making powers may, as a general 
rule, exercise those powers only once in relation to the same matter.”203  
Accordingly, once a decision has been taken, it is both “final and conclusive”,204 and 
may not be “revoked or varied by the decision-maker.”205 That being said, Pretorius 
does note that the rule is not absolute, and that variations are permitted in certain 
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circumstances, but that this power is exercised very sparingly, seeing that public policy 
demands finality in litigation.206 
These same considerations apply to administrative law, with the doctrine holding 
that:  
“an administrative agency which has finally performed all its statutory functions or duties in 
relation to a particular matter subject to its decision-making jurisdiction has exhausted its 
powers and has discharged its mandate in relation to that matter.”207 
The promotion of certainty is well entrenched in public law, and it has often been said 
that the “rule of law doctrine rests upon the principle of legal certainty”,208 which is one 
of the founding values in the Constitution.209 This implies that, similar to litigation, there 
must be a point at which an administrative decision/action can be deemed both final 
and conclusive. 
However, the procurement context seems to provide a stumbling block in this 
regard, one which is necessary to consider in relation to both internal remedies, as 
well as in the Gijima judgment. 
On 8 August 2010, the North Gauteng High Court delivered judgment in Azola 
Recruitment Solutions CC v National Energy Regulator of South Africa (“Azola”).210 In 
this case, the applicant tendered to perform recruitment and selection processes for 
the first respondent.211 The bid document required bids to be submitted on or before 
a certain date and time.212 The applicant’s bid was submitted fifteen minutes after the 
cut-off time, but was considered due to a system error.213 Further, their bid was 
deemed highly successful, and the tender was subsequently awarded to them.214 The 
bid document stipulated that the award made by the second respondent, the Bid 
Adjudication Committee, would be final.215 However, sometime later, the second 
respondent discovered the system error, informed the first respondent thereof and 
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advised that the award be withdrawn and the contract be cancelled.216 The first 
respondent proceeded accordingly.217 
The applicant approached the High Court for review, contending that the first 
respondent was functus officio and “not entitled to revoke its decision.”218 In the 
alternative, if the tender could be revoked, only the second respondent was entitled to 
make such a decision.219  
The court took as its point of departure the fact that the first respondent was an 
organ of state, duly acting under the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 
(“PFMA”). The PFMA provides that the CEO of the first respondent serves as the 
accounting officer thereof. Section 56(1) of the PFMA “grants to such an accounting 
officer the power to delegate functions or to instruct officials to perform duties assigned 
to the accounting authority.”220 The court was of the opinion that a decision to establish 
a Bid Adjudication Committee, as well as entrusting it with the powers to take final 
decisions, is done in terms of such delegated powers.221 Lastly, while this would 
ordinarily imply that the Bid Adjudication Committee’s decision should be final, section 
56(3) of the PFMA provides that the accounting authority “may confirm, vary or revoke 
any decision taken by an official as a result of a delegation or instructions in terms of 
subsection (1).” The court emphasised that the justification for section 56(3) is that 
organs of state are public entities, and accordingly are accountable to the public due 
to the utilisation of public resources.222 Thus, a CEO or accounting authority must be 
able to act where it is necessary to ensure compliance with the law. This, the court 
believed, meant that the first respondent was not functus officio at the time the tender 
award was revoked, and the first respondent had the “express authority to effect such 
a revocation.”223 
The implication of this judgment is that where an administrator with original statutory 
decision-making powers delegates those powers under a standard delegation 
provision, he/she retains those powers. The administrator is not divested thereof. It is 
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therefore possible for the administrator to overrule the decision taken by those to 
whom the powers were originally delegated. 
This judgment now raises an important question in relation to Gijima, namely, 
whether a standard delegation provision such as the one in the Azola case, can serve 
as an internal remedy?224 The assumption being, that an organ of state has taken a 
particular decision, and an aggrieved party has raised a complaint in relation to said 
decision. It is unclear what would happen if the organ of state agrees, wants to review 
its own decision, but then decides to let the administrator with original decision-maker 
power overturn the decision, instead of approaching the court for legality review in 
accordance with Gijima. In other words, instead of approaching the court, the organ of 
state determines that the decision was made by a committee or person to whom 
powers was originally delegated, and thus the administrator argues that due to him/her 
retaining their original decision-making powers, the decision is not functus officio and 
overturns the decision.  
Would the above not amount to an internal remedy that is being utilised? What 
implication would this have for the principle of finality? Does this amount to an 
additional power now vested in organs of state? 
This thesis can certainly not within its scope attempt to provide an answer to these 
questions, especially when its focus falls primarily on the impact of internal remedies 
for use by private parties, not organs of state. Nevertheless, their relevance to the 
future of both judicial review and the exhaustion of internal remedies cannot be 
underestimated. 
6 The absence of a uniform system of internal controls 
This chapter has showed that there is a distinct relationship between judicial review 
and internal remedies.225 In accordance with both PAJA and case law, a party must 
first exhaust any and all available internal remedies before approaching a court to ask 
for review of administrative action. The argument often advanced in favour of this duty, 
is that there is a need for “an integrated system of regulation of administrative 
action”,226 a system that equips the public administration to, as far as possible, correct 
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its own mistakes. This was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Koyabe, where it 
held:  
“approaching a court before the higher administrative body is given the opportunity to 
exhaust its own existing mechanisms undermines the autonomy of the administrative 
process. It renders the judicial process premature, effectively usurping the executive role 
and function. The scope of administrative action extends over a wide range of 
circumstances, and the crafting of specialist administrative procedures suited to the 
particular administrative action in question enhances procedural fairness as enshrined in 
our Constitution.”227  
Accordingly, the administration is often deemed to be in a better position than the 
courts to assess and correct its own mistakes, especially when the administration has 
the necessary expertise to deal with the matter, which the court may lack. 
Despite the specific wording of section 7(2) of PAJA, as well as the continued 
emphasis by the courts on the utilisation and exhaustion of internal remedies, there is 
still no uniform system of internal controls (or remedies) in South Africa.228 An 
aggrieved party has no right to an internal remedy, nor is there an obligation on “a 
particular part of the administration to have internal remedies”229 in place. During the 
drafting of PAJA, the possibility of establishing a more “coherent and uniform system 
of internal remedies was considered.”230 In fact, section 10(2)(a)(ii) provides that:  
“[t]he Minister may make regulations relating to the establishment, duties and powers of an 
advisory council to monitor the application of this Act and to advise the Minister on any 
improvements that might be made in respect of internal complaints procedures, internal 
administrative appeals and the judicial review by courts or tribunals of administrative 
action.” 
Thus, the establishment of a uniform system of internal controls was left to the 
discretion of the Minister of Justice, which, to date, has not exercised that discretion.  
The implication of this is that where statute provides for an internal remedy, the 
aggrieved party must exhaust it prior to approaching a court for review,231 or where 
they approach the court first, the court must direct them to first exhaust the remedy.232 
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But, where no such internal remedy is provided for in statute or the regulations that 
apply to the administration concerned, the aggrieved party has no right to demand that 
they be provided with one, nor is there an obligation on the administration in question 
to provide it.  
The absence of such a uniform system of internal controls constitutes an integral 
part of this thesis, and it shall be argued going forward that such a system must be 
both established and implemented.233 
7 Conclusion 
With the enactment of section 33 of the Constitution, the right to just administrative 
action became a constitutionally recognised right. An aggrieved party has the right to 
approach a High Court (or designated Magistrate’s Court) and ask for review of 
administrative action. However, contrary to the common law, PAJA now places an 
obligation on such an aggrieved party to first exhaust any and all available internal 
remedies. Should the applicant fail to do so, there is a duty on the court to direct them 
to first exhaust the internal remedy. Further, it is now an established principle that 
organs of state seeking to review its own decisions are not beneficiaries of the rights 
encapsulated in section 33 of the Constitution, but must rather rely on legality review. 
South African law therefore draws a distinction between a private party seeking review 
of administrative action (which is the focus of this thesis), and organs of state wanting 
to review its own decisions. 
However, South Africa is yet to implement a uniform system of internal controls, 
enabling South Africans from all backgrounds to approach the administration 
concerned and demand that it either provide clarity on its decision, or correct one made 
in error. While courts continue to emphasise the strict duty to exhaust internal 
remedies where they are provided, there is no similarly enforceable obligation on the 
state to actually provide an aggrieved party with an internal remedy. Only if there is 
one, need it be exhausted, otherwise the only option is to approach a High Court, 
generally the court of first instance for judicial review, and ask the court to review the 
administrations’ decision. 
What this chapter has, however, not yet addressed, is what constitutes an internal 
remedy (its content and formulation)? The answer to this question will only be provided 
                                            




in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. This will not be done in chapter 4 that follows below. 
Rather, the aim of chapter 4 is to set out the argument in favour of an obligation on 
the state to provide both a uniform system of internal controls, together with a right for 
an aggrieved party to a have an internal remedy. 
The reasoning behind this methodology is that one now knows the position 
regarding the exhaustion of internal remedies in terms of section 7(2) of PAJA,234 
together with the importance of accountability as a concept applicable to the public 
administration as a whole.235 Therefore, the following issue will be to consider the 
argument for why there is a need for internal remedies within the South African judicial 
system,236 where after one would then investigate what these internal remedies must 
actually consist of in order to enable a more open and accountable public 
administration.237 
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1 Introduction  
  In its third decade of democracy, South Africa continues to face enormous 
challenges on the economic, political and social front. From high unemployment to 
extreme poverty,1 as well as staggering levels of corruption2 and political infighting,3 
South Africa appears to be on the brink of disaster. Almost a decade ago, former 
Constitutional Court Justice Kate O’Regan stated that:  
“[t]he deep inequalities that persist are visible reminders of the effects of apartheid and 
colonialism. Until these scars are healed, the vision of our Constitution will not have been 
achieved. There is a great burden on government, in particular, to address this historic 
legacy.”4 
Justice O’Regan’s remark serves as a stark reminder that South Africa’s problems 
continue to be a combination of both old and new challenges, and that the project of 
realising a free, equal and transformative society will not be achieved overnight. As I 
will argue below, it is indeed these challenges that must serve as arguments in favour 
of a uniform system of internal remedies in South African administrative law.5 
Chapter 3 of this thesis emphasised that there is no uniform system of internal 
controls in South Africa, and no enforceable duty against the state to implement such 
a system.6 Due to its absence, the South African justice system remains inaccessible 
for the majority of South Africans due to the high costs, prolonged time periods and 
technical nature thereof. If the possibility existed to approach the public administration 
directly, and have it correct or review its own administrative actions or decisions, 
instead of approaching the High Court (or designated Magistrate`s Court) for the 
review of such a decision or action, then the justice system would be more open and 
accessible, and the public administration more accountable.  
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Thus, this chapter will set out the rationale behind the creation and implementation 
of a duty on the state to provide for a uniform system of internal controls. It is no longer 
sustainable to have the courts enforce the rule that an internal remedy should be 
exhausted, only if and when it exists. Rather, together with section 7(2) of PAJA that 
requires the exhaustion of internal remedies, there should be a similarly enforceable 
duty on the state to provide the public with internal remedies, and allow the public 
administration to deal with its own decisions and actions on a first hand basis. 
In principle, this would ensure that those living below the poverty line, will be able 
to access justice, as well as ensure that the project of Transformative 
Constitutionalism is realised. 
The argument in favour of such a uniform system of internal controls will be set out 
by firstly, emphasising the need for an accountable public administration. Secondly, 
the effect of the dual nature of administrative law will be considered, and lastly, the 
rationale behind the implementation of such a uniform system will be presented at the 
hand of four main points. 
2 The public administration and its accountability 
Chapter 2 emphasised that the primary focus of this thesis falls on the public 
administration. A subdivision of the executive arm of government, the public 
administration (which has no set definition),7 is concerned only with the 
implementation of legislation and policy.8 Thus, it is for the personnel in the public 
administration to implement, and carry out, the will of the executive on a daily basis. 
Accordingly, the public administration is the component of the state machinery that 
citizens come into contact with most frequently. It is for this reason that chapter 2 
emphasised that the public administration is regulated by section 195 of the 
Constitution, and that it is subject to both the Batho Pele principles, as well as the 
Public Service Commission.9 
When studying section 195 of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, the one 
constitutional value of the public administration that is continually emphasised, is its 
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accountability to the broader public.10 In President of the Republic of South Africa v 
South African Rugby Football Union (“SARFU”),11  the Constitutional Court held that: 
“[t]he Constitution is committed to establishing and maintaining an efficient, equitable and 
ethical public administration which respects fundamental rights and is accountable to the 
broader public. The importance of ensuring that the administration observes fundamental 
rights and acts both ethically and accountably should not be understated.”12 
This continued emphasis can be explained in light of South Africa’s past, and the 
general disregard for rights during the Apartheid era.13 
However, chapter 214 highlighted that an over-emphasis of this component can lead 
to an under-performing and stifled public administration. The Constitutional Court in 
Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of 
Governing Bodies of State Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal,15 held that:  
“[a]s a young democracy facing immense challenges of transformation, we cannot deny 
the importance of the need to ensure the ability of the executive to act efficiently and 
promptly.”16  
This is further supported by Cora Hoexter, who holds that: 
“administrative law ought to facilitate creative decision-making in the public interest, but at 
the same time permit the effective assertion of citizens’ rights and limit any abuses of public 
power.”17 
Thus, there is a general consensus among the courts and academics that the 
efficiency of the public administration could not be sacrificed in order to realise the 
dream of an open, transparent and accountable public administration. Rather, there 
would need to be a balance between the two. Yet, the question is how one is to achieve 
that balance? 
According to Cora Hoexter, the hope was that PAJA would provide for an integrated 
system of administrative law, enabling a more “balanced approach to judicial 
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intervention.”18 Yet, PAJA failed in this endeavour, and ended up enforcing the primacy 
of judicial review instead.19 Hoexter was at pains to stress that PAJA did not address 
“the perfect rival to judicial review”, namely “the opportunity to have a decision 
reconsidered by the administration itself.”20 
Therefore, this thesis argues that internal remedies could provide the means with 
which to counter the continued emphasis of judicial review, and ensure the realisation 
of a more integrated system of administrative law in South Africa. Internal remedies 
will be able to strike a more appropriate balance between accountability and 
efficiency.21 However, the dual nature of administrative law may pose as a stumbling 
block to the realisation of a uniform system of internal remedies. 
The meaning and implication of this concept will be addressed below. 
3 The dual nature of administrative law 
 Administrative law aims to achieve two objectives simultaneously. It aims to restrict 
public power, on the one hand, and to “enable and facilitate the exercise of public 
power”,22 on the other.23 The former amounts to the exercise of control over the 
administration, while the latter is the empowerment of the administration.24 While the 
two aims appear to stand in opposition to one another, they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.25  
Administrative law’s function is to determine how a statutory provision or 
administrative power may be understood, implying that the above two components link 
with lawfulness, a core principle of administrative law. Lawfulness implies that an 
administrator must function within the parameters of an empowering provision.26 Thus, 
administrators are empowered to do what is provided for in the provision 
(empowerment), but simultaneously restricted, as they may not exceed the limits of 
the powers conferred within the provision (control).27 
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Harlow and Rawlings provided an extensive analyses on the dual nature of 
administrative law, with a specific focus on the so-called “red light” and “green light” 
theories of administrative law.28  
According to the red light theory, the “primary function of administrative law should 
be to control excesses of state power and, more precisely, subject it to the rule of the 
law courts.”29 Harlow and Rawlings noted that it is “light-heartedly”30 referred to as the 
red light theory due to its continued emphasis on control. In short, red light theorists:  
“believed that law was autonomous to and superior over politics; that the administrative 
state was dangerous and should be kept in check by law; that the preferred way of doing 
this was through adjudication; and that the goal should be to enhance liberty, conceived in 
terms of the absence of external constraints.”31  
However, post-World War II, the green light theory began to develop, viewing 
administrative law as a “vehicle for political progress”32 and welcomed the 
establishment of the administrative state.33 Green light theorists believed: 
“that law was not autonomous from politics; that the administrative state was not a 
necessary evil, but a positive attribute to be welcomed; that administrative law should seek 
not merely to stop bad administrative practice, and that there might be better ways to 
achieve this than adjudication; and that the goal was to enhance individual and collective 
liberty conceived in positive and not just negative terms.”34 
Thus, green light theorists “viewed the legal profession as too old-fashioned to reform 
itself.”35 Rather, focus had to be on “alternatives to the court.”36 
Accordingly, if the above is applied to administrative law more generally, there are 
two sides attempting to form one component. On the one side, there is empowerment 
(or facilitation), the component of administrative law which provides the administrator 
with the manner in which he or she must go about the exercise of their powers. On the 
other side is control, the component which enables an affected party to review an 
administrative decision. The red light theory emphasises that control must occur 
primarily through the courts, while the green light theory seeks to consider alternatives 
                                            












to judicial intervention, alternatives that could enable the administration to exercise 
greater power over the review of its decisions and actions. The different approaches 
of these theories speak to the fact that there remains a gap between empowerment 
and control, a gap that persists in spite of the fact that empowerment and control 
attempts to form one component and function simultaneously.  
I argue that internal remedies present the opportunity to bridge the above-
mentioned gap, and ensure that empowerment and control function simultaneously to 
ensure that there is a viable alternative to judicial review.  
Instead of arguing that certain aspects of administrative law fulfil a pertinent 
facilitation purpose, while others fulfil a more controlling purpose, one can argue that 
internal remedies can achieve both. Internal remedies allows for control over the public 
administration, but does so in way that nevertheless allows the administration to reach 
the correct decision on its own, without having recourse to the courts. Thus, internal 
remedies are a way to bring together the two sides of the coin.  
However, as was emphasised in chapter 3, South Africa lacks a uniform system of 
internal controls, and there is no enforceable duty against the state to implement such 
a system.37 The general rule is that if and when an internal remedy exists, an 
aggrieved party must first exhaust such internal remedy before approaching a court 
for review.38 Where no internal remedy is provided for, an aggrieved party must 
approach the courts for judicial review.  
This means that in the context of internal remedies, section 7 of PAJA, and in 
particular section 7(2), only provides for the control component, but not that of 
empowerment. With judicial review maintaining its primacy, the public administration’s 
ability to deal with administrative matters remains constrained. The courts have often 
reiterated that it may lack the necessary expertise of the public administration to deal 
with certain matters.39 In this regard, the courts have often emphasised that the public 
administration is better suited to deal with matters of an administrative nature. 
However, at the moment the public administration can only deal with the review of its 
administrative matters directly if an internal remedy exists. In its absence, it is for the 
courts to review the matter.  
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It is therefore paramount that South Africa implements a uniform system of internal 
remedies that can function jointly with the exhaustion of internal remedies under 
section 7(2) of PAJA. This will empower the public administration to deal with parties 
aggrieved by its decisions or actions directly, but still restrict the exercise of power in 
the sense that the public administration has to remain open, accessible and 
accountable, as it must ensure the transparency of its procedures to the broader public 
throughout. 
There are a number of arguments that serve to underscore the need to empower 
the public administration. The rationale for the implementation of a uniform system of 
internal remedies is accordingly discussed below. 
4 The rationale behind a duty for the state to provide a uniform system of 
internal remedies  
4 1 Introduction 
The argument in favour of a duty on the state to implement a uniform system of 
internal controls rests primarily on four points, discussed below, namely: (a) section 
33(3) of the Constitution; (b) the realisation of the vision of Transformative 
Constitutionalism; (c) lack of access to justice due to high unemployment and poverty; 
and (d) the exhaustion of domestic remedies under international law. 
4 2 Section 33(3) of the Constitution 
Section 33 of the Constitution lies at the heart of realising the right to administrative 
justice. In general, this provision provides that everyone has a right to just 
administrative action, which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.40 In particular, 
section 33(3) holds that: 
“(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); 
and  
(c) promote an efficient administration.”  
Section 33(3)(a) recognises that review does not have to occur by means of the 
courts, and section 33(3)(c) simultaneously recognises that the public administration 
                                            




must function as efficiently as possible. The need for an efficient administration is 
emphasised in section 195 of the Constitution as well, and is subject to both the 
principles of Batho Pele, as well as the Public Service Commission.41  
Thus, section 33(3) provides the basic structure for legislation to comply with the 
right to administrative justice. The fact that the efficiency of the administration is 
emphasised, together with methods other than judicial review, is a further argument in 
favour of the implementation of a system of internal remedies. It will allow the public 
administration to take decisions or implement actions, but nevertheless remain 
accountable. The public administration will be able to reconsider a decision or action 
and correct it where necessary, without having to involve the judiciary. This allows for 
the creation of a bridge between the empowerment and control objectives of 
administrative law,42 and the establishment of a truly efficient and accountable public 
administration. Accordingly, a direct link can be made between the dual nature of 
administrative law and section 33(3) of the Constitution.  
This argument is further supported by the realisation of the project of Transformative 
Constitutionalism, together with current unemployment and poverty figures, as well as 
international law.  
4 3 Transformative Constitutionalism and administrative justice 
The Interim Constitution, and its successor, the Constitution, signalled the end of 
Apartheid South Africa, and the beginning of a democratic and constitutional state.43 
The Constitution Preamble holds that the 1996 Constitution is adopted in order to:  
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“We, the people of South Africa declare that- 
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“[…] [h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights; [and] [l]ay the foundations for a democratic 
and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen 
is equally protected by law […].” 
However, almost three decades later, the dream of realising a constitutional state 
based on the rule of law and an accountable government seems distant and 
unreachable.  
Nevertheless, in the last 30 years, much has been written about the so-called 
project of Transformative Constitutionalism, and its contribution to realising the vision 
of the Constitution. But what is Transformative Constitutionalism, and what can it add 
to this debate regarding, specifically, the public administration’s accountability? 
The leading paper regarding the definition, as well as importance of, Transformative 
Constitutionalism, was authored by Professor Karl Klare in 1998,44 and is continuously 
referenced by all academics who contribute to the topic.45 Klare envisions 
Transformative Constitutionalism as a:  
“long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed 
to transforming a country's political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism 
connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political 
processes grounded in law.”46 
Klare argues that it is something which cannot quite be captured in the word “reform”,47 
yet stops just short of a “revolution.”48 
Put differently, former Chief Justice Pius Langa opined that Transformative 
Constitutionalism includes “the pursuit of some form of economic transformation and 
a change in legal culture.”49 Accordingly, Justice Langa held that transformation is an 
ongoing process which recognises that there is value in that ever-present process 
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itself.50 It envisions a “meaningful improvement of the material conditions of people’s 
lives together with a real change in legal culture.”51  
Thus, it would appear that Transformative Constitutionalism envisages that the 
legal culture of South Africa must change, which implies that the Constitution itself 
should be central to any and all decisions, whether taken by the judiciary or those 
serving in the executive.  
Considering the above, it is important to note that there are four aspects of 
transformation that can be found within the Constitution.52 They are: (a) the realisation 
of substantive equality;53 (b) the achievement of social justice;54 (c) the introduction 
and implementation of human rights standards;55 and lastly, (d) the “promotion of a 
culture of justification in public-law interactions.”56 In light of the fact that the work of 
the public administration involves administrative action which amount to public-law 
interactions, the focus of this thesis falls specifically on the last-mentioned feature.  
Yet, a relevant question in this context is how the public administration is going to 
create and enforce such a culture of justification?  
The Constitution preamble57 clearly establishes that the Final Constitution signals 
a decisive break from South Africa’s Apartheid past, in order to enable a shift from a 
culture of authority to a culture of justification. This implies that the Constitution 
expects all institutions which are created by it, to adopt and foster this culture of 
justification as well. The impact of this development, specifically for the public 
administration, is a two-way street. Meaning, it is not just for members of the public to 
expect that the public administration should justify why it made a specific decision, or 
took a certain action. Rather, the public administration itself should realise that it 
should foster and enforce this culture of justification. It must come from within. This is 
the only way an inherent culture of justification will exist, in which the administration 
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knows beforehand that it will have to justify its decision or action, and the public 
simultaneously knows that its request for justification will be met.58 
But, without mechanisms with which the public administration can create and 
enforce this culture of justification, this vision will not become a reality. Accordingly, 
the public administration should be empowered with the tools necessary to achieve 
the realisation of this culture, and one way with which to provide those tools is through 
a uniform system of internal remedies.   
In the ordinary course of business, section 5 of PAJA provides that when an initial 
decision is taken by the public administration, and if it does not furnish the affected 
party (or parties) with reasons of its own accord, it must furnish the relevant party with 
adequate59 and written reasons, if so requested within 90 days of the decision having 
been taken.60 Should there be no internal remedies in place, then if the affected party 
aggrieved by said administrative decision or action want it reviewed, he or she may 
approach a review court.  
However, if a uniform system of internal remedies were in place, an aggrieved party 
would not need to approach a review court, but could rather approach the 
administration responsible for making the decision, or taking the action, first. Should 
the decision or action remain the same upon reconsideration, or should it be 
overturned, the right to request reasons continues to apply, and the administration 
must justify its decision.  
Thus, the right to reasons, together with a system of internal remedies, will enable 
the public administration to create and enforce a culture of justification which will assist 
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in the realisation of a public administration which is open, efficient, transparent and 
accountable. Through these measures, greater effect will be given to the vision of 
Transformative Constitutionalism, and enable administrative actions to be finalised 
with greater speed and efficiency, as opposed to judicial review, with its cumbersome 
nature.61 
However, it is important to note that there are other benefits to implementing a 
uniform system of internal remedies as well, and which links with the project of 
Transformative Constitutionalism. These include increasing access to justice and 
making review proceedings more affordable.62 This is discussed below. 
4 4 Poverty, and its impact on the achievement of administrative justice 
4 4 1 General 
On 10 October 2019, the World Bank updated its “overview” of South Africa and its 
economy, and stated that:  
“South Africa remains a dual economy with one of the highest inequality rates in the world, 
with a consumption expenditure Gini coefficient of 0.63 in 2015. Inequality has been 
persistent, having increased from 0.61 in 1996. High inequality is perpetuated by a legacy 
of exclusion and the nature of economic growth, which is not pro-poor and does not 
generate sufficient jobs. Inequality in wealth is even higher: the richest 10% of the 
population held around 71% of net wealth in 2015, while the bottom 60% held 7% of the 
net wealth. Furthermore, intergenerational mobility is low meaning inequalities are passed 
down from generation to generation with little change in inequality over time. Not only does 
South Africa lag its peers on level of inequality and poverty, it lags on the inclusiveness of 
consumption growth.”63  
This is highly problematic and presents a number of difficulties when it comes to 
access to justice. 
The right of access to courts is guaranteed under section 34 of the Constitution. 
Yet, despite the recent designation of Magistrate’s Courts to hear PAJA matters, 
review of administrative action remains predominantly a matter dealt with in the High 
Court.64 Currently, there are only fourteen provincial High Court divisions,65 and each 
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are located in urban areas (cities or large towns).66 This constitutes a barrier to access 
to justice, seeing that some people have to travel great distances to get to the court. 
Further, the high costs and time-consuming nature of the judicial process, prevents 
access.67 It is estimated that, if all procedures are followed and all parties perform their 
respective responsibilities in a timely manner, a review application could take nine 
months to be finalised before a court.68 However, it is a well-known fact that securing 
access to records held by the government often poses the greatest challenge in review 
applications.69 Thus, a more accurate time-line could be anything between twelve to 
eighteen months, if not longer, from launch of an application to date of judgment by 
the court.70 
In light of the above, it is unsurprising that the majority of South Africans continue 
to struggle to gain access to the justice system. The consideration of current 
unemployment figures, as well as the nature and monetary value of legal services, 
may assist in understanding this predicament. 
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4 4 2 South Africa’s current unemployment and poverty figures 
By the end of the first quarter of 2020, South Africa’s unemployment rate climbed 
to a record 30.1%.71 According to the information released by Statistics South Africa, 
16.4 million people were employed in the first quarter, while the 30.1% unemployment 
rate implies that 7.1 million people were unemployed in the first quarter.72 However, 
the unemployment rate does not include the 15.4 million people who were not 
economically active (discouraged work seekers and economically inactive) in the first 
quarter.73  
Together with these figures, it is important to consider household income. According 
to an “Income and Expenditure of Households” study, released at the same time as 
the 2011 census results (the most recent nation-wide census), the household income 
for South Africans stood at R119 542 per annum, with it being noticeably lower for 
black households at R69 632 per annum.74 Furthermore, 55.5% of the population 
continue to live below the upper-bound poverty line, which currently stands at R1 227 
per person per month.75 Lastly, and quite shockingly, if one takes home more than 
R7 300 per month, one falls in the top 10% of South African earners.76 
These figures illustrate why many cannot afford the high costs of legal fees. 
4 4 3 The nature of legal fees  
Legal fees may consist out of the combined cost of (a) fixed fees charged by the 
state to members of the public for allowing them to access public procedures such as 
filing papers at court; (b) the tariffs put in place by the Rules Board for litigation (which 
                                            
71 Anonymous “Quarterly Labour Force Survey” (23-06-2020) StatsSA 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2020.pdf> (accessed 03-07-2020). It 
previously stood at 29.1% at the end of 2019. See: Anonymous “Quarterly Labour Force Survey” (11-
02-2020) StatsSA <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12948> (accessed 25-04-2020). 
72 Anonymous “Quarterly Labour Force Survey” StatsSA. 
73 Anonymous “Quarterly Labour Force Survey” StatsSA.   
74 Anonymous “Income and Expenditure of Households 2010/2011” (06-11-2012) StatsSA 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0100/P01002011.pdf> (accessed 19-12-2019). 
75 Anonymous “How much you need to earn each month to be in the richest 1% in South Africa” (22-
09-2019) BusinessTech <https://businesstech.co.za/news/wealth/336309/how-much-you-need-to-
earn-each-month-to-be-in-the-richest-1-in-south-africa/> (accessed 19-12-2019). 
76 Anonymous “How much you need to earn each month to be in the richest 1% in South Africa” 
BusinessTech; T Head “You can compare your household income to the rest of SA using this tool” (05-07-2018) 
The South African <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/household-income-inequality-calculator-




is subject to taxation); and lastly (c) “the largely unregulated tariffs charged by legal 
practitioners for transactions and for litigation.”77  
These costs are further combined with the three different scales with which courts 
award costs upon judgment in a matter. The three scales are: (a) party and party; (b) 
attorney and client; and (c) attorney and own client costs.  
Firstly, party and party costs “are legal costs that a court may order the defendant 
to pay to the plaintiff in a court case.”78 The implication of this scale is not that the 
“losing” party will settle all of the costs of the “winning” party. Rather, these costs 
include the costs specific to the particular matter, and while it may exclude certain 
costs, the costs are “subject to court tariffs, which are set by law and charged 
according to fixed scales [which differ between the Magistrate’s and High Courts].”79 
This implies that the law firm’s own specific costs are ignored, and one focusses solely 
on the costs as set out in the regulations.80 
Secondly, attorney and client costs “include party and party costs, as well as other 
legal costs – including charges for attendances between you and your attorney.”81 In 
some situations, the court may decide to award attorney and client costs, or a portion 
thereof, to the successful litigant, however this is seldom done.82 If attorney and client 
costs are awarded, it is subject to the same court tariffs as party and party costs.83  
Lastly, attorney and own client costs “are the actual fees payable by a client to an 
attorney, in terms of their fee agreement (in which case the hourly rate is not restricted 
to the statutory Magistrate`s and High Court tariffs). They’re not generally awarded by 
the Courts.”84 
Lastly, upon completion of the matter, the preparation of the bill of costs must take 
place, as well as a process known as taxation.85 Once a party has been successful in 
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a case and have been awarded legal costs, the bill of costs must be prepared (often 
done by an external service provider known as a cost consultant). The bill of costs is 
then served on the unsuccessful party, and a copy is sent to the taxing master of the 
particular court. The taxing master decides which costs are recoverable and payable 
by the losing party,86 and signs and stamps a certificate known as an allocator, which 
can be used to enforce payment of legal costs. 
Accordingly, legal fees consist of a complex matrix of fees combined to form one 
bill of costs. The problem, however, is that the monetary value of those costs can be 
quite burdensome. 
4 4 4 The costs of legal fees charged by attorneys and advocates 
When compiling a bill of costs, legal practitioners must consider the tariffs and fees 
as provided for in statute87 and calculate costs based on whether the matter was heard 
in the High Court or Magistrate`s Court.88 However, as mentioned above,89 depending 
on the scale with which the court awards costs, attorneys and advocates may further 
add their own personal costs, as set up by their firm, as well as separately charge for 
their first consultation when obtaining a mandate from their client.  
In Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association v Harrison,90 the 
Constitutional Court highlighted “how counsel’s fees have burgeoned in recent 
years.”91 The Court held:  
“It is the concept of what it is reasonable for counsel to charge that this judgment hopes to 
influence. We feel obliged to express our disquiet at how counsel’s fees have burgeoned 
in recent years. To say that they have skyrocketed is no loose metaphor. No matter the 
complexity of the issues, we can find no justification, in a country where disparities are 
gross and poverty is rife, to countenance appellate advocates charging hundreds of 
thousands of rands to argue an appeal”92 (emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, it is when one considers both the fees in the regulations, as well as the 
costs of fees charged by firms, that one realises the unaffordability thereof.93 
For “[c]onsultation with a client and witnesses to institute or to defend an action…”94 
in the High Court, attorneys may be charge R292.50 “per quarter of an hour or part 
thereof.”95 Further, the amount of R117.50 may be charged, per page, for “drawing up, 
checking, typing, printing, delivery, copies…” of letters, telegrams and facsimiles.96 
In the Magistrate’s Court, fees are calculated primarily on three scales, namely: (a) 
Scale A (value of dispute less than or equal to R7 000); (b) Scale B (value of dispute 
is above R7 000, but less than or equal to R50 000); or (c) Scale C (value of dispute 
exceeds R50 000).97 For defended actions, costs would be R542 (Scale A), R719.50 
(Scale B) or R865.50 (Scale C), for the taking of instructions to sue, defend, institute 
or defend a counterclaim, or for perusing documentation.98 
Combined with the above, should firms or attorneys add their own personal costs, 
then according to a 2015 report on Public Interest Legal Services in South Africa,99 a 
first year junior advocate may charge “approximately R550 per hour or R5 500 per 
day.”100 Counsel of ten years’ standing could charge between R1 500 and R2 400 per 
hour, or between R15 000 and R24 000 per day,101 and senior counsel who has been 
awarded “silk” status could charge between R25 000 and R35 000 per day, if not 
more.102 
Of course, it is true that for those members of the public who live below the poverty 
line, free legal services are available through either Legal Aid South Africa, the Legal 
Practice Counsel or through legal aid clinics and pro bono work down by those in the 
legal profession. However, in order to qualify for assistance by, for example, Legal Aid 
South Africa, one must meet the requirements of the so-called “means-test.”103 If the 
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applicant is unemployed, they do not need to complete the test, but if they are 
employed the test is compulsory.104  
However, even with the options for legal aid, these forms of assistance will only 
help those most in need, if they can reach the offices of these institutions, and if they 
qualify for the assistance. A gap continues to exist for those who fail to qualify, as well 
for those people who might even be classified as living above the poverty line, but for 
whom the monetary value of legal fees, especially those fees necessary to complete 
a legal matter such as High Court litigation, far exceed their own or household income. 
4 4 5 Final remarks 
With 55.5% of the population having to make ends meet on less than R1 300 per 
month, it is impossible for the majority of South Africans to afford legal fees. Due to 
current poverty and employment levels, the fact that there are only fourteen High Court 
divisions, as well as the time-consuming nature of review, there remains a gap 
between the rich and the poor, and ensures that there cannot be access to justice for 
all.  
There is a constant emphasis on the need to rethink the calculation of costs, and 
the need to accommodate more people through pro bono work. It is for precisely this 
reason that this thesis considers the implementation of a system of internal remedies, 
which can be utilised to circumvent the courts, and the complex matrix of scales and 
fees which can be quite burdensome, to directly approach the administration 
concerned itself. 
4 5 The exhaustion of domestic remedies under international law  
The last argument to consider in support of the implementation of a uniform system 
of internal remedies is the so-called exhaustion of domestic remedies under 
international law. Section 39 of the Constitution provides for the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights, with section 39(1) providing that:  
“[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— 
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(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom;  
(b) must consider international law; and  
(c) may consider foreign law.” 
Thus, international law must be considered, when appropriate to do so under the 
circumstances. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court in Koyabe v Minister for Home 
Affairs (Lawyers for HR as Amicus Curiae) (“Koyabe”),105 considered the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies under international law, when considering whether the mere 
lapsing of the time period for the exhaustion of an internal remedy (under domestic 
law) could be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of exhaustion under section 7(2) of 
PAJA.106   
It is a recognised principle of customary international law that, should a respondent 
state provide domestic remedies, the applicant should first exhaust those remedies 
before approaching an international forum.107 The purpose of those remedies are to 
provide states with the opportunity to “find their own solutions”,108 and “to make 
beneficial use of their access to relevant facts [and] information […].”109  
Similarly, if and when an internal remedy exists under domestic law, the aggrieved 
party must first exhaust that remedy before approaching a review court.110 If there has 
been non-compliance with section 7(2) of PAJA, then the court must direct the affected 
party to first exhaust any and all available internal remedies.111 This allows the 
administration to deal with the administrative decision or action directly, allowing it to 
resolve the matter in accordance with its own rules and procedures. 
It is nevertheless vital that one realise that the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
under international law, is an issue which occurs in a completely different context than 
that of the exhaustion of internal remedies under domestic law. Hence the 
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Constitutional Court emphasising the “analogous”112 nature of domestic remedies 
under international law, and merely drawing a correlation between the two rules. 
Accordingly, in drawing this correlation, there remains a further important distinction 
between these two rules. Referencing Udombana, the Court in Koyabe emphasised 
that:  
“[a] condition for the application of the local remedies rule is that it must first be determined 
whether those remedies exist, which implies the corresponding duty of the state to provide 
them. . . ” (emphasis added).113 
The argument in international law, that there should be a recognisable and enforceable 
duty on states to provide domestic remedies, has been consistently made since the 
1960’s.114 However, no similar argument has been made in relation to the exhaustion 
of internal remedies under PAJA at a national (domestic) level. Chapter 3 of this thesis 
established that there is currently no right to an internal remedy under South African 
administrative law, nor is there an enforceable duty against the state to demand an 
internal remedy.115  
Thus, it is peculiar to note that, despite the difference in context, two diverging 
arguments remain. This thesis, however, draws from the arguments made by 
international law scholars and argues in favour of the creation of an enforceable duty 
against the state to provide a uniform system of internal remedies. 
4 6 Reflection 
The rationale behind the implementation of a uniform system of internal remedies 
rests primarily on four points, namely: (a) section 33(3) of the Constitution; (b) 
Transformative Constitutionalism; (c) South Africa’s current poverty and 
unemployment levels; and (d) international law. Each point emphasised a different 
argument in favour of the creation of a duty on the state to provide members of the 
public with a right to an internal remedy. 
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Firstly, it is required by section 33(3) of the Constitution, which recognises that 
review does not have to occur solely by means of the courts, and simultaneously 
recognises that the public administration must function as efficiently as possible. It 
allows one to make a direct connection with the dual nature argument of administrative 
law. 
Secondly, the implementation of a uniform system of internal controls will support 
the realisation of the project of Transformative Constitutionalism, not only because it 
will ensure compliance with the fourth aspect of transformation,116 but also because 
review, when undertaken by the administration itself, could occur considerably quicker, 
and at much less cost.  
Thirdly, South Africa’s high unemployment rate, together with marginal household 
income, prevents the majority of South African’s from affording the high legal fees 
involved in settling legal matters. 
Lastly, it remains peculiar that, in spite of a difference in context, international law 
scholars have argued, since the 1960`s, that there should be a recognisable and 
enforceable duty on states to provide domestic remedies, yet no similar argument has 
been made by scholars at a domestic level in respect of administrative law. 
5 Conclusion    
South Africa continues to face social, political and economic challenges well into its 
third decade of democracy. Accordingly, this chapter set out to illustrate why there is 
a need for a uniform system of internal remedies in South Africa. Its implementation 
will empower the public administration to deal with parties aggrieved by its decisions 
or actions directly, but still restrict the exercise of power in the sense that the public 
administration has to remain open, accessible and accountable, as it must ensure the 
transparency of its procedures to the broader public throughout. This allows the control 
and empowerment components of administrative law to function simultaneously, and 
links with section 33(3) of the Constitution. 
However, even if a uniform system is implemented, one question remains, namely 
what constitutes a valid and functional internal remedy? In the following two chapters, 
                                            




this shall be investigated in depth, in light of examples found both in local government 
legislation,117 as well as elsewhere.118 
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Chapter 1 emphasised that this thesis is comprised of two distinct components,1 
namely: (a) the need to implement a uniform system of internal controls in South 
African administrative law, and (b) the content, requirements and scope of a 
successful internal remedy. Chapters 2,2 33 and 44 addressed the first component, 
having established that the state has not yet implemented a uniform system of internal 
remedies. Rather, section 7(2) of PAJA merely requires an aggrieved party to exhaust 
any and all available internal remedies before approaching a review court, if and when 
such an internal remedy exists. In the absence thereof, the aggrieved party may 
approach a review court directly.  
Accordingly, chapter 45 argued that the rationale behind the implementation of a 
uniform system of internal remedies is two-fold: Firstly, to facilitate a greater realisation 
of the vision of Transformative Constitutionalism and secondly, to enable a large 
portion of South African society, who ordinarily do not have the financial means, to 
gain access to justice expediently. A uniform system of internal remedies, in which an 
aggrieved party can approach the public administration directly will accordingly enable 
marginalised sections of society to bypass the constraints associated with the court 
system, such as high costs and expediency in obtaining a remedy.  
The second part of this thesis aims to provide the criteria for a successful and 
effective internal remedy, on the assumption that the argument in favour of a uniform 
system of internal remedies is accepted. The aim of this chapter, however, is not to 
provide an exact framework for an effective internal remedy, nor to provide the state 
with an ultimatum on what a uniform system of internal controls must include. Rather, 
the focus will be on three different provisions in local government legislation, one of 
which is an effective internal remedy, and the other two not. Utilisation of local 
government legislation will enable one to begin to formulate the general criteria for a 
uniform system of internal controls.  
Thus, this chapter will first consider the minimum criteria for an effective internal 
remedy, as already provided by the courts, where after the focus shall shift to a study 
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of local government legislation, specifically section 62 of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (“Systems Act”), and regulations 49 and 50 of the 
Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 Municipal Supply Chain 
Management Regulations (“Supply Chain Management Regulations”).6 
2 The bare minimum criteria for an effective internal remedy 
2 1 What qualifies as a remedy in South African law? 
Michael Bishop writes that the “law without remedies is like a broken pencil. 
Pointless.”7 This statement implies the need for a critical understanding of what 
constitutes a remedy, as well as what makes it effective for a particular grievance.  
Firstly, a remedy, according to the courts,8 includes: (a) a statutory right;9 (b) a 
common law right;10 (c) an order of summary judgment;11 (d) a right of appeal;12 and 
(e) an order of the court.13 Thus, the meaning ascribed to the word “remedy” will differ 
depending on the context. However, what the above-mentioned categories all have in 
common is that a remedy is something which is used to “cure or make better. The only 
precondition to the use of the word is a state of affairs which needs making better.”14  
Secondly, what makes a remedy effective? To answer this question, one must turn 
to the Constitutional Court judgment of Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 
(“Fose”).15 Ackerman J held that:  
“[i]n our context an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without 
effective remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights entrenched in the 
Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced.”16 
In light of this, Bishop opines that “effective relief” is “relief that leaves no gap between 
right and remedy: it makes the constitutional ideal a reality.”17 Thus, when considering 
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the meaning of effectiveness in general, it must mean that the remedy must go hand-
in-hand with the right, and be capable of vindicating any breach of said right. 
However, Bishop is at pains to stress that when he uses the word remedy, he is 
referring to a cure “for the violation of a constitutional right.”18 This is not only crucial 
to understanding his study of remedies in general, but also for purposes of this thesis, 
specifically because this thesis focuses on the use of internal remedies, as effective 
mechanisms with which to cure a violation of the right to just administrative action, a 
constitutional right enshrined in section 33 of the Constitution.  
Accordingly, should there be a duty on the state to provide the public with a right to 
internal remedies, it would fall within category (a) mentioned above, namely, members 
of the public having a statutory right to an effective internal remedy, if their right to just 
administrative action were to be violated. 
2 2 The principle of Ubi jus, ibi remedium 
In Minister of the Interior v Harris,19 Centlivres CJ held: 
“There can to my mind be no doubt that the authors of the Constitution intended that those 
rights should be enforceable by the Courts of Law. They could never have intended to 
confer a right without a remedy. The remedy is, indeed, part and parcel of the right. Ubi jus, 
ibi remedium.”20 
The dictum, “where there is a right, there is a remedy”,21 was recognised in the 
democratic dispensation by the Constitutional Court in August v Electoral 
Commission,22 to recognise the right of incarcerated persons to vote in democratic 
elections. 
The dictum, ubi jus, ibi remedium, has achieved “near universal assent in legal 
systems across the world and does not seem to require much by way of normative 
justification.”23 Accordingly, it is widely accepted that a right must be accompanied by 
a remedy. One must be able to enforce a right, in order for that right to acquire 
meaning.24 
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Nevertheless, the discussion of this dictum should not be misconstrued to say that 
this thesis is arguing that there are currently no remedies in place to enforce one’s 
right to just administrative action.25 There are remedies, judicial review being the most 
prevalent one.26 However, it is argued that, in light of prevailing socio-economic 
challenges,27 there is a need for a further set of remedies, preferably in the form of a 
uniform system of internal controls. The implementation of such a system by the state 
will ensure a broader realisation of the dictum, ubi jus, ibi remedium, and allow a more 
accessible, yet still effective, method for the protection and enforcement of the right to 
just administrative action.  
2 3 The minimum criteria for an effective internal remedy 
Chapter 328 has already provided an in-depth discussion on the exhaustion of 
internal remedies under section 7(2) of PAJA, as well as the basic criteria for an 
effective internal remedy, noting that section 7(2) only applies to a “particular type of 
internal remedies.”29 However, it is worth repeating those criteria here, in order to 
better grasp the remainder of the discussion, both in this chapter, as well as the 
following chapter. 
Firstly, an internal remedy is one provided for in “any other law.”30 This implies that 
it must be a statutory remedy.31 According to Burns, once a statute expressly provides 
for an internal remedy, then no court would doubt the existence of such a remedy, and 
would direct the applicant to first exhaust said remedy.32 Thus, if it is not a remedy 
found in statute, it cannot be an internal remedy. Parties cannot, for example, create 
an internal remedy by inserting a clause into a contract. 
Secondly, “the remedy must be internal to the administration”33 concerned. 
Accordingly, even if the remedy in question is one provided for in statute, but the 
particular statute and/or remedy bears no relation to the administration in question, it 
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is not an internal remedy that requires exhaustion by the applicant prior to approaching 
a review court.34  
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the internal remedy must be “available to the 
complainant and be effective.”35 In Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the 
Eastern Cape,36 the Constitutional Court held: 
“It goes without saying that every improper performance of an administrative function would 
implicate the Constitution and entitle the aggrieved party to appropriate relief. In each case 
the remedy must fit the injury. The remedy must be fair to those affected by it and yet 
vindicate effectively the right violated”37 (emphasis added).  
Writing specifically in the context of internal remedies just three years later, the 
Court in Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for HR as Amicus Curiae) 
(“Koyabe”),38 held that:  
“[a] remedy will be effective if it is objectively implemented, taking into account the relevant 
principles and values of administrative justice present in the Constitution and our law. An 
internal remedy must also be readily available and it must be possible to pursue without 
any obstruction, whether systemic or arising from unwarranted administrative conduct.”39 
Therefore, in the context of internal remedies, a remedy would only be effective if it 
can provide the complainant with relief akin to the relief provided by a court.40  
Once an internal remedy meets the above-mentioned criteria, it must be exhausted 
in accordance with section 7(2)(a) of PAJA. Alternatively, where the applicant has not 
yet done so, the court must insist on the exhaustion thereof in accordance with section 
7(2)(b) of PAJA (subject to the exception in section 7(2)(c)). 
In conclusion, it would appear that the most basic criteria for a uniform system of 
internal controls, is that the public administration should be enabled by the state to 
provide the public with a remedy that is (a) found in statute; (b) is internal to the 
particular administration; and (c) which is available, appropriate and effective for the 
grievance in question. 
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3 The need to emphasise local government legislation  
This thesis has continually emphasised the need for an accountable and open 
public administration, in which those whom it serves are able to hold it to account when 
there is a failure on the part of the administration to perform its functions correctly and 
efficiently.41  
There are three spheres of government, namely: (a) national; (b) provincial; and (c) 
local government.42 Together, these three spheres follow an integrated model of 
government, in which each sphere has distinct powers, but simultaneously also 
experience an overlap in certain areas.43  
While all three spheres are critical to the effective functioning of government as a 
whole, this chapter seeks to emphasise specifically local government and local 
government legislation, as the point of departure for investigating what constitutes the 
criteria for an effective internal remedy. The reason for this is that local government is 
the sphere of government with which members of the public come into contact most 
frequently. This can be seen in the wording of section 152(1) of the Constitution, which 
holds: 
“The objects of local government are— 
(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
(b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;  
(c) to promote social and economic development;  
(d) to promote a safe and healthy environment; and  
(e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government.” 
Thus, the arm of the public administration performing municipal functions must be able 
to perform its functions in a speedy, open and transparent manner.  
In order to realise these objectives, legislation was promulgated, specifically the 
Systems Act. The preamble of the Act provides that it is promulgated: 
“[t]o provide for the core principles, mechanisms and processes that are necessary to 
enable municipalities to move progressively towards social and economic upliftment of local 
communities, and ensure universal access to essential services that are affordable to all; 
[…] [and] to establish a framework for support, monitoring and standard setting by other 
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spheres of government in order to progressively build local government into an efficient, 
frontline development agency capable of integrating the activities of all spheres of 
government for the overall social and economic upliftment of communities in harmony with 
their local natural environment; […].” 
Accordingly, this Act and accompanying regulations will be discussed for the 
remainder of the chapter, enabling one to grasp why section 62 of the Systems Act 
has been uniformly accepted as an internal remedy in need of exhaustion under 
section 7(2) of PAJA.  
However, it must be noted that emphasis has been on the creation of a uniform 
system of internal remedies in light of the prevailing socio-economic circumstances of 
the majority of South Africans. Yet, in this chapter, the focus shall be primarily on 
procurement cases involving large corporations which certainly possess the financial 
means to approach a review court. Nevertheless, these cases are used merely for 
illustrative purposes, to serve as the point of departure for determining the general 
criteria of an effective internal remedy. Chapter 6 will highlight a number of provisions 
that go to the heart of addressing the needs of the marginalised sections of South 
African society.  
4 Local government legislation and regulations 
4 1 Introduction 
In the section that follows, section 62 of the Systems Act will be discussed in depth, 
in order to compare it to regulation 49 (together with regulation 50) of the Supply Chain 
Management Regulations. However, the reasoning and methodology behind this 
comparison warrants an explanation. 
Udeh writes that a high number of procurement cases that come before the courts, 
are on municipal procurement.44 This creates an opportunity to consider a number of 
judgments that have all made pronouncements on the same provisions in the Systems 
Act.  
However, no comparison can be made between two or more legal mechanisms, 
without considering the effect of outside factors or variables. Thus, one way to 
minimize the effect that those variables might have, is to compare mechanisms which 
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find application within the same context. By doing this, one can exclude the effects of 
contextual differences between different mechanisms. 
 Accordingly, the general application of section 62 of the Systems Act will first be 
considered. This will be followed by a case discussion of Reader v Ikin (“Reader 
HC”),45 which impacted the applicability of section 62 in certain contexts. An in-depth 
discussion of section 62 in the procurement context will then follow, as well as the 
case law confirming it as an effective internal remedy requiring exhaustion.46 Lastly, 
regulation 49 as it applies in the procurement context will be considered, allowing one 
to draw a clear distinction between it and section 62. This will illustrate why regulation 
49 does not qualify as an internal remedy for the purposes of section 7(2) of PAJA. 
4 2 The implication and effect of section 62 in the context of local government 
4 2 1 The general application of section 62 
Section 62(1) of the Systems Act provides an appeals procedure for any person 
whose rights are affected by any decision taken under a delegated power.47 The 
provision holds: 
“A person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by a political structure, political 
office bearer, councillor or staff member of a municipality in terms of a power or duty 
delegated or sub-delegated by a delegating authority to the political structure, political office 
bearer, councillor or staff member, may appeal against that decision by giving written notice 
of the appeal and reasons to the municipal manager within 21 days of the date of the 
notification of the decision. 
However, “[t]he provisions of section 62 do not detract from any appropriate appeal 
procedure provided for in any other applicable law.”48 A section 62 appeal may be 
lodged only against a decision taken by “persons or structures to whom powers have 
been delegated.”49 Yet, a decision taken under delegated authority, and which is 
subsequently confirmed by the municipal council, may not be appealed under section 
62. 
Further, it is important to note that the appeal must be lodged, in writing, with the 
municipal manager, within 21 days of being notified of the decision. The court in 
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Amandla GCF Construction CC v Municipality Manager of Saldanha Bay 
Municipality,50 confirmed that the municipal manager does not have the power to 
extend the 21 day period.51  
In Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan 
Municipalit,52 the court refused to read into section 62(1), the requirement that an 
award notification must be in writing.53 Rather, “such notification may reach the 
affected person in any manner and from whomever, not necessarily from the decision 
maker.”54 Lastly, in respect of the right to reasons, the court was at pains to stress 
that:  
“the right to receive written reasons under section 33(2) of the Constitution is dependent 
upon the affected person requesting reasons within the stipulated time period from 
becoming aware of the action, or might reasonably have been expected to become aware. 
There is no requirement in either PAJA or the Constitution that the written reasons must 
accompany the notification of the decision, and such construction goes against the express 
wording of section 5 of PAJA.”55 
De Visser and Steytler argues that this produces an unsatisfactory result.56 The 
timeline in PAJA extends beyond that appeal timeline, and creates an opportunity for 
the municipality to, through delaying the furnishing of reasons, “orchestrate the lapsing 
of the 21 day period.”57 They therefore submit that the 21 day period should commence 
on the day the aggrieved party is furnished with reasons.58 
In spite of the above, a number of cases has sought to discuss the effectiveness of 
section 62 as an internal remedy, as well as going so far as to impose certain 
limitations on its applicability in specified circumstances. In this regard, the decision of 
Reader v Ikin (“Reader HC”)59 stands out, and will be discussed below. 
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4 2 2 Reader v Ikin  
In this case, the appellants, a number of parties who lived within a community in 
which a building was to be erected, brought review proceedings to set aside the 
municipality’s decision to approve the building plans of the first respondent.60 The 
municipality opposed the review application on the grounds that the appellants had 
not exhausted the appeal under section 62 of the Systems Act.  
The legal question raised on appeal, was whether or not the appellants enjoyed a 
right of appeal under section 62. 
To answer this question, the court turned to the restriction that section 62(3)61 
imposes on section 62(1).62 Counsel for the appellants submitted that the effect of 
reading the two provisions together, was that only a party whose rights are affected 
by the decision may lodge an appeal under section 62(1), “and that no variation or 
revocation of the decision in question by an appeal authority my detract from any rights 
that may have accrued, presumably to a third party, as a result of that decision.”63 This 
was confirmed by Davis J, when he held: 
“The mechanism created by ss62(1) and 62(3) of the Systems Act provides an appeal for 
a party aggrieved by the initial decision but does not extend to third parties who contend 
that their rights or legitimate expectations have been adversely affected by the decision. 
The latter group, however, have a right of access to a court to set aside such a decision.”64 
This decision was confirmed on appeal by the SCA, in Municipality of the City of 
Cape Town v Reader (“Reader SCA”).65 The SCA noted that, in addition to the findings 
of the court a quo, and contrary to the provisions of section 62, the appellants failed to 
allege that the approval of the building plans itself (the decision), affected their rights. 
Rather, they merely alleged that it was the execution thereof (construction of the 
building) which affected their rights.66 This, coupled with the court’s understanding of 
the provisions of section 62, led the SCA to confirm that section 62 is an internal 
remedy as contemplated in section 7(2) of PAJA. However, section 62 does not extend 
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to third parties who contend that their rights or legitimate expectations has been 
adversely affected by the decision in question.67  
4 2 3 Effect of Reader v Ikin 
The judgments in both Reader HC and Reader SCA reduced the availability of the 
internal appeals’ mechanism under section 62. Yet, both judgments are agreeable. It 
may serve to limit the scope of the provision’s applicability, but it does not detract from 
its usefulness, nor does it hold that section 62 is not an internal remedy for the 
purposes of section 7(2) of PAJA.  
4 3 The significance of section 62 in the context of procurement 
The discussion above painted a broad picture of section 62’s application in general. 
However, in light of the versatile application of section 62 of the Systems Act, it is a 
mechanism often used specifically in the context of municipal procurement, serving as 
an internal appeals mechanism for unsuccessful bidders. The discussion that follows 
shall focus on section 62 in this context alone. This will be done in order to better 
facilitate a comparison between section 62 and regulation 49 which itself finds 
application specifically in the procurement context. 
As with the general application above, section 62(1) provides a mechanism 
whereby unsuccessful bidders may “submit complaints regarding a procurement 
decision to the contracting authority for its reconsideration.”68  
Section 62 is quite significant because a “substantial number of procurement cases 
that come to the courts are on municipal procurement.”69 Accordingly, the provision 
creates a “well-structured internal review mechanism”70 with the power to scrutinize 
any and all decisions taken by an office-bearer acting under delegated municipal 
authority.71 
The advantages of section 62 are that decisions can be reached in an expedient 
and simple manner, which “causes less disruption to procurement”,72 and is 
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considerably cheaper than judicial review before the courts.73 Further, in accordance 
with section 62(3), the appeal authority has the power to “confirm, vary or revoke the 
appealed decision”74 which also allows a greater opportunity “for correction of [a] 
challenged decision than is generally available in judicial review.”75 
In conclusion, Udeh opines that in spite of the fact that section 62 is not the only 
internal review mechanism in the procurement context, “it is the only one that 
constitutes an effective internal remedy.”76 However, some courts have set out to limit 
the availability of section 62 to unsuccessful bidders, as is illustrated below. 
4 4 Case law’s impact on section 62’s viability in the procurement context 
4 4 1 Syntell (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 
In the matter of Syntell (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town (“Syntell”),77 the court had to 
determine whether, on Reader HC’s interpretation, Syntell had a right of appeal in 
terms of section 62 of the Systems Act.78 Both Syntell and Actaris (the second 
respondent) competed for a tender invited by the City of Cape Town (“the City”).79 The 
City awarded the tender to Actaris on 15 January 2007,80 but advised Actaris that the 
award was subject to a: 
“21 day appeal period in terms of the Municipal Systems Act and [that] no rights will accrue 
for 21 days from the date of this notification or until any such appeal has been finalised.”81 
Syntell was informed that their bid was unsuccessful, and appealed against the award 
to Actaris on 8 February 2007.82  
Relying on the court’s decision in Reader HC,83 the City contended that 
“unsuccessful tenderers are ‘third parties’ vis a vis the successful tenderer.”84 This 
would mean that Syntell was a third party vis a vis Actaris, and thus had no right to 
utilise the internal appeal under section 62 of the Systems Act. 
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However, Syntell set out to distinguish their case from the one in Reader HC. Unlike 
in Reader HC, the award of the tender to Actaris was “expressly made conditional 
upon no appeal being lodged within the stipulated period, or any appeal being 
dismissed.”85 Further, the court in Reader HC based their judgment on the effect of 
section 62(3) of the Systems Act, which it understood to mean that: “once a right 
accrues as a result of a decision, that decision cannot be reversed on appeal if the 
reversal take[s] away the right initially granted.”86 However, Syntell argued that no 
rights had accrued to Actaris as a result of the notification in the tender award, and 
thus no rights existed which could be varied or revoked on appeal. 
Nevertheless, the City continued to argue that rights had accrued to Actaris when 
the initial award was made, and Syntell had no right of appeal.87 The court disagreed 
with this contention on four grounds.88 
Firstly, no rights could have accrued to Actaris, since the award was expressly 
made subject to the 21-day appeals period.89 Secondly, once Syntell brought the 
appeal, they had a right to see the appeal process concluded, and a decision reached 
in terms thereof.90 Linked to this point is the court’s view that an unsuccessful bidder’s 
right to appeal does not, in any event, depend the notification of award referred to in 
section 62, but rather exists ex lege by virtue of section 62(1).91 Thirdly, the facts of 
Syntell were distinguishable from those in Reader HC, meaning that the ratio in 
Reader HC was “not applicable to Syntell’s internal appeal”.92 Lastly, there were “no 
accrued rights which could be affected by a variation or revocation of the tender award 
on appeal.”93  
The court in Syntell confirmed the right of unsuccessful bidders to appeal under 
section 62 of the Systems Act, by distinguishing itself from Reader HC and holding 
that Reader HC’s ratio does not apply in the procurement context.  
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4 4 2 Loghdey v City of Cape Town   
Before the judgment in Loghdey v City of Cape Town (“Loghdey”),94 “unsuccessful 
tenderers in municipal procurement generally enjoyed a right of appeal under section 
62 of the Systems Act.”95 The judgment in Syntell was one of the cases to confirm that 
right.96 However, the court in Loghdey disputed such a general right in the context of 
the facts of the particular case, creating doubt for future cases. 
The City of Cape Town (“the City”) began a competitive bidding process for the 
“provision of a kerbside parking management service.”97 While the City awarded the 
contract to the successful bidder, the two unsuccessful bidders applied to court for 
“review and set-aside of the award.”98 Their allegations were that the City acted 
contrary to its own Supply Chain Management Policy (“SCMP”) by not notifying all the 
bidders of its decision to accept the successful bid, and for not informing them of their 
right under section 62 of the Systems Act to appeal against the decision within 21 days 
“before the contract award”.99 The court, however, proceeded to ask whether 
unsuccessful bidders have a right to appeal in terms of section 62 “before”100 the 
award. The court answered in the negative. 
The court’s findings were based on three grounds, namely (a) that the tender 
documents themselves are not binding, with Loghdey being distinguishable from 
Syntell on this basis; (b) that the right to appeal is only for the person who has asked 
or applied for the decision; and (c) that the SCA’s judgment in Reader SCA had the 
effect of overruling earlier High Court precedents.101  
However, Udeh argues that the court’s decision in Loghdey was “erroneous, 
considering judicial precedent at the time”,102 and I support this view. 
With regards to (a), the court held that the tender documents themselves do not 
afford bidders a right of appeal under the Systems Act.103 In this regard, two issues 
need to be addressed. Firstly, the court held that the City’s SCMP clauses as well as 
conditions of tender “were merely an attempt by the City to record its understanding 
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of the effect of section 62.”104 Accordingly, unless the award notification contains a 
similar reference to those provisions, those clauses and conditions are, on their own, 
not binding.105 Yet, this interpretation is inconsistent with the decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief 
Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency NO (“Allpay 
Consolidated”),106 where the Court held that: 
“The Circular and the Request for Proposals, read together with the constitutional and 
legislative procurement provisions, thus constituted the legally binding and enforceable 
framework within which tenders had to be submitted, evaluated and awarded.”107 
This implies that all tender documentation, together with the tender or tenders received 
in response thereto, forms “the basis for the formal contract to be concluded; and their 
requirements are not merely internal prescripts that contracting authorities may 
disregard at whim.”108 Accordingly, the decision in Allpay Consolidated trumps the 
decision in Loghdey,109 showing that Loghdey is incorrect. 
Secondly, the court in Loghdey held that there was a clear distinction between its 
facts and those of Syntell, where the award notification was expressly made subject 
to section 62.110 However, I doubt whether a distinction can be drawn between the two 
cases on that basis alone. Both Syntell and Loghdey were High Court decisions 
considering the broader issue of whether section 62 of the Systems Act finds 
application in procurement matters.111 They therefore concern the same issue.  
Further, as confirmed by Allpay Consolidated, both the tender documents and 
applicable policies are binding,112 and the court in Syntell specifically stated that an 
unsuccessful bidder’s right to lodge an appeal under section 62 is not derived from a 
“notification of award”,113 but rather “already existed (ex lege) by virtue of section 
62(1).”114 This would mean that separate notice of section 62 in the notification award 
is unnecessary.  
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 With regards to (b), the second ground for the court’s finding in Loghdey, the court 
held that the right to appeal is only for the person who has asked or applied for the 
decision. It was the view of the court that the facts in Loghdey, were on par with those 
in Reader HC, and thus strictly applied the Reader HC rule, as confirmed in Reader 
SCA.115 Yet, the facts and circumstances were quite distinguishable.  
The court in Reader SCA had to determine whether third parties who objected to 
an applicant’s building plans, were entitled to an appeal under section 62, and the 
court answered in the negative.116 Yet in Loghdey, the unsuccessful bidder was a party 
to the procurement process.117 This would mean that the unsuccessful bidder falls 
within the category of objectors that would have access to section 62 under the rule in 
Reader SCA, since the unsuccessful bidder also applied for the decision. Meaning, 
through submitting a bid, the unsuccessful bidder applied for the contract to be 
awarded to it. The unsuccessful bidder is therefore quintessentially a party whose 
application (in this case its bid) is turned down or rejected, which is under Reader SCA, 
exactly the type of party that can rely on a section 62 appeal.  
Lastly, in terms of (c), the third ground for the courts’ finding in Loghdey, it appears 
that the court assumed that Reader SCA overruled earlier High Court judgments which 
confirmed the right of unsuccessful bidders to appeal under section 62.118 Again, this 
is incorrect. As seen above, both Reader judgments dealt specifically with third parties 
objecting to the approval of a building permit, not unsuccessful bidders disputing the 
outcome of a procurement process. This implies that earlier High Court judgments, 
which confirmed that unsuccessful bidders may appeal under section 62, continue to 
apply.119 
Nonetheless, and despite the arguments made here, it was believed that the 
decision in Loghdey severely restricted the right of unsuccessful bidders to lodge an 
appeal under section 62 of the Systems Act.120  
                                            









4 4 3 CC Groenewald v M5 Developments (Pty) Ltd 
Two months after the decision in Loghdey, the SCA rendered judgment in the case 
of CC Groenewald v M5 Developments (Pty) Ltd (“Groenewald”),121 which in effect 
overturned the decision in Loghdey.122 
In this matter the municipality of Cape Town had invited tenders for the provision of 
low-cost housing. M5 Developments originally received the tender, with the 
unsuccessful bidders being informed in writing of both the outcome, and their right to 
appeal the award within 21 days under section 62.123 While two unsuccessful bidders, 
Blue Whale and ASLA, both filed notices to appeal under section 62, only Blue Whale 
did so within the prescribed 21-day period.124 Nevertheless, the municipal manager 
(Groenewald), acting as the appeal authority under section 62, reversed the original 
decision and awarded the tender to ASLA.125 This led to M5 Developments instituting 
review proceedings in the High Court, which overturned the decision of Groenewald. 
Groenewald, the municipality and ASLA all appealed to the SCA.126 
In both the court a quo, and in its heads of argument on appeal, M5 Developments 
relied on the judgment in Reader SCA, and contended that:  
“as an unsuccessful tenderer, [ASLA] did not have clearly defined rights adversely affected 
by the decision of the tender adjudication committee.”127  
Accordingly, M5 Developments argued that ASLA and Blue Whale did not have a right 
to appeal under section 62.128 However, counsel for M5 Developments conceded in 
argument on appeal that both ASLA and Blue Whale enjoyed a right to appeal under 
section 62.129 
The SCA believed that this concession was “correctly made”,130 stating that its 
interpretation of the majority judgment in Reader SCA was that:  
“s 62 gives no general right to appeal to those who object to a municipal planning 
permission or decision and that a neighbour, who was not a party to the application for the 
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approval of the building plans, did not have a right directly affected by a decision on the 
application and thus had no right to appeal under s 62.”131 
The SCA highlighted that the majority in Reader SCA specifically did not address the 
question of whether “an unsuccessful tenderer would have a right to appeal against 
the acceptance of the tender of another”.132 Therefore, the SCA held in the present 
matter that the two unsuccessful bidders, together with M5 Developments, were all 
parties to the tender proceedings, and that they were entitled to an appeal under 
section 62 of the Systems Act.133 
Accordingly, the SCA succeeded in distinguishing the facts before it from those in 
Reader SCA, and finding that unsuccessful bidders do enjoy a general right of appeal 
under section 62.134  
The SCA also made to two further important findings. Firstly, an appeal authority 
may only reconsider the bids of the parties who submitted an appeal, as opposed to 
reconsidering all the tenders submitted.135 Secondly, the appeal authority may not 
award the tender to a party who did not lodge an appeal against the original award.136 
The SCA ultimately dismissed the appeal.  
4 4 4 The confirmation of the Groenewald decision 
Some have argued that the facts in Groenewald are distinguishable from those in 
Loghdey, which would imply that the findings in Loghdey would continue to apply.137 
This argument is based on the fact that in Groenewald, the notification of award 
specifically highlighted the right of unsuccessful bidders to appeal within 21 days under 
section 62, whereas the notification of award in Loghdey did not contain a similar 
condition.138 Nonetheless, Udeh raises a number of points which may be used to 
counter this argument, to ensure that Groenewald continues to be seen as 
confirmation of the viability of section 62 of the Systems Act as an internal remedy in 
procurement cases. 
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Firstly, the SCA in Groenewald regarded the right to appeal under section 62 to 
accrue to unsuccessful bidders ex lege, and not by means of contract.139 This means 
that the right of appeal does not accrue only when there is a reference to section 62 
in the notification award. Secondly, in Loghdey, reference was made to a 21 day 
appeal period, as well as section 62, in both the municipality’s SCMP and conditions 
of tender.140 As was confirmed in Allpay Consolidated, the SCMP and conditions of 
tender are “deemed incorporated into the award notification and binding on all the 
parties”.141 Thus, whether there is such a condition in the notification of award should 
not have an impact on the availability of section 62 as an internal remedy. Lastly, in 
Groenewald, the SCA specifically held that the ratio of Reader SCA did not apply to 
unsuccessful bidders.142 This would imply that the court’s findings in Loghdey was 
overruled by the SCA’s judgment in Groenewald, because Loghdey was squarely 
based on the ratio in Reader SCA. 
In my opinion, Udeh succeeds in distinguishing Loghdey (restricting the right of 
unsuccessful bidders to lodge an appeal under section 62) from those cases such as 
Groenewald, which has confirmed the right of unsuccessful bidders to appeal under 
section 62. An unsuccessful bidder has an ex lege right to appeal and that right does 
not depend on whether reference was made to such a right in the award notification 
of the tender concerned.143 To require a notification of award to reference section 62 
directly, would be to misunderstand the wording and effect of section 62, as well as to 
disregard the Constitutional Court’s finding in Allpay Consolidated. 
Accordingly, the SCA’s ruling in Groenewald overturned Loghdey, and restored the 
right to an appeal of unsuccessful bidders under section 62. Groenewald was 
subsequently applied in Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo 
City Metropolitan Municipality144 and in DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local 
Municipality (“DDP Valuers”).145  
                                            
139 Udeh (2016) APPLJ 83; See also Syntell (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2008 ZAWCHC 120 paras 
65 & 68. 
140 Udeh (2016) APPLJ 83; 2010 ZAWCHC 25 para 16. 
141 Udeh (2016) APPLJ 83; 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) para 38 read with footnote 42 of the judgment.  
142 See heading 4 4 3 above. 
143 Udeh (2016) APPLJ 84. 
144 2014 3 All SA 560 (ECG). 




4 4 5 The effect of 62(3) of the Systems Act 
While section 62(1) is now generally accepted as an internal remedy to be 
exhausted by unsuccessful bidders, section 62(3) of the Systems Act serves as a 
stumbling block for the full and effective realisation of the remedy.  
Section 62(3) holds:  
“The appeal authority must consider the appeal, and confirm, vary or revoke the decision, 
but no such variation or revocation of a decision may detract from any rights that may have 
accrued as a result of the decision.” 
While the subsection indicates the wide variety of remedies that may be exercised by 
an appeal authority, the interpretation of the provision by courts seems to be in need 
of reconsideration.146 
Currently, courts are interpreting section 62(3) to mean that a:  
“section 62 appeal cannot succeed if it will result in a revocation or variation of a right that 
has accrued from the decision in issue. This effectively exempts unconditional award or 
concluded contracts from the appeal.”147 
The majority judgment of the SCA in Reader SCA viewed section 62(3) as effectively 
protecting the decision of the political office bearer.148 
However, Vinti rightly opines that this is an incorrect interpretation, and that the 
preferable interpretation of section 62(3) can be found in the minority judgment of Jafta 
JA.149 According to Jafta JA, section 62(3): 
“does not protect the decision, which constitutes the subject matter of the appeal itself, from 
being varied or revoked. Section 62(3) protects the rights, which have accrued as a 
consequence of such a decision.”150 
Accordingly, if the appeal authority does decide to vary or revoke the impugned 
decision, subsection (3) will be triggered and the variation or revocation should not 
affect rights which have accrued as a result of the impugned decision.151 Thus, section 
62(3) should be interpreted to protect the rights of an applicant who has acquired rights 
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“in the matter on the strength of the decision of the relevant authority.”152 Such an 
interpretation would bring the provision in line with the principle of legal certainty.153 
In light of the above, both Udeh and Vinti argue that section 62(3) should be 
amended to enable the full and effective functioning of the provision as a whole.154  
Nevertheless, interpretative problems with section 62(3) should not detract from the 
general functionality of section 62(1) which continues to serve as an internal remedy 
for unsuccessful bidders. Both Reader HC and Reader SCA155 dealt with a very 
particular set of facts, and the judgments must be viewed in that light. Further, every 
court from Syntell156 to Groenewald157 managed to distinguish their facts from Reader 
(HC and SCA), as well as confirm section 62 as an effective internal remedy, in spite 
of section 62(3). 
I therefore continue to view section 62 as an example of an effective internal 
remedy. 
4 4 6 Comparing section 62 to regulation 49 
The discussion above has illustrated that section 62 of the Systems Act is generally 
accepted to provide unsuccessful bidders with a right of appeal and an effective 
internal remedy.  
The primary focus of section 62, in the procurement context, is to provide an appeal 
to unsuccessful bidders who wish to appeal against a tender awarded under a 
delegated authority.158 Section 62 is not be utilised by third parties who were not party 
to the tender process, and who cannot prove that their rights were directly affected by 
the decision of the bid adjudication committee. However, third parties may approach 
a review court directly. Lastly, an unsuccessful bidder’s right to appeal does not 
depend on the inclusion of a specific condition referencing section 62 in the award 
notification, it is an ex lege entitlement. 
While this would enable one to have a firm grasp of the applicability in the 
procurement context of section 62 of the Systems Act, it has not yet been compared 
                                            
152 461. 
153 461. 
154 Udeh (2016) APPLJ 86-87; Vinti (2019) Stell LR 462. 
155 High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal. 
156 2008 ZAWCHC 120 paras 82-83.  
157 2010 ZASCA 47 paras 21, 23-24, 27. 





to regulations 49 and 50 of the Supply Chain Management Regulations, nor has the 
reason for why regulation 49 is not deemed to be an effective internal remedy been 
discussed. 
Regulation 49 provides that:  
“The supply chain management policy of a municipality or municipal entity must allow 
persons aggrieved by decisions or actions taken by the municipality or municipal entity in 
the implementation of its supply chain management system, to lodge within 14 days of the 
decision or action a written objection or complaint to the municipality or municipal entity 
against the decision or action.”159 
Regulation 49 then functions jointly with regulation 50, which sets out the procedure 
for the resolution of disputes, objections, complaints and queries as envisioned in 
regulation 49. 
It would appear that regulation 49 “does not necessarily oblige a local authority to 
provide for an internal appeal in its procurement policy.”160 Yet, it is less constricting 
than section 62, as it allows a larger group of people to lodge complaints, and those 
complaints can also be lodged against a wider range of procurement decisions.161 
Conversely, section 62 is only available to a person “‘whose rights are affected’ by the 
procurement decision taken in terms of a delegated power’”.162 Regulation 49 is 
available to “all ‘persons aggrieved’ by any decision or action taken ‘in the 
implementation of [the authority’s] supply chain management system’”.163  
Regulation 49 (in conjunction with regulation 50) and section 62 are therefore 
distinct and separate remedies that appear to cater to different groups.164 
Nonetheless, regulation 49 is not recognised as an effective internal remedy in need 
of exhaustion for the purposes of section 7(2) of PAJA. Regulation 49 allows a 
municipality or municipal entity to formulate its own policy, but with the requirement 
that it provides for a process as set out in regulations 49 and 50. However, it is a well-
established principle that the policy of a particular authority “cannot override the 
legislative provision contained in [section] 62 of the Systems Act”.165 This implies that 
any remedy in an authority’s policy that falls short of an internal appeal would be 
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“subsumed by the wider [section] 62 appeal mechanism.”166 Accordingly, section 62 
would appear to “obviate the usefulness of regulation 49”,167 seeing that both relate to 
municipal internal remedies and the Systems Act, as statute, enjoys precedence over 
regulations.168 Lastly, in DDP Valuers, the SCA confirmed that regulations 49 and 50 
fall short of what is seen as an internal remedy for the purposes of section 7(2) of 
PAJA.169 
Section 62 therefore remains the primary mechanism through which unsuccessful 
bidders will challenge the award of tenders.  
4 4 7 Insight gained from case law 
Both section 62 and regulation 49 have now been discussed. The purpose for the 
comparison between these mechanisms, in the procurement context, is to provide a 
legal framework within a single context of administrative decision-making, of internal 
mechanisms that do and do not qualify as internal remedies. This provides one with a 
useful set of remedies, applicable to the same decisions. These remedies can then be 
analysed to determine what the basic characteristics of an effective internal remedy 
are by looking at what makes one of these mechanisms an effective internal remedy 
and what makes the other not an effective internal remedy. Their comparison reveals 
the presence in the one instance and the absence in the other instance of those 
aspects of the mechanism that would qualify it as an effective internal remedy. 
In the next component of this chapter, section 62 and regulation 49 will be weighed 
against a set of criteria, already deemed to be applicable to effective internal remedies. 
4 5 Basic characteristics of an effective internal remedy 
As was confirmed above,170 the most basic characteristics of an internal remedy, is 
that: (a) it must be found in statute; (b) should be internal to the particular 
administration concerned; and (c) should be available, appropriate and effective for 
the grievance in question.  
If section 62 is weighed against these criteria, it would appear that section 62 
embodies all three. Firstly, section 62 is found in statute, namely: the Systems Act. 
Secondly, the remedy is internal to local government, more specifically the 
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procurement component of municipal structures. Lastly, section 62 is deemed an 
available, appropriate and effective remedy for unsuccessful bidders to rely on, when 
challenging the outcome of tender procedures.171 
Conversely, while regulations 49 and 50 appear to meet criteria one and two,172 it 
falls short of the third criteria.173 Regulation 49 may allow a municipality or municipal 
entity to formulate its own policy, but that policy may not override the legislative 
provisions contained section 62. Section 62 seems to override regulation 49. Thus, 
regulation 49 is not an effective internal remedy in need of exhaustion under section 
7(2) of PAJA. 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider whether these three criteria are the only 
characteristics of a successful and effective internal remedy. Surely, internal remedies 
must be capable of achieving more? 
Thus, a fourth criteria is expediency. This means that an effective internal remedy 
is one which allows decisions to be reached in a quick and forthright manner, allowing 
speedy resolution of disputes.174 Unlike judicial review which could take anywhere 
between nine months and two years to complete (if there is no disruption and all steps 
are followed without delay, which is seldom the case),175 an internal remedy must 
empower its utiliser to gain access to the public administration, and be provided with 
a decision within a reasonable amount of time. While there will be a variance in the 
different time-periods to be followed, it generally amounts to a relatively short period 
of time within which the aggrieved party and the administrator concerned, must act. 
Further, an internal remedy must as far as possible be able to bring finality to a 
dispute, instead of allowing room for doubt.176 This is in line with the functus officio 
doctrine, or so-called principle of finality.177 Accordingly, those with decision-making 
powers must be able to exercise their powers without fear, favour or prejudice. Once 
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the internal remedy has been invoked by an aggrieved party, the decision reached 
under the utilisation of said remedy must be both acceptable and final. 
However, finality here should not be understood to mean that once a decision has 
been reached by the administrator, it cannot be challenged through lodging a review 
application in the courts. This is not what I mean by an “acceptable and final decision”. 
Due to the wording of both PAJA and section 33 of the Constitution, judicial review will 
always be a formal possibility, and in this sense, internal remedies will never be able 
to bring finality to an administrative matter. 
Therefore, this criteria means that the content of the administrative decision should 
be clear, understandable and acceptable to both parties at the conclusion of the 
internal remedy. That is, even if the aggrieved party loses on the internal remedy, they 
should nevertheless be satisfied that the decision was reached in a fair and just 
manner, implying that the decision in question is indeed the appropriate one and that 
there is no need to lodge a further challenge by way of review. 
Accordingly, if administrators are properly trained, and if there is a sufficient 
regulatory framework in terms of which they are empowered to act, internal remedies 
present a greater opportunity to provide an aggrieved party with a substantive solution 
for their administrative query, than judicial review, and accordingly bring substantive 
finality to the dispute. Internal remedies provide a mechanism with which the time-
consuming and expensive nature of administrative dispute-resolution through judicial 
review can be addressed. 
In conclusion, these criteria serve as the general criteria for what one would want 
internal remedies to achieve. It is the point of departure for those serving in the 
executive to formulate the principles necessary to establish and implement a uniform 
system of internal controls (and remedies).   
4 6 Final remarks on section 62 
The aim of this section was to provide an in depth and calculated discussion on 
section 62 of the Systems Act, in order to compare it to regulations 49 and 50 of the 
Supply Chain Management Regulations. As stated above,178 focus was placed 
specifically on local government legislation, due to it being the part of the public 
administration that members of the public come into contact with most often, for 
                                            




methodological reasons, as well as due to the high prevalence of review cases 
(concerning municipal procurement) before the courts.179  
The significance of section 62 as an internal remedy was highlighted, and the 
discussion of case law illustrated that despite debate amongst the courts, the SCA has 
clearly confirmed section 62 to be an effective internal remedy in need of exhaustion 
under section 7(2) of PAJA. While the provision may be relied on by unsuccessful 
bidders challenging a procurement decision taken under delegated powers, it may not 
be relied on by third parties who were not a part of the tender process. Rather, such 
third parties must approach a review court directly, should they wish to challenge the 
outcome of the particular tender process.  
Further, the comparison between section 62 and regulation 49 also revealed that a 
mechanism need not be comprehensive in the sense that it must be available, across 
the board, to everyone. It is acceptable for a remedy to be limited to a specific set of 
aggrieved parties.180 This will better enable the administration to deal with 
administrative matters, instead of being inundated by complaints for which it lacks the 
capacity to resolve.  
In short, the discussion showed that effective internal remedies are (a) found in law; 
(b) internal to the administration concerned; (c) available, appropriate and effective; 
(d) capable of allowing for speedy resolution of disputes; and (e) capable of producing 
a final and binding decision.  
While section 62 meets the above-mentioned criteria, regulations 49 and 50 are 
deemed to fall short of these five general criteria, and illustrates that, unless remedies 
are clearly formulated, they will not qualify for exhaustion under section 7(2) of PAJA. 
5 Conclusion 
Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the first component of this thesis, namely: that the 
state has not yet implemented a uniform system of internal remedies. Rather, section 
7(2) of PAJA requires one to exhaust an internal remedy if and when it exists. Chapter 
4 then specifically addressed the rationale behind the need to implement a uniform 
system of internal controls. 
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Accepting the argument made in chapter 4, the aim of this chapter was to highlight 
the general criteria for a successful and effective internal remedy. Its aim was not to 
provide an exact framework for an effective internal remedy, nor to provide the state 
with an ultimatum on what a uniform system of internal controls must include.  
The discussion of section 62 and regulations 49 and 50 highlighted the general 
characteristics of an effective internal remedy, yet, section 62 is not the only effective 
internal remedy that exists. There are other examples appearing in the South African 
statute book. Therefore, the following chapter of this thesis will aim to highlight a 
number of these examples, allowing one to formulate a more coherent set of principles 
that a uniform system of internal remedies should comply with, which may cater for 
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The preceding chapter reiterated: (a) the need to implement a uniform system of 
internal controls in South African administrative law, and (b) the content, requirements 
and scope of a successful internal remedy. While the first component (a) was 
addressed in chapters 2, 3 and 4, the principle purpose of chapter 5 was to initialise a 
discussion of the second component (b), and in so doing, provide the general criteria 
for an effective internal remedy that requires exhaustion in terms of section 7(2) of 
PAJA. 
While chapter 5 provided the general criteria for an effective internal remedy, this 
chapter seeks to shift the focus specifically to the South African context, and the 
implication of the ideal of administrative justice as envisioned by the Constitution. 
Without considering the impact of poverty, income inequality, and a general lack of 
access to justice for those within the marginalised sections of society, there can be no 
concrete and effective determination of the criteria for a uniform system of internal 
controls. 
Accordingly, this chapter will first highlight the importance of the need for an 
accountable public administration, which is committed to realising the vision of 
Transformative Constitutionalism. Secondly, the general criteria for an effective 
internal remedy, as discussed in chapter 5, will be highlighted. Thirdly, a number of 
statutory provisions, already recognised as effective internal remedies, will be 
discussed. These remedies aim to assist marginalised members of the public who do 
not ordinarily have the financial means, to gain access to justice expediently. These 
provisions, as interpreted by both the courts and academia, will be used to formulate 
a further set of criteria for a uniform system of internal controls. 
2 Accountability and Transformative Constitutionalism 
This thesis has emphasised continuously the need for an efficient and accountable 
public administration,1 as enshrined in section 195 of the Constitution.2 Chapter 4 
argued that one of the ways to ensure that the public administration both foster, and 
maintain, a culture of accountability, is through the realisation of the project of 
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Transformative Constitutionalism.3 My interpretation of Transformative 
Constitutionalism in the context of administrative justice, is that it implies a need for 
the public administration to create a “culture of justification”4 in order to realise the 
vision of an accountable public administration. However, a culture of justification does 
imply a very particular task for the public administration itself. As I argued in chapter 
4,5 it is not just for members of the public to expect that the public administration should 
justify why it made a specific decision, or took a certain action. Rather, the public 
administration itself should realise that it should foster and enforce this culture of 
justification. It must come from within. That is the only way an inherent culture of 
justification will exist, in which the administration knows beforehand that it will have to 
justify its decision or action, and the public simultaneously knows that its request for 
justification will be met. 
Chapter 4 further maintained that the mechanisms through which the above can be 
achieved, is access to the right to reasons (under section 5 of the PAJA) and a uniform 
system of internal controls.6 Once a member of the public initialise the procedure of a 
particular internal remedy, the administration concerned must provide reasons for its 
decision to either vary, confirm or overturn the decision under review.   
Accordingly, chapter 6 builds on both this argument, as well as the general criteria 
for a uniform system of internal controls provided in chapter 5, and will endeavour to 
indicate that one of the most important rationales behind a uniform system of internal 
remedies, is to ensure a more open and accessible public administration, which is 
efficient and accountable, and which can enable marginalised sections of society to 
gain access to justice, without having to approach a review court. 
3 Previously confirmed characteristics of an Effective Internal Remedy 
Chapter 5 determined that an internal remedy that requires exhaustion under 
section 7(2)(a) of PAJA, is one which is: (a) found in law; (b) internal to the 
administration concerned; and (c) available, appropriate and effective.7 It further 
established that an internal remedy must also be (d) capable of allowing a speedy 
resolution of disputes; and (e) capable of producing a final and binding decision.8 
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However, will the above-mentioned criteria be able to effectively assist the 
marginalised sections of society to gain access to the justice system? Is there not a 
possibility that internal remedies are subject to more principles? There is no way to 
answer this question without having further recourse to case law and academic 
literature.  
Thus, it is important to determine whether a further number of criteria exist which 
should inform the decision-making of the state, when formulating the principles and 
procedures of a uniform system of internal controls that is fit-for-purpose in the South 
African context. This will be done by examining both statute and case law. 
4 A focus on the poor and marginalised 
In chapter 5 the focus fell primarily on section 62 of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (“Systems Act”). This meant that a number of cases 
were discussed involving large corporations which possessed the financial means to 
approach a review court, if they were an unsuccessful bidder in a procurement matter.9  
However, it is a sad reality that the same cannot be said about a large portion of 
South African society, who continue to live in poverty. South Africa’s unemployment 
figure reached record highs of 29.1% in 2019, and 30.1% in the first quarter of 2020.10 
Roughly 55.5% of the population were living below the upper-bound poverty line,11 
which means that the majority of South Africans lack the financial means to access 
justice through the court system. Nevertheless, even if a marginalised person could 
gain access to the courts, it is a fact that judicial review continues to be a task mainly 
performed by the High Court, and can take anywhere between nine months to two 
years to complete, if all procedures are followed correctly.12 It is an extremely timeous 
process, causing the wheels of justice to turn extremely slowly.13   
Accordingly, with such prevailing circumstances, the implementation of a uniform 
system of internal controls could present marginalised people with the means to gain 
access to justice both speedily and affordably. While a uniform system of internal 
controls would surely need to accommodate both the financially strong and weak, it is 
                                            
9 See heading 3 in chapter 5. 
10 Anonymous “Quarterly Labour Force Survey” (23-06-2020) StatsSA 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2020.pdf> (accessed 03-07-2020). 
11 See heading 4 4 2 in chapter 4. 
12 See heading 4 4 1 in chapter 4. 
13 The recent extension of PAJA jurisdiction to lower courts is unlikely to change this situation much 
given the extensive possibility of appeals against lower court judgments to the High Court. See heading 




primarily the poor and marginalised who will be best served through the 
implementation thereof.  
However, the realisation of such a system poses unique challenges, and the criteria 
used to implement this system must be well-formulated. Therefore, in order to further 
investigate and formulate these criteria, focus will be placed on a number of internal 
remedies, already implemented and utilised, in the immigration, social assistance and 
school fee context. These provisions, together with a discussion of case law, follow 
below.   
5 Section 8 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 
5 1 General  
The first provision to consider is section 8 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 
(“Immigration Act”), a highly detailed provision which provides two separate channels 
of internal review. It provides a step-by-step approach according to which immigration 
officials must process both those seeking to enter the Republic, and those wishing to 
leave it. Similar to the provisions compared in chapter 5,14 section 8 allows one to 
compare two internal mechanisms for review, but which finds application in the same 
context. 
The provision is cited in full and provides:15  
“(1) An immigration officer who refuses entry to any person or finds any person to be an 
illegal foreigner shall inform that person on the prescribed form that he or she may in writing 
request the Minister to review that decision and-  
(a) if he or she arrived by means of a conveyance which is on the point of departing 
and is not to call at any other port of entry in the Republic, that request shall without 
delay be submitted to the Minister; or  
(b) in any other case than the one provided for in paragraph (a), that request shall be 
submitted to the Minister within three days after that decision.  
(2) A person who was refused entry or was found to be an illegal foreigner and who has 
requested a review of such a decision-  
(a) in a case contemplated in subsection (1)(a), and who has not received an answer 
to his or her request by the time the relevant conveyance departs, shall depart on that 
conveyance and shall await the outcome of the review outside the Republic; or   
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(b) in a case contemplated in subsection (1)(b), shall not be removed from the Republic 
before the Minister has confirmed the relevant decision.   
(3) Any decision in terms of this Act, other than a decision contemplated in subsection (1), 
that materially and adversely affects the rights of any person, shall be communicated to 
that person in the prescribed manner and shall be accompanied by the reasons for that 
decision.   
(4) An applicant aggrieved by a decision contemplated in subsection (3) may, within 10 
working days from receipt of the notification contemplated in subsection (3), make an 
application in the prescribed manner to the Director-General for the review or appeal of that 
decision.   
(5) The Director-General shall consider the application contemplated in subsection (4), 
whereafter he or she shall either confirm, reverse or modify that decision.   
(6) An applicant aggrieved by a decision of the Director-General contemplated in 
subsection (5) may, within 10 working days of receipt of that decision, make an application 
in the prescribed manner to the Minister for the review or appeal of that decision.   
(7) The Minister shall consider the application contemplated in subsection (6), whereafter 
he or she shall either confirm, reverse or modify that decision” (emphasis added). 
Section 8 was recognised as an effective internal remedy in need of exhaustion by the 
Constitutional Court in Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for HR as Amicus 
Curiae) (“Koyabe”).16  
5 2 Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs 
5 2 1 Facts  
The factual matrix of Koyabe was highly contested by the parties,17 but is primarily 
centred around Mr Koyabe, the first applicant, and his second wife, Mrs Koyabe, who 
are both Kenyan nationals. While Mr Koyabe had first gained entry to the Republic in 
1994 under a work permit, he subsequently divorced his first wife, a South African 
national, and applied for a number of different permits over the years.18 However, in 
2007, both applicants received a letter stating that they had previously obtained South 
African identity documents through fraudulent means and no longer qualified for 
permanent residence after the period, 1 July 2005.19 They were classified as prohibited 
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persons who no longer qualified for visas and were to be deported.20 Nevertheless, 
they were informed of their right under section 8 of the Immigration Act to request the 
Minister to review the decision.21 However, the applicants first submitted a letter to the 
Minister requesting the reasons for the departments’ decision to withdraw or terminate 
their residency permits.22 An immigration official informed them that the reasons were 
adequately detailed in the original letter, and that the applicants had three days to 
submit their application for review to the Minister.23 The applicants decided to 
approach the High Court for review of the departments’ decision instead. 
In the High Court, it was found that the applicants had failed to exhaust section 8 of 
the Immigration Act, an internal remedy, as required under section 7(2)(a) of PAJA, 
and that the Court was obliged to deny their application under section 7(2)(b) of PAJA 
until they had done so. The applicants were further denied leave to appeal in both the 
High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) and subsequently approached the 
Constitutional Court.24 
5 2 2 Section 8 as an effective internal remedy 
The Constitutional Court recognised that it was in the interests of justice for it to 
grant leave to appeal, in order for it to give clarity on the relationship between section 
8 of the Immigration Act and section 7(2) of PAJA.25  
First, the Court provided a detailed discussion on the duty to exhaust internal 
remedies under PAJA.26 The Court recognised the importance of allowing the public 
administration to deal with administrative matters internally, especially since those 
decisions may involve specialist knowledge which the courts, in general, may lack.27 
The Court further held that the duty to exhaust internal remedies should not be rigidly 
imposed, and that the duty is not absolute.28 There can be exceptional circumstances 
where the court would allow an applicant to approach a review court directly, should 
the internal remedy in question not be effective, or its exhaustion futile.29 
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Secondly, the Court interpreted section 7(2) to the effect that it does not exclude a 
court’s review jurisdiction. Rather, a court must exercise its review powers in one of 
two situations: (a) once all internal remedies has been exhausted, or (b) when 
exceptional circumstances are found to exist.30 
In terms of section 8 itself, the Court held that it qualifies as an “internal 
administrative review and appeal” procedure for the purposes of section 7(2) of PAJA 
and may be used to challenge administrative decisions taken under the Immigration 
Act.31  
Section 8 provides two internal mechanisms for review and “[t]he procedure 
applicable in a particular case will depend on the nature of the administrative 
decision.”32 The first channel is section 8(1) which provides two routes for appeal, 
depending on the circumstances. Section 8(1)(a) affords a person who is refused entry 
or found to be an illegal foreigner to apply, in writing, for review to the Minister.33 
Nevertheless, if such person arrived on a conveyance set to depart, such individual 
shall depart on said conveyance while the application is referred to the Minister with 
urgency, and await the Minister’s decision, abroad.34 However, in terms of section 
8(1)(b), in any other case, the affected person has three days to apply to the Minister 
for review and may not be deported “unless and until the Minister has confirmed the 
decision.”35 
The second channel, section 8(4), stands in direct contrast to section 8(1):  
“In all cases other than those contemplated in section 8(1), where a decision has materially 
and adversely affected a person’s rights, the decision shall be communicated in the 
prescribed manner and reasons shall be furnished. Under section 8(4), the affected person 
may, within 10 working days, request a review or appeal to the Director-General. Within a 
further 10 days of the receipt of the Director-General’s decision, the person may seek a 
ministerial review or appeal.”36 
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This has the result that section 8(1) is “more urgent and provides aggrieved parties 
with a direct route to the Minister.”37 This indicates that urgency may play a role in 
determining which route to follow.  
Accordingly, the Court held that “[t]he internal remedies under section 8 of the 
[Immigration] Act illustrate the value and importance of a tailored remedial structure 
designed to cure a specific administrative irregularity.”38 The Court further believed 
that the procedure under section 8(1) was the applicable route to follow in the 
applicants’ case, and proceeded to consider the facts in light thereof. 
5 3 Insight gained from the immigration context 
The Court’s emphasis on “the value of a tailored remedial structure”39 speaks to a 
broader issue often emphasised in this thesis. While this thesis wants to determine the 
basic principles that must inform a uniform system of internal controls, when such a 
system is implemented by the state, the remedies created under it must be capable of 
addressing a wide range of issues. Therefore, it must be capable of sometimes 
addressing very specific needs, and not just apply broadly, being incapable of 
providing appropriate relief.40  
It is further important to note that the distinction between sections 8(1) and 8(4), 
speaks to a further criteria for an effective internal remedy: section 8(1) provides a 
direct route to the Minister, while section 8(4) requires one to first apply to the Director-
General, where after one may appeal to the Minister. This supports the argument 
made in chapter 5,41 that it is acceptable for a remedy to be limited to a specific set of 
aggrieved parties. Internal remedies should sometimes be capable of assessing 
whether someone requires a form of relief, either more urgently in one situation than 
another, or more broadly, a form of relief relevant to them, but wholly inapplicable in 
another situation.  
Accordingly, while internal remedies should preferably be formulated according to 
a step-by-step procedure, as seen for example in section 8(4)-8(7) of the Immigration 
Act, the state must, nevertheless, be cognisant of the fact that certain arms of the 
public administration may require internal remedies closely tailored to their needs, and 
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perhaps more flexible than those of another arm of the public administration. 
Therefore, as is the case with the Immigration Act, the state must formulate remedies 
in accordance with the specific needs of each arm of the public administration. This 
will be necessary to enable the effective functioning of the public administration, and 
the realisation of the vision of administrative justice as contained in section 33 of the 
Constitution. 
6 Section 18 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 
6 1 General 
Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that: “[e]veryone has the right to have 
access to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance.” In line with this provision, South Africa 
established one of the most comprehensive social assistance programs in Southern 
Africa, which “consists of means-tested grants to designated groups, namely persons 
with disabilities, older persons and children.”42 In the 2020 budget speech, the Minister 
of Finance announced that social grants would increase by between 4% and 4.7% 
over the next financial year and projected an additional one million grant recipients by 
2022/23.43 This would mean that 19 million people would be receiving social grants by 
2022/23.44  
With such a large group of grant recipients, the Department of Social Development 
and its associated agencies requires considerable regulation. Thus, a number of 
statutes have been promulgated, including the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 
(“Social Assistance Act”), as amended by the Social Assistance Amendment Act 5 of 
2010.  
For the purposes of this thesis, focus will be specifically on section 18 of the Social 
Assistance Act, an appeals mechanism for those aggrieved by decisions taken under 
the Act. Section 18 provides: 
“(1) If an applicant or a beneficiary disagrees with a decision made by the Agency in respect 
of a matter regulated by this Act, that person or a person acting on his or her behalf may, 
within 90 days of his or her gaining knowledge of that decision, lodge a written application 
to the Agency requesting the Agency to reconsider its decision in the prescribed manner. 
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(1A) If an applicant or a beneficiary disagrees with a reconsidered decision made by the 
Agency in respect of a matter contemplated in subsection (1), that person or a person acting 
on his or her behalf may, within 90 days of his or her gaining knowledge of that decision, 
lodge a written appeal with the Minister against that decision, setting out the reasons why 
the Minister should vary or set aside that decision. 
(2) The Minister may-   
(a) upon receipt of the applicant's or beneficiary's written appeal and the Agency's 
reasons for the decision confirm, vary or set aside that decision; or 
(b) appoint an independent tribunal to consider an appeal contemplated in subsection 
(1A) in the prescribed manner and that tribunal may, after consideration of the matter, 
confirm, vary or set aside that decision. 
(3) If the Minister has appointed an independent tribunal in terms of subsection (2)(b) all 
appeals contemplated in subsection (1A) must be considered by that tribunal.  
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (1A), the independent tribunal may in the prescribed 
manner condone any late application by an applicant or a beneficiary” (emphasis added). 
Section 18 thus provides a mechanism with which one may appeal to, in writing, the 
Agency and thereafter to the Minister, and grants the Minister the power to either 
consider the appeal on his/her own, or to appoint a tribunal to hear the appeal. 
It is further important to note that the Minister has promulgated regulations to give 
effect to the provisions of the Social Assistance Act, although these have proven 
troublesome in the past.45 However, in 2011 regulations were finally promulgated 
which dealt specifically with the lodging of appeals and reconsideration of grant 
awards by both the South African Social Security Agency (“SASSA”), as well as the 
Independent Appeals Tribunal. It is a 41 page document, setting out a step-by-step 
procedure to be followed by all those involved in the reconsideration of grant awards. 
Section 18 of the Social Assistance Act, as considered and applied by the courts, 
will be discussed below. 
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6 2 Cele v South African Social Security Agency and 22 Related Cases 
6 2 1 Facts 
The case of Cele v South African Social Security Agency and 22 Related Cases 
(“Cele”),46 concerns 23 different matters brought either against the Minister of Social 
Development or SASSA, each one on one of three grounds, namely: (a) the applicant 
receiving no formal response to their application for one or other form of social 
assistance grant, (b) failure to put in place arrangements to hear an appeal against a 
refusal to award a disability grant, or (c) failure to provide an applicant, who received 
one or other social assistance grant in the past, with reasons for stopping said grant 
payments.47  
Wallis AJ decided to consider the 23 matters together, delivering a judgment highly 
critical of, firstly, the high number of social assistance related matters currently causing 
congestion of the court roll in the Kwa-Zulu Natal High Court Division,48 secondly, 
failure of these matters to identify the relevant statutory provisions on which reliance 
is placed,49 and thirdly, the legal practitioners who seem to fail to perform their duties 
with the high level of professionalism and attention to detail required by their respective 
clients.50 
In spite of the difficulty the court faced in determining which statutory provisions 
were applicable in the current matter, Wallis AJ briefly commented on the applicability 
of section 18 of the Social Assistance Act, as well as PAJA. These comments will be 
discussed below, as they provide insight for the subsequent case discussion. 
6 2 2 Section 18 as an effective internal remedy 
By the time the court rendered judgment in 2008, no regulations had yet been 
promulgated under the Social Assistance Act which came into force on 1 April 2006. 
The court recognised that the reason grants are now provided by national government, 
was due to the fact that the administration thereof faced significant challenges when it 
was under the control of provincial governments. This prompted the courts and 
national government to intervene, and bring the administration of grants under the 
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control of national government and SASSA.51 However, with no regulations yet in 
force, Wallis AJ held that a failure to promulgate regulations could only be forgiven if 
the social assistance system functioned effectively based solely on the provisions of 
the Act itself.52 Yet, this was not the case. While section 18 of the Social Assistance 
Act provides an internal appeals mechanism, “no independent tribunal has been 
established in terms of s18(2)(b) of the 2004 Act to consider appeals.”53 The court held 
that the lack of regulations meant that administrative problems originally experienced 
at provincial level, was now merely transferred to national level.54 
It is my opinion that this shows that regulations must be put in place to give broader 
effect to the provisions of the Act, enabling those personnel who must administer the 
grant system, and especially the appeals process, to perform their duties with the full 
knowledge of what is expected of them. 
Nevertheless, recognising that section 18 is in place to regulate internal appeals, 
Wallis AJ was at pains to stress that litigation must remain a measure of last resort as 
long as other measures could first be exhausted to resolve the matter.55 The court did, 
however, find it puzzling that in none of the papers before it, was reference ever made 
to the provisions of PAJA. Relying on submissions made by amicis curiae, the court 
held that a failure to provide reasons is specifically dealt with in section 5 of PAJA, and 
that in: 
“administering social assistance grants and providing for an appeal against the refusal of 
such grants, SASSA and the Minster of Social Development are exercising public powers 
and performing public functions in terms of legislation.”56  
Accordingly, PAJA was applicable to the matters before the court, and should inform 
the administration of awarding and refusing social assistance grants, as well as the 
internal appeal mechanisms in place to challenge those decisions. 
Therefore, this case stressed the importance of providing an administrative system 
capable of both functioning effectively, as well as addressing the needs of those 
accessing the system. This point shall be elaborated on below, subsequent to the 
following case discussion. 
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6 3 Minister of Social Development v Mpayipheli 
6 3 1 Facts 
Minister of Social Development v Mpayipheli (“Mpayipheli”),57 concerned an appeal 
to the full bench of the High Court, also concerning section 18 of the Social Assistance 
Act. On 28 August 2014, the respondent submitted an application for a disability grant, 
which was refused.58 The respondent applied for reconsideration under section 18(1) 
of the Social Assistance Act, but SASSA dismissed it on the grounds that the 
application was not lodged within the prescribed 90 day period.59 On 1 June 2015, the 
respondent lodged an appeal with the Minister in terms of section 18(1A).60 On 29 
June 2015, the respondent received a letter requiring his attorneys to furnish the 
department with certain documentation as required under regulation 14(2) of the 2011 
regulations,61 which was duly provided on 15 July 2015.62 Believing the appeal will 
now run its course, the respondent waited for the outcome of the appeal. However, by 
8 October 2015, no decision had yet been received from the department.63 On the 
same day, the attorneys for the respondent enquired as to whether the Minister had 
reached a decision. On 13 October they received an email from Tefu Khomotso, a 
legal administrative officer, informing them that the application for reconsideration was 
lodged outside the 90 day period. Thus, the respondent was advised to reapply for the 
desired social assistance grant, seeing that SASSA’s legislation does not permit 
condonation of late reconsideration applications.64 
The respondent approached the court a quo for judicial review, the legal question 
being whether the Minister had in fact taken a decision on appeal. The court a quo 
held that the Minister had not. The court found in favour of the respondent and ordered 
the Minister to decide the appeal within 30 days.65 With leave of the court, the Minister 
appealed against the “whole of the judgment and order.”66 
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6 3 2 Section 18 as an effective internal remedy 
On appeal, the court pointed out that the Minister can either consider the appeal on 
his/her own, or appoint an independent tribunal to do so. It then considered the 
submissions made by counsel. 
Counsel for the appellants argued that there could be no decision to appeal against, 
as SASSA had taken no decision due to the reconsideration being lodged with SASSA 
outside the 90 day period.67 Counsel further argued that the letter dated 13 October 
2015, written by Tefu Khomotso, was a decision as contemplated in section 18(1A), 
as it cannot be expected of the Minister to write each and every appeal letter herself.68  
The court rejected both of the above-mentioned arguments. Firstly, SASSA had 
clearly recorded a decision regarding the reconsideration, stating in their letter that: 
“we do not award you the grant. Your application for reconsideration was lodged outside 
the prescribed 90 day period […]. If you wish to appeal against the above decision, you 
may appeal to the National Minister of Social Development in writing against such decision 
within ninety (90) days after the date on which you were notified of the decision.”69 
Accordingly, there was a decision to appeal against. Secondly, the letter of 13 October 
2015 does not: 
“purport to have been written on the instructions of the Minister. A functionary, whose power 
the legislation has conferred, must himself/herself exercise the power unless such power 
has been delegated to someone else.”70 
While the Minister does not have to write the letter which informs an applicant of the 
decision herself, she must nevertheless be the one who decides the appeal, and then 
instruct an official to record her decision.71 A departmental official is “not entitled to 
arrogate to himself powers which have not been conferred on him by law.”72 Thus, the 
letter written by Tefu Khomotso cannot be a decision as envisioned in section 18(1A) 
of the Act. 
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The court held that the Minister had failed to fulfil her obligations under the Social 
Assistance Act, and acted unlawfully.73 Further, because Tefu Khomotso was not 
empowered by the Act to decide an appeal, that decision was also unlawful.74 
The court upheld the decision of the court a quo, and dismissed the appeal.75 
6 4 Insight gained from the Social Assistance context 
A number of important principles may be drawn from the case discussion above, 
and which will inform the formulation of the criteria for a uniform system of internal 
controls. 
Firstly, the decision of Cele specifically stated that litigation should always be a 
measure of last resort, as long as other methods exist with which a matter may be 
resolved.76 This implores one to continue to search for alternative methods of dispute 
resolution and the implication is that an alternative to litigation should be found as a 
general approach to resolving administrative disputes. This is critical, seeing that large 
sections of society must still overcome barriers before accessing the court system. 
Secondly, when formulating the criteria and measures which will be necessary to 
implement a system of internal controls, the state must take its lead from both section 
33 of the Constitution, as well as PAJA. PAJA is the principal piece of legislation aimed 
at giving effect to the right to administrative justice.77 This means that a uniform system 
of internal controls will first and foremost be regulated by PAJA and the principles 
included therein. The Constitution must inform the decision-making of the state. 
Thirdly, the Minister of Social Development and the department, dragged their feet 
when it came to the implementation of regulations to give effect to the Social 
Assistance Act. For the period of 1 April 2006 to December 2006, there was general 
confusion, as regulations which appeared to be in force, turned out to have been 
published merely as draft regulations.78 Furthermore, no general regulations were in 
force until August 2008, and no formal set of regulations regulating appeals until 2011. 
This speaks to a larger problem, in that the public administration must often cope with 
a failure on the part of the executive to timeously enact the measures and provide the 
regulations necessary to allow it to function effectively. Thus, should the state proceed 
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to implement a uniform system of internal controls, the above must serve as a warning 
of what could ensue if there is a failure to plan meticulously at the start of that process 
and to ensure that all components of a contemplated administrative decision-making 
regime are put in place to enable the entire system of function effectively, including 
dealing with disputes.  
Fourthly, the 2011 regulations is a 41 page document. This illustrates that internal 
remedies requires a well-formulated and structured set of principles. Meaning, a step-
by-step process must be provided, which members of the public and the administration 
may use to effectively utilise and implement such remedy.79 Thus, more broadly, a 
uniform system of internal controls will similarly require a step-by-step formulation, and 
Mpayipheli clearly illustrates this point. 
Mpayipheli shows that the office-bearers who must implement and exercise powers 
under a uniform system of internal controls, must know exactly what is expected of 
them, as well as the limits of their individual powers. This falls within the principle of 
lawfulness, a general principle of administrative law, and which is listed in section 33 
of the Constitution. The state must be cognisant of the fact that, with the 
implementation of a uniform system, will come the responsibility to consider ahead of 
time, both the chain of command and the rules and principles necessary, to allow 
administrators to best perform their duties under said system. Appropriate delegations 
of authority must be designed and implemented, which also implies that the requisite 
capacity must be available within the decision-making entity to fully implement the 
contemplated system. 
With this in mind, it is necessary to determine whether there are further criteria to 
consider. 
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7 Section 40 of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 
7 1 General 
More than 20 years after democracy, South Africa’s education system continues to 
struggle with both the legacy of Apartheid, as well as the numerous challenges linked 
to transformation, redistribution and a lack of resources. Arendse writes that:  
“[t]he disturbing reality is that the majority of learners who are branded as ‘among the worst 
in the world’ are located at the former black schools in contrast to learners at former white 
schools who are on average outperforming their counterparts at the previously 
disadvantaged schools.”80 
Despite the government’s implementation of laws and policies to ensure that public 
funding is aimed at redressing the disparities that exist between different schools and 
communities, it is a reality that the financing of public schools is still largely reliant on 
school fees.81 The amount of fees charged is determined by the parent community of 
the area serviced by the school and “there is a growing concern that the public funding 
system is reinforcing the existing inequality between former black and white schools.”82 
This argument is supported by the fact “that wealthy schools can sustain their position 
of privilege by charging high school fees which enable them to operate on budgets far 
exceeding those of poor schools which cannot charge similar amounts.”83 
This means that the ability of parents or guardians to pay schools fees, forms an 
important consideration in determining the school to which they will send their children. 
With South Africa’s unemployment rate reaching 30.1% in the first quarter of 2020, 
and more than 50% of South Africans living below the upper-bound poverty line,84 
there are many parents who will have no other option but to place their children in no-
fee schools. For those who might wish to send their children to former Model C 
Schools,85 or fee-paying schools, the payment of fees will become a monthly financial 
concern.  
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Thus, until such time that the school funding system is reconsidered, fees for public 
schools remain in place, and if parents should wish to send their child to a “more 
advantaged” school, higher school fees will be a reality. In this context it may not be 
possible for a parent to pay the fees or a dispute may arise regarding the amount of 
fees payable. In such circumstances, parents and schools will have to turn to section 
40 of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (“SASA”), as well as the Regulations 
relating to the Exemption of Parents from Payment of School Fees in Public Schools 
(“Exemption Regulations”).86 
Section 40 of SASA provides: 
“(1) A parent is liable to pay the school fees determined in terms of section 39 unless or to 
the extent that he or she has been exempted from payment in terms of this Act.  
(2) A parent may appeal to the Head of Department against a decision of a governing body 
regarding the exemption of such parent from payment of school fees. 
(3) In deciding an appeal referred to in subsection (2), the Head of Department must follow 
due process which safeguards the interests of the parent and the governing body” 
(emphasis added). 
Regulation 5 of the Exemption Regulations sets out four categories of possible 
exemptions, whereas regulation 6 provides that a Governing Body has 30 days from 
receipt of the application to make a decision. Furthermore, regulation 8(1) holds that: 
“[a] parent who is dissatisfied with the decision referred to in regulation 6(1) may, in 
writing and within 30 days after receipt of the notification of that decision, appeal to the 
Head of Department” against the decision of the Governing Body. Regulations 8(2)-
8(6) then provide the further steps to be followed when lodging an appeal. 
The effectiveness of section 40 as an internal remedy, in conjunction with the 
Exemption Regulations, will accordingly be discussed. 
7 2 Head, Western Cape Education Department v S 
7 2 1 Facts 
In Head of Department: Western Cape Education Department v S (Women’s Legal 
Centre as Amicus Curiae) (“HoD v S”),87 the court had to determine: 
“whether liability of biological parents for school fees at public fee paying schools, as 
provided for in s 40(1) […], is joint liability, or joint and several liability, and if the latter, 
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whether the consequences are such as to impact disparately, negatively and ultimately 
unlawfully on single parents.”88 
Ms S applied for an exemption under the Exemption Regulations, as the yearly school 
fee in 2011 stood at R13 250, and Ms S’s yearly income stood at R160 284, in addition 
to the R33 540 received, annually, from her former spouse, for child maintenance.89 
When applying for an exemption, a parent must provide the school with the combined 
income of both parents, as required by the formula under regulation 6.90 This, Ms S 
believed was unfair, as it cannot be expected of her to provide the school with the 
financial particulars of her former spouse.91 Accordingly, she argued that the 
regulations fail to make provision for single parents, and that the exemption should be 
capable of being calculated on the basis of joint liability, not joint and several liability.92 
In her view, it amounted to an infringement of “her right, relative to her circumstances, 
to apply as individual for a fee exemption.”93 
7 2 2 Is section 40 an effective internal remedy? 
The court took note of the fact that Ms S’s application had “far reaching implications 
for a large number of parents at fee-paying schools throughout the Western Cape”.94 
In particular:  
“The failure of the education authorities to comply with their obligations to ensure that 
school fees are not an obstacle to access to education, is a matter of considerable public 
interest, which needs to be remedied without delay.”95 
This links back to my earlier point that the economic means and circumstances of the 
majority of South Africans imply that the payment of school fees is a monthly financial 
concern, and measures must be in place to alleviate such concerns where possible. 
While section 40 and the Exemption Regulations purports to be that measure, this 
case exposed flaws within the administration of section 40 as an internal remedy. It 
was the task of the SCA to remedy those flaws. 
Firstly, the court held that on proper interpretation of section 40(1), as read with 
sections 38 and 39, as well as the definition of parent in section 1, the provision must 
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imply joint and several liability for parents for the payment of school fees.96 However, 
this would mean that the Act fails to cater for single parents.  
Secondly, due to the above, the court provided an in-depth discussion of regulation 
1 and 6. In light thereof, the court concluded that it is within the powers of a School 
Governing Body to grant a conditional exemption to parents in the position of Ms S.97  
The court opined that “where the combined gross income of both the parents is the 
denominator, a parent cannot be granted a total or partial exemption where he or she 
is unable to or does not provide the gross annual income of the other parent.”98 
However, regulation 1 provides a conditional exemption for a parent who does not 
qualify for any exemption, but who does supply information indicating his or her 
inability to pay school fees due to personal circumstances beyond his or her control.99 
Such conditional exemptions are granted “with the proviso that the parent agrees to 
conditions for the payment of the school fees.”100 Thus, the court held that a conditional 
exemption may be awarded to parents in the position of Ms S, under which they shall 
be entitled to the total or partial exemption that they would have been entitled to if they 
had been the only parent of the learner concerned.101 
The court concluded that the school and its governing body had subjected Ms S to 
“repeated violations of her constitutional and statutory rights.”102 She was entitled to 
have her fee exemption applications processed in line with the provisions of the Act 
and Exemption Regulations, as interpreted and set out by the SCA. Further, while 
parents under section 40(1) of SASA remain jointly and several liable, it is within the 
powers of a School Governing Body to grant a conditional exemption under regulation 
1 of the Exemption Regulations, in line with the courts’ order. 
7 3 Insight gained from the school fee context 
The discussion of the above-mentioned case allows one to highlight a number of 
points.  
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Firstly, the Exemption Regulations are contained within a 26 page document.103 
This once again supports the afore-mentioned principle under heading 6 4 above, that 
internal remedies must be provided for in a well-formulated and structured document, 
which provides a step-by-step procedure for its implementation and utilisation. It 
cannot be that the only component of an internal remedy which is well-formulated, is 
the main statutory provision which contains the appeal mechanism itself. As illustrated 
by HoD v S (and Mpayipheli in relation to section 18 of the Social Assistance Act), 
reliance will often be placed on the other provisions of the Act or regulations as well, 
and thus the internal remedy as a whole will need to be clearly formulated and set out. 
Along with clarity in the formulation of the actual internal remedy itself, the requisite 
administrative and support mechanisms must also be in place to ensure that the 
internal remedy can be effectively implemented and that aggrieved parties, especially 
those with limited means, can effectively gain access to it. 
Secondly, the case of HoD v S once more supports the argument made in relation 
to section 8 of the Immigration Act, and the Constitutional Court case of Koyabe.104 It 
was emphasised above,105 that the state must recognise that a generally-formulated 
set of internal controls will not necessarily be capable of addressing the needs of the 
public across all sets of prevailing circumstances. As seen in HoD v S (and Koyabe), 
internal remedies should sometimes be capable of assessing whether someone 
requires a form of relief in their circumstances, which might be wholly inapplicable in 
the circumstances of another. Closely-tailored remedies for specific needs might be 
necessary in certain circumstances. It is therefore important that the state consult 
broadly, and plan meticulously, before formulating principles, and implementing a 
uniform system of internal controls. Furthermore, in its implementation, the controls 
must allow for individualised attention to disputes and for the unique circumstances of 
a particular case to be effectively accommodated. 
Lastly, this case illustrates that even if the state does everything it can, and a 
uniform system of internal controls is implemented with the best of intentions, 
situations will arise in the future, where amendment of principles will be required. As 
the legal landscape develops and changes, and as transformation of societal norms 
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occurs, situations will arise where new principles and rules are required, where new 
sets of circumstances will need to be recognised, and where the state will need to 
provide for those prevailing circumstances within its internal controls framework. The 
entire system must thus remain flexible and open for ongoing reforms. 
8 Criteria drawn from the South African context 
In light of the discussion above, it is suggested that a further four criteria exist which 
should inform the decision-making of the state when formulating internal remedies:106 
8 1 A right to reasons 
It is important that a right to reasons should be recognised as part of the internal 
control mechanism. Currently, section 5 of PAJA provides that when an initial decision 
is taken by the public administration, and if it does not furnish the affected party (or 
parties) with reasons of its own accord, it must furnish the relevant party with adequate 
and written reasons, if so requested within 90 days of the decision having been taken. 
However, in each of the provisions considered in this chapter, provision was in fact 
made for the administrator to provide the reasons for their decision to confirm, vary or 
overturn the impugned decision. To require that a right to reasons be given effect to, 
will enable the public administration to create and enforce a culture of justification 
which will assist in the realisation of a public administration which is open, efficient, 
transparent and accountable. 
8 2 Clear and structured formulation 
Internal remedies require a clear and structured formulation. A step-by-step 
procedure should be provided, which provides clarity regarding each step of the 
process. This means that the necessary administrative and support structures must 
be in place, to ensure that all parties involved knows exactly what is expected of them 
at each step of the process.  
8 3 Robust and tailored remedies 
There is a need for the state to be robust in their formulation of internal remedies. 
While one, clearly formulated, internal remedy might be capable of providing 
appropriate relief across the board in one department of the public administration, the 
same could not necessarily be said in relation to another department. Therefore, some 
                                            




areas of the public administration might require more than one form of internal control, 
seeing that different circumstances may require different forms of relief.  
Further, situations might arise in which someone needs to lodge an appeal more 
urgently than in another situation. Internal remedies might need to be tailored to 
specific needs, and even contain limitations as to the parties for which it caters. Thus, 
the state must take care to consult broadly and determine what principles might be 
required in one department of the public administration that might not be correct or 
effective in another.  
8 4 Continued review of internal remedies 
The state will need to continuously review and update internal remedies. The future 
is unpredictable, and as the legal landscape develops and changes, and as 
transformation of societal norms occurs, situations will arise where new principles and 
rules are required, where new sets of circumstances will need to be recognised, and 
where the state will need to provide for those prevailing circumstances within its 
internal controls framework. The implementation of a uniform system of internal 
remedies requires a flexible and open system wherein the state is aware of the 
continued need to update remedies as the need arises. 
Accordingly, there is a direct link between this criterion and the one mentioned 
directly above at heading 8 3. Chapter 4 of this thesis emphasised the dual nature of 
administrative law,107 holding that administrative law aims to both empower the 
administration, but also exercise control over it. Considerable debate exists between 
the so-called red-light theorists (control) and green-light theorists (empowerment) as 
to which one of these components are more important. However, if the state 
formulates robust and closely-tailored remedies (8 3 above), as well as maintain an 
open and flexible system in which internal remedies are continuously updated, then 
one can ensure that the gap between empowerment and control disappears. Internal 
remedies that comply with these criteria, will be able to ensure a viable alternative to 
judicial review, enabling the empowerment and control components of administrative 
law to function simultaneously.  
                                            





This chapter aimed to build on the discussion in chapter 5, in order to provide a 
comprehensive criteria for the implementation of a uniform system of internal 
remedies. Not all members of the public are equal, and there continues to be people 
who are marginalised, and who fail to gain access to the justice system. Therefore, if 
reliance can be placed on internal remedies, it could present an opportunity to provide 
them with access. The criteria identified in this chapter thus constitute an important 
additional layer to a potential internal remedies regime in South African administrative 
law. 
Accordingly, some mechanisms which already exist and which aim to assist the 
disadvantaged, were discussed. These mechanisms aim to provide a more level 
playing field, in line with the vision of Transformative Constitutionalism. However, not 
all internal controls are effective, and they sometimes contain gaps, as illustrated in 
the immigration, social assistance and school fee contexts. 
It is for this reason that each section contained a discussion on possible solutions, 
as well as the lessons drawn from the discussion of case law, to assist the state in 
their formulation of the criteria for effective internal remedies. It is important to see 
where improvements can be made in the future. 
In the following (concluding) chapter, I will summarise the arguments made in this 
thesis, and present my recommendations and final criteria for a uniform system of 
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The enactment of section 7(2)(a) of PAJA overhauled the common law duty to 
exhaust available internal remedies. Firstly, there is now a “positive and unequivoca l 
obligation”1 to exhaust internal remedies, irrespective of the circumstances. Secondly, 
a review court may not review administrative action until internal remedies have been 
exhausted (unless an exemption is granted).2 Lastly, in order for an exemption to be 
granted, the applicant must prove the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying 
why he or she should not be required to first exhaust an available internal remedy.3 
This illustrates that the duty to exhaust any and all available internal remedies is 
strictly enforced. It places renewed pressure on an aggrieved party to first approach 
the public administration, utilising its procedures, before approaching the court. This 
thesis regards this as a positive development, seeing that internal remedies are 
usually more informal than judicial proceedings,4 allowing a more affordable and 
expedient manner of obtaining relief, which “can address a wider range of issues 
regarding administrative action.”5 
Nonetheless, South Africa has no uniform system of internal controls.6 A party 
affected by an administrative action has no right to an internal remedy, nor is there an 
obligation on a particular part of the public administration to have internal remedies in 
place.7 The creation of a “more coherent and uniform system of internal remedies”8 
was considered during PAJA’s drafting process.9 However, this was left to the 
discretion of the Minister of Justice, who was afforded the discretion in terms of PAJA, 
to appoint an advisory council who could advise on “any improvements that might be 
made in respect of internal complaints procedures”.10 To date, no steps to this effect 
have been taken.11 Therefore, whether an aggrieved party will have an internal remedy 
                                            
1 C Plasket “The Exhaustion of Internal Remedies and s7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000” (2002) 119 SALJ 50 52; G Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in G Quinot (ed) 
Administrative justice  in South Africa: an introduction (2016) 95 115. 





7 100.  
8 101. 
9 101. 
10 S10(2)(a)(ii) of PAJA. 




to exhaust depends on the “particular legislative framework in terms of which the 
administrative action”12 was taken. 
The above formed the basis for formulating the two distinct components of which 
this thesis was comprised. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provided the framework for the first 
component, and set out the arguments in support of the implementation of a uniform 
system of internal controls in South African administrative law. Secondly, chapters 5 
and 6 addressed the second component, by setting out the content, requirements and 
scope of an effective internal remedy. 
Below will follow a summary of the main points of each chapter, followed by my 
recommendations for the criteria of a uniform system of internal controls, and possible 
formulations for an internal remedy. 
2 Summary of chapters 
2 1 Chapter 2 
Between 1990 and 2000, South African administrative law experienced a shift 
towards an all-encompassing concept known as administrative justice. This intimated 
that one’s focus could no longer be solely on judicial review. Rather, alternative 
methods for obtaining administrative justice had to be scrutinised.   
The hope was that PAJA, together with section 33 of the Constitution would enable 
this. However, Cora Hoexter opines that PAJA is a lost opportunity, for failing to 
provide an integrated system of administrative law where judicial review is no longer 
the primary mechanism for obtaining administrative justice.13 
Instead PAJA, in light of section 33, has facilitated the clear shift towards a culture 
of justification to foster accountability in the public administration. This means that the 
public administration itself, should realise that it has a duty to justify why it took a 
certain decision or carried out a specific action. It cannot be that the public 
administration only justifies its actions when requested to do so by the public. 
2 2 Chapter 3 
This chapter provided an in depth discussion on judicial review under both the 
common law and PAJA.  
                                            
12 100. 




Focussing specifically on PAJA,14 there are two procedural requirements that must 
be complied with before approaching a court for judicial review. Firstly, section 7(1) 
requires an applicant to launch the application for review within a specified time-
period.15 Secondly, any and all available internal remedies need to be exhausted in 
light of section 7(2)(a), and if they are not, the court must direct the applicant to exhaust 
them in terms of section 7(2)(b), unless an exemption were granted under section 
7(2)(c).  
This means that, contrary to the common law, there is now a strict duty to exhaust 
internal remedies under PAJA. 
However, there seems to be confusion on what is meant by the term “exhaustion”, 
especially where more than one available internal remedy exist. While the courts have 
clearly specified what the term does not mean, the link between the words “all” and 
“exhaustion” remains unclear. Nevertheless, it is my interpretation that what is meant 
by the exhaustion of “any and all” internal remedies, will heavily depend on the context 
of the particular matter in question. 
2 3 Chapter 4  
This chapter set out the rationale behind the creation and implementation of a duty 
on the state to provide a uniform system of internal remedies. The rationale is 
dependent on four main points. Firstly, section 33 of the Constitution, the right to 
administrative justice. Section 33(3)(a) recognises that review does not have to occur 
by means of the courts alone, and section 33(3)(c) simultaneously recognises that the 
public administration must function as efficiently as possible. Chapter 4 argued that 
emphasis on the efficiency of the administration, together with methods other than 
judicial review, is an argument in favour of a system of internal remedies.  
Secondly, the project of Transformative Constitutionalism envisages that the legal 
culture of South Africa must change, which implies that the Constitution itself should 
be central to any and all decisions, whether taken by the judiciary or those serving in 
the executive. A system of internal remedies, together with the right to reasons under 
section 5 of PAJA, will enable the public administration to create and enforce a culture 
of justification, which will assist in the realisation of a public administration which is 
open, efficient, transparent and accountable.  
                                            
14 For a discussion of the common law, see heading 5 in chapter 3. 




Thirdly, poverty and its impact on administrative justice must be considered. South 
Africa’s unemployment figure stood at 30.1% in the first quarter of 2020, and roughly 
55.5% of the population were living below the upper-bound poverty line. This means 
that the majority of South Africans lack the financial means to access justice through 
the court system, while being highly dependent on various public social welfare 
programmes. Further, even if they could gain access to the courts, the time-consuming 
and costly nature of judicial review serves as stumbling blocks. Accordingly, other 
methods for obtaining administrative justice need to be available. 
Lastly, the exhaustion of domestic remedies under international law can be applied 
by analogy to the context of administrative justice. Since the 1960’s, there has been a 
consistent argument in international law, that there should be a recognisable and 
enforceable duty on states to provide domestic remedies which should first be 
exhausted prior to approaching an international forum for relief. However, it is peculiar 
that no similar argument has been made in relation to the exhaustion of internal 
remedies under PAJA at a national (domestic) level. 
2 4 Chapter 5 
Should the arguments in chapter 4 be accepted, then the second component of the 
thesis had to be addressed, namely the content and scope of an effective internal 
remedy. Chapter 5 set out to provide the general criteria for an effective internal 
remedy, by comparing (in the procurement context) section 62 of the Systems Act and 
regulation 49 and 50 of the Supply Chain Management Regulations. This culminated 
in the formulation of five general criteria, which is summarised under heading 3 below. 
2 5 Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 built on the arguments in chapter 5, by shifting the focus away from 
procurement, and focussing specifically on the marginalised sections of South African 
society. Chapter 6 argued that it is not possible to formulate a further set of criteria for 
an effective internal remedy, without considering South Africa’s poverty figures, 
persistent income inequality and the general lack of access to the justice system for 
marginalised sections of society. Accordingly, focus was placed on three diverse 
internal remedies in the immigration, social welfare and school-fee contexts. By 
examining these remedies, a further four criteria were identified,16  which should inform 
                                            




the state’s decision-making when formulating a uniform system of internal remedies 
that are fit-for-purpose in South Africa. 
3 The Criteria for a Uniform System of Internal Controls 
Based on the analyses in the preceding chapters, the following nine criteria can be 
put forward to frame the creation of internal remedies in the South African 
administrative context. 
3 1 A remedy found in law 
An internal remedy is one which is found in law. This has been interpreted to mean 
that it must be found in statute (or statutory regulations).17  
3 2 Internal to the administration 
An internal remedy is internal to the administration concerned. This implies that in 
the utilisation and execution thereof, no one other than the aggrieved party and 
administrative officer concerned, should be involved.18  
3 3 Available, effective and appropriate 
An internal remedy must be available, effective and appropriate for the particular 
grievance. Thus, it must be akin to the relief provided by a court.19 
3 4 Speedy resolution of disputes  
Internal remedies must be capable of providing for the speedy resolution of 
disputes. It cannot be subject to the same time-constraints often seen under judicial 
review.20  
3 5 A final and binding decision 
An internal remedy must be capable of providing a final and binding decision for the 
parties concerned. Accordingly, the authorised administrator who may confirm, vary 
or overturn the impugned decision, must be empowered to the extent that their 
decision is enforceable under the law.21 
                                            
17 See heading 2 3 in chapter 5. 
18 See heading 2 3 in chapter 5. 
19 See heading 2 3 in chapter 5. 
20 See heading 4 5 in chapter 5. 




3 6 A right to reasons 
A right to reasons should be recognised as part of the internal control mechanism. 
Together with section 5 of PAJA which provides for a right to request reasons, this 
thesis argues that to require that a right to reasons be given effect to, will enable the 
public administration to create and enforce a culture of justification which will assist in 
the realisation of a public administration which is open, efficient, transparent and 
accountable.22 
3 7 Clear and structured formulation 
Internal remedies require a clear and structured formulation. There needs to be a 
step-by-step procedure which regulates the entire remedy, and which provides clarity 
regarding each step of the process.23  
3 8 Robust and tailored remedies 
The state should be robust in their formulation of internal remedies. One internal 
remedy might not be capable of providing appropriate relief across the board in one 
department of the public administration. The state must be able to cater for the different 
needs of different departments, and take note of issues such as urgency, time-
constraints, and the possibility of imposing limitations on the use of a particular remedy 
by some members of the public.24   
3 9 Continued review of internal remedies 
Lastly, the entire system must remain flexible and open for ongoing reforms. The 
state must continuously reconsider internal remedies to update them as societal norms 
and needs changes. Mechanisms would possibly have to be amended or updated as 
circumstances arise for which provision was not previously made. The periodic 
assessment of the efficacy of particular internal remedies to achieve their stated aims 
must also form part of the design of the internal remedy regime.25 
                                            
22 See heading 8 1 in chapter 6. 
23 See heading 8 2 in chapter 6. 
24 See heading 8 3 in chapter 6. 




4 Possible constructions to follow when formulating internal remedies  
4 1 General 
In light of the nine criteria for an effective internal remedy, I put forward in the section 
below, some illustrations of what an internal remedy could look like. This will enable 
the state, those in academia, as well as those accessing and relying on regulations, 
to see the practical implementation of the nine criteria. 
4 2 Blank spaces  
Please note that at certain places in the formulations below, blank spaces will 
appear. This is done because internal remedies are context specific. Thus, because I 
am not formulating an internal remedy for a specific arm of the public administration, 
content cannot be provided to that particular blank space.  
Further, the formulations are possible constructions to follow as a point of departure. 
When formulating an actual internal remedy to the stage of completion, its construction 
and content could vastly differ from the formulations provided here. 
Lastly, not all information necessarily have to appear in the internal remedy itself. 
As seen in the discussion of legislation in chapters 5 and 6, some internal remedies 
are supplemented by regulations which further elaborate on the information provided 
in statute. Thus, the formulations below include your basic information. 
4 3 Time-periods 
The formulation of time-periods is extremely difficult. Almost every internal remedy 
studied in this thesis contained a different time-period within which the remedy had to 
be utilised.26 This also included different time-periods under which the administrator in 
question had to reach a decision.  
It is evident, however, that time-periods must be relatively short, otherwise there 
would be no difference between approaching a court (judicial review) and approaching 
the administration (internal remedies). The shortest time-period found is three (3) 
days, and the longest ninety (90) days. The latter time period is already quite long. My 
recommendation is that no internal remedy should really exceed such a time-period.  
                                            
26 S8(1)(a) of the Immigration 13 of 2002 refers to 3 days, while the remainder of the provision speaks 
of 10 days; s18(1) of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 provides a 90-day appeal period (appeal to 
the Minister); s40 of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 provides no time period, while regulation 
6 provides a School Governing Body with 30 days from receipt of the relevant application, to reach a 
decision; s62 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 requires an appeal within 21 days of becoming 




4 4 Examples of possible formulations  
4 4 1 Formulation one 
1(1) A person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by a [SPECIFIC DECISION- 
MAKER], may lodge an appeal with the [NAME OF PERSON MANAGING APPEAL 
PROCESS] within [NUMBER] days of being notified of the decision, by providing 
written notice (with accompanying reasons). 
(2) The [NAME OF PERSON MANAGING APPEAL PROCESS] must within [NUMBER] days 
of receiving the notice, acknowledge receipt thereof and refer the matter to the 
[NAME OF APPEAL AUTHORITY] for consideration. 
(3) The [NAME OF APPEAL AUTHORITY] must within [NUMBER] days of receiving notice 
of the appeal, confirm, vary or revoke the impugned decision. 
(4) The decision of the [NAME OF APPEAL AUTHORITY] must be accompanied by 
reasons. 
4 4 2 Formulation two 
1(1) An applicant who disagrees with a decision made by the [SPECIFIC DECISION-
MAKER], may within [NUMBER] days of becoming aware of the decision, lodge a 
written appeal with the [SPECIFIC DECISION-MAKER] requesting him/her to 
reconsider the decision. 
(2) The [SPECIFIC DECISION-MAKER] may upon receiving the written appeal –  
(a) confirm, vary or revoke the appealed decision; or 
(b) appoint a [NAME OF APPEAL AUTHORITY] to consider the appeal, and that 
[NAME OF APPEAL AUTHORITY ] may, after consideration of the appeal, 
confirm, vary or revoke the appealed decision. 
(3)  The decision contemplated in sub-section 2(a) and (b) must be accompanied by 
reasons for the decision. 
4 4 3 Formulation three  
1(1) A person who is dissatisfied with a decision taken by the [SPECIFIC DECISION-
MAKER], may within [NUMBER] days of being notified of the decision, lodge an 
application for reconsideration with the [SPECIFIC DECISION-MAKER]. 
(2) The application for reconsideration must be accompanied by –  
(a) reasons for the appeal; and 




(3) The [SPECIFIC DECISION-MAKER] must within [NUMBER] days of receiving the 
application, confirm, vary or set-aside the decision, and provide reasons for their 
decision. 
(4) A person dissatisfied with the decision contemplated in sub-section (3), may appeal 
against that decision by lodging an application for reconsideration with the [NAME 
OF APPEAL AUTHORITY]. 
(5) The [NAME OF APPEAL AUTHORITY] must within [NUMBER] days of receiving the 
application contemplated in sub-section (4), confirm, vary or set-aside the appealed 
decision, and provide reasons for their decision. 
5 Final remarks   
If one translates the term Batho Pele, it means: putting people first. By placing focus 
on the public administration, its accessibility and transparency, as well as on those 
living in poverty and within the marginalised sections of society, this thesis sought to 
do just that. By arguing that the realisation of a uniform system of internal controls 
could greatly assist in providing access to the justice system, it aimed to put those less 
fortunate at the centre of its argument. In order for the vision of Transformative 
Constitutionalism to be realised, all members of the public should be able to access 
both the justice system, as well as the public administration and succeed in getting 
both a response and solution to their problems. 
A system of internal remedies will ensure the realisation of both objectives of 
administrative law, namely empowerment and control. Currently, section 7(2) of PAJA 
only provides for the control component, but not empowerment. Internal remedies can 
bridge the divide between these two components, ensuring that control is exercised 
over the public administration, but also enable the public administration to correct its 
own mistakes without recourse to the courts. Internal remedies are the key to linking 
justice to administration in the South African context where large parts of society are 
highly dependent on administrative decision-making in their daily lives, but unable to 
access the judicial system.  
A uniform system of internal remedies will ensure that the public administration 
functions efficiently, but in an open and transparent manner. Those lacking access to 
justice, will gain it, and ensure the further realisation of the principles contained in 
section 33 and 195 of the Constitution, the vision of Transformative Constitutionalism, 
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